Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III - Performance

Programme in a nutshell

Concrete examples of achievements (*)

^{(*) Key achievements in the table state which period they relate to. Many come from the implementation of the predecessor programmes under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework. This is expected and is due to the multiannual life cycle of EU programmes and the projects they finance, where results often follow only after completion of the programmes.}

Budget for 2021-2027

^{(*) Excluding MFA loans provisioning.}

Rationale and design of the programme

The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is the means by which the EU has been supporting reforms in the enlargement region with financial and technical assistance since 2007.

Budget

Budget programming (million EUR):

^{(*) Excluding MFA loans provisioning.
(**) Only Article 15(3) of the financial regulation.}

  Financial programming:
  + EUR 604.3 million (+ 4%)
  compared to the legal basis*

^{* Top-ups pursuant to Article 5 of the multiannual financial framework regulation are excluded from financial programming in this comparison. Financial programming excludes MFA loans provisioning.}

Since the beginning of the current multiannual financial framework, IPA III has been reinforced by EUR 631 million for the support to the refugees and host communities in Türkiye, out of which EUR 71 million and EUR 106 million came from the Heading 6 margin in 2022 and in 2023, respectively, while EUR 454 million came from the special instruments in 2023. On the other hand, EUR 67.6 million was transferred from IPA III to the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve, to DG European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) (for the crisis in Afghanistan)⁽¹⁾, to DG International Partnerships (for technical assistance facilities) and to the European External Action Service (for staff expenditure in delegations).

^{(1) Compensated with the use of assigned revenue originating from recoveries originating from the instrument for pre-accession assistance for rural development.}

Budget performance – implementation

Multiannual cumulative implementation rate at the end of 2022 (million EUR) (*):

^{(*) Excluding MFA loans provisioning.}

Annual voted budget implementation (million EUR)⁽¹⁾:

^{(1) Voted appropriations (C1) only. Excluding MFA loans provisioning.}

Contribution to horizontal priorities

Green budgeting

Contribution to green budgeting priorities (million EUR):

Climate mainstreaming.

• It is estimated that IPA III measures will contribute EUR 4 billion to climate mainstreaming in 2021-2027, and that IPA III contributed EUR 555 million in 2022 (subject to quality review).
• IPA III contributes to mainstreaming climate action in the EU’s policies and to achieving an overall target of 30% of EU budget expenditure supporting climate objectives. Measures under IPA III are expected to contribute 18% of the overall financial envelope of the programme to climate objectives, with the objective of increasing this percentage to 20% by 2027.
• Estimates reflect the reporting methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee for the Rio markers on climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. The budget of interventions contributing to climate change is weighted at 100% if mitigation or adaptation is the ‘principal objective’ of the measure and 40% if it is a ‘significant objective’.
• The partial results for 2021-2022 suggests that IPA III is in the early stages of implementation, while the evolution of this marker is on track. The quality review of 2022 data will be performed during 2023. The Commission is committed to stepping up its efforts to achieve the climate target by the end of the multiannual financial framework.
• In 2022, three measures with climate adaptation or mitigation as a principal objective were adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (environment and climate change, along with sustainable urban and reliable transport) and the annual action plan in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU for environment and climate change).
• IPA III supports the beneficiaries in their efforts to align themselves with the climate change and energy package and in the implementation of the external dimension of the European Green Deal. In particular, the measures support the implementation of several priorities of the economic and investment plan for the western Balkans (clean energy, environment, transport) and the green agenda for the western Balkans, especially under thematic window 3 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity) of the IPA III programming framework. A great deal of the support in the area of clean energy and smart transport is channelled to the beneficiaries via the Western Balkans Investment Framework, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and the Green for Growth Fund. In Türkiye, the establishment of the Turkey Investment Platform in 2022 will ensure that the country can take advantage of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and that investment is channelled to support the implementation of the Turkish Green Deal.

Biodiversity mainstreaming.

• It is estimated that IPA III measures will contribute EUR 586 million to biodiversity mainstreaming in the 2021-2027 period, and that they contributed EUR 67.9 million in 2022 (subject to quality review).
• Estimates reflect the reporting methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee for the Rio marker on biodiversity. The budget of interventions contributing to climate change is weighted at 100% if biodiversity is the ‘principal objective’ of the measure and 40% if it is a ‘significant objective’.
• The partial results for 2021-2022 suggest that IPA III is in the early stages of implementation, while the evolution of this marker is on track. The quality review of 2022 data will be performed during 2023. The Commission is committed to stepping up its efforts to achieve the biodiversity target by the end of the multiannual financial framework.
• Moreover, under the IPARD III programmes, the beneficiaries are supported with agri-environment-climate operations aimed at improving the status of biodiversity, extensively managed ecosystems and genetic resources that are at risk of being lost.
• In 2022, one initiative with biodiversity as a principal objective was adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (environment and climate change).
• Biodiversity, ecosystem protection and ecosystem restoration are key pillars of the green agenda for the western Balkans. The thematic window ‘Green agenda and sustainable connectivity’ will be the primary entry point for supporting action in the area of ecosystems and biodiversity. However, measures under other thematic windows of the IPA III programming framework, such as the ‘Competitiveness and inclusive growth’ window, including the agriculture and rural development priority, will also contribute to biodiversity protection and the management of natural resources, in line with the goals of the European Green Deal. The EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 requires that all EU neighbourhood countries be on board, particularly those aspiring to EU membership. Biodiversity and ecosystem conservation and restoration enjoy high-level political support in the western Balkans and Türkiye. In those countries, which are biodiversity hotspots, specific support is provided to further align legislation with the EU’s acquis, notably the EU birds and habitats directive, and to prepare for the designation of Natura 2000 sites. Technical assistance is targeted at, among other things, supporting the management of protected areas and forestry management. Considerable progress has been made in terms of acquis alignment, but challenges remain in ensuring its effective implementation, for instance with respect to illegal logging and the use of environmental impact assessments.

Gender

Contribution to gender equality (million EUR) (*):

<sup>(*) Based on the applied gender contribution methodology, the following scores are attributed at the most granular level of intervention possible:
- 2: interventions the principal objective of which is to improve gender equality;
- 1: interventions that have gender equality as an important and deliberate objective but not as the main reason for the intervention;
- 0: non-targeted interventions (interventions that are expected to have no significant bearing on gender equality);
- 0*: score to be assigned to interventions with a likely but not yet clear positive impact on gender equality.</sup>

In 2021, the IPA III contribution to gender mainstreaming was EUR 42.8 million through measures with gender equality as a principal objective (2) and EUR 498.4 million as a significant objective (1).

In 2022, the initially estimated IPA III contribution to gender mainstreaming was EUR 11 million through measures with gender equality as a principal objective (2) and EUR 865.6 million as a significant objective (1). Moreover, on top of the figures presented in the table above, IPA III contributed EUR 350.5 million through measures, financed from carried-over appropriations and recoveries, with gender equality as a significant objective.

The attribution of the above scores is also in line with the gender equality policy marker and methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee. This is also aligned with the 2021-2025 EU gender action plan III for external relations, adopted in November 2020.

The Commission is committed to implementing the new gender action plan and promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in international forums and agendas. 2021 was the first year of implementation of this action plan. The assessment of the plan’s performance against its indicators will be a feature of the midterm review, which is currently underway and is expected to be finalised by the end of 2023.

In 2022, one initiative with gender equality as a principal objective was adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of North Macedonia (EU for improved health, social protection and gender equality).

This measure is focused on promoting gender equality and mainstreaming by:

• developing services to prevent and protect against gender-based violence;
• improving the state response to the country’s most significant health threats, in particular in the field of maternal and neonatal healthcare (improving the prevention and control of oncological diseases by developing a national cancer control strategy and an implementation and quality control plan for national population-based screening programmes for breast, cervical and colorectal cancer);
• improving social services.

Digital

Contribution to digital transition (million EUR):

• The Commission committed EUR 306.4 million in 2021 and EUR 385 million in 2022 as the IPA III contribution to the digital transition.
• Digitalisation is an indicator of the global Europe results framework level 3 (indicator 3.2), and reported as such in the annual report on EU external action. The marker has been operational since late 2020, therefore the commitments and payments for 2021 correspond to a complete year. The marker exists for the whole of heading 6 of the budget, including IPA III.
• The budget of interventions contributing to digital transformation is weighted at 100% if measures are marked as a ‘principal objective’ or 40% if they are marked as ‘significant objective’. No quality review has yet been performed. In order for an action to be considered to relate to digitalisation, the following general considerations must be taken into account.
  • An analysis of the digitalisation context must be conducted to inform future steps and facilitate the identification of the measure’s digital component.
  • After the analysis, the existence of a digitalisation-situation specific objective or result should be identified. It is important to make sure that this objective is backed by at least one indicator from the sector indicator guidance on digitalisation.
  • It should be kept in mind that the data and indicators found in the action document should be disaggregated by sex, age, socioeconomic status and region, where appropriate and applicable.
• In 2021 and 2022, the Commission concentrated its main efforts on reducing data roaming prices within the western Balkans and the EU. In this context, the following two main milestones were achieved: (1) the voluntary gradual reduction of roaming charges between the EU and the western Balkans as of 1 October 2023, as agreed at the last EU–Western Balkans Summit in December; and (2) the removal of data roaming within the western Balkans since July 2021. In 2022, the Commission approved two digital infrastructure projects with a value of EUR 45 million in IPA funding within the Western Balkans Investment Framework. This concerns the roll-out of rural broadband in Serbia and the establishment of smart labs in the Albanian education system.
• In addition, concerning the western Balkans, the Commission is preparing an IPA regional digital programme for adoption in 2024 (EU4Digital). This programme will accelerate the digital transition for the whole region, focusing on four main strands: (1) secure and sustainable digital and telecom infrastructure across the region; (2) enhancing the interoperability of public services; (3) digitalising businesses; and (4) developing digital skills.
• In 2022, five measures with digital transformation as principal objective were adopted:
  • the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (employment, education, social policies and health action);
  • the annual action plan in favour of North Macedonia (EU for improved border and migration management, EU for modern public administration, EU for improved health, social protection and gender equality);
  • the annual action plan in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU4 public administration reform increased administrative capacity, EU4 public finance management).
• Digitalisation and the digital transition are an important part of the common regional market action plan, which aims to create a regional digital area focusing on roaming, digital skills, the digital economy, the recognition of electronic signatures and other forms of electronic identification, and the protection of data. This was the most important part of IPA III’s digital contribution in 2021 and 2022. Digital has also been recognised as an enabler and has been integrated as a component in measures across different sectors.

Budget performance – outcomes

• There is a smooth transition from IPA II to IPA III, because the key objectives and priorities remain the same, and IPA III programmes are building on the results of IPA II programmes. Also, the instrument has become more strategic, with only one multiannual programming document: the IPA III programming framework. IPA III has a strong performance focus, as support is focused on those measures that are in line with the EU’s key strategic priorities and that are mature both technically and in terms of institutional capacity. In parallel, IPA III will ensure fair sharing so that no IPA III beneficiary is left behind. Furthermore, the simultaneous annual programming of all IPA III beneficiaries and multi-country measures ensures stronger synergies between national and multi-country measures. Finally, the introduction of the IPA III result framework streamlines the indicators to be used for IPA III measures.
• Following the adoption of the legal framework in the second part of 2021 and the conclusion of the framework agreements with IPA III beneficiaries in 2022, full implementation started in 2022. Most contracted measures are therefore at a very early stage of implementation, and it is too early to show any results on an aggregate level. However, the results achieved with IPA II so far and the state of play with accession negotiations may indicate the expected direction of IPA III performance.
• Regarding the key performance indicator on political criteria in the western Balkans, some results have been achieved to pave the way for IPA III implementation, such as the good progress in Albania in implementing its comprehensive justice reform, progress in Kosovo^(*) in the fight against corruption and progress in North Macedonia on justice, freedom and security. However, the impact of IPA III support will depend on the genuine political commitment of IPA III beneficiaries to rule-of-law reforms.
• Regarding the key performance indicator on the readiness of western Balkans beneficiaries to enact public administration reform, most such beneficiaries have achieved some results at the start of IPA III, and they are moderately prepared, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the early stages of public administration reform and Kosovo has some level of preparation. This poses a specific challenge for the key performance indicator target, because the success of the remaining reforms to be supported under IPA III is increasingly dependent on strong political commitment to reforms.
• Regarding the key performance indicators on political criteria and readiness for public administration reform in Türkiye, there has been backsliding compared to the baseline. Therefore, the June 2018 Council conclusions stating that Türkiye continues to move further away from the European Union, and that Türkiye’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, still hold true, and were reaffirmed in December 2022. IPA III support in these areas is likely to be affected because, despite the provision of substantial support to civil society, no substantial IPA III support for the areas of rule of law and public administration reform is planned without a clear political commitment to reforms. Rather, the focus of EU support to Türkiye is expected to be on those areas where Türkiye remains a key partner for the EU.
• With regard to the key performance indicator on economic criteria in the western Balkans, none of the western Balkan partners can be considered a fully functioning market economy, and the level of compliance varies. One of the main priorities under IPA III is to support the implementation of the economic and investment plan, which aims at closer integration and bridging the socioeconomic gap between the western Balkans and the EU, assisting the region’s post-COVID-19 recovery and bringing it closer to the EU single market. Besides support provided through bilateral envelopes, the economic and investment plan is supported in particular through the Western Balkans Investment Framework⁽¹⁾. Substantial support is also provided through a multi-country programme, ‘EU contribution to sustainable transport connectivity in the western Balkans’.
• Linked to the key performance indicator on economic criteria in the western Balkans, IPA III addresses the challenges of human development and integration in the labour market by improving the transition from school to work and by activating young people with the youth guarantee. The EU expects that the youth guarantee, which is flagship 10 of the economic and investment plan for the western Balkans, will bring about positive performance results. Budget support, technical assistance and sectoral operational programmes are being deployed to support overall labour market participation, alongside the Commission’s support to improve the business environment in the region. IPA III support is also provided to employment programmes, in particular for young people and women in Türkiye, to improve labour market participation rates. IPA III also supports cooperation and mobility opportunities in higher education, training, youth and sport. For example, under Erasmus+, around 9 500 students and staff have already benefited from international credit mobility. A total of 17 projects in higher education institutions in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have received funding for Jean Monnet actions, and Serbia and North Macedonia have participated in all strands of the Erasmus+ programme on an equal footing with EU Member States.
• Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has confirmed the importance of IPA III’s focus on the economic and investment plan, which aims to bridge the socioeconomic gap between the region and the EU and to help the green and digital transitions in the region. There has been no need to amend adopted programmes as the result of the war, but rather to accelerate the implementation of measures promoting energy diversification, renewable energy sources, gas and electricity interconnections, climate action, circular economy, sustainable transport networks and sustainable food systems. There has therefore possibly been a more positive impact on the key performance indicator on economic criteria.
• While IPA III has demonstrated adaptability and has responded well to emerging crises,  the ongoing crises may affect the overall performance of IPA III. The 2023 programming exercise for the western Balkans was put on hold. Also, the funding planned for key enlargement priorities (EUR 500 million) had to be refocused to address the immediate impact of the war in Ukraine, to cushion against increases in energy prices and their impact on vulnerable households and small and medium-sized enterprises. Similarly, the 6 February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria are affecting the 2023 programming exercise, as part of the refugee assistance planned for 2023 will be mobilised to help refugees and host communities in the stricken area, rather than throughout Türkiye.
• To support territorial cohesion and cross-border cooperation, nine cross-border cooperation programmes between IPA III beneficiaries for the 2021-2027 period were adopted in 2022. These programmes aim to continue helping to rebuild connections and cooperation in the region and to support the western Balkans flagship initiative of ‘Supporting reconciliation and good neighbourly relations’. Similarly, all 15 Interreg programmes for 2021-2027 involving IPA III beneficiaries and Member States were adopted in 2022, marking a new phase of EU territorial cooperation. These programmes will incentivise candidate countries to implement reforms in various areas, strengthen regional cooperation and build up their capacities in relation to future EU membership, in particular in the field of cohesion policy.

^{(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(1) The Western Balkans Investment Framework is the main financial vehicle for the implementation of the economic and investment plan in the region. Established in 2009 by the European Commission in partnership with financial institutions, the Western Balkans Investment Framework is governed by a Strategic and Operational Board chaired by the Commission, the members of which include the 27 Member States and Norway.}

MFF 2014-2020 – Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) II

Prepared in partnership with the beneficiaries, IPA II set a new framework for providing pre-accession assistance for the 2014-2020 period.

IPA is a unique programme that supports IPA beneficiaries in their ambitious political and economic reforms and in their progressive alignment with the European Union's rules, standards, policies and practices on their path towards EU membership. It fosters reforms in candidate and potential candidate countries through a combination of financial assistance and policy dialogue, preparing them for the rights and obligations that come with EU membership.

Budget

Cumulative implementation rate at the end of 2022 (million EUR):

Performance assessment

• Candidate countries and potential candidates in the western Balkans and Türkiye need to implement difficult and time-consuming structural reforms to make progress in the fundamental areas of the political criteria, to achieve sustainable and far-reaching political and societal transformation. For enlargement to become a reality, a firm commitment, including sustained political will, to the principle of ‘fundamentals first’, remains particularly essential.
• The programme is making progress towards achieving its overall objectives despite the large influence of external factors. The Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has left a heavy impact on the western Balkans, including on food and energy security, hindering the economic rebound following the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Regarding the reforms related to the political criteria, IPA has continued to support rule of law and public administration reforms both through multi-country and bilateral measures. One key example of good progress supported by IPA is the justice reform. On the other hand, Türkiye is experiencing very serious reform reversals regarding the functioning of the judiciary and freedom of expression. Türkiye’s continued backsliding in areas linked to political criteria, combined with a low absorption capacity, led to a significant cut in pre-accession support following the 2017 Council decision.
• Candidate countries and potential candidates from the western Balkans made limited progress towards meeting the economic criteria, not least due to the impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, according to the 2022 enlargement reports. Türkiye, on the other hand, is considered to be well advanced in the area of the functioning market economy although there have been increasingly serious problems and it has reached a ‘good level’ as far as the ability to face competitive pressure is concerned.
• With respect to the alignment with the EU acquis, while Türkiye experienced some reversal, the western Balkans partners have generally improved their preparations. One of the key tools supported via IPA is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument, used in 2022 intensively by Montenegro, followed by Albania and Kosovo. This tool allows to share EU best practices and support the alignment of legislation in all sectors of the acquis.
• The countries are making progress in aligning with EU standards in the agri-food sector via their respective rural development programmes. Progressively upgrading towards these standards is both a political and economic priority.
• In terms of fostering greater regional integration within the western Balkans, IPA has focused its support on civil society and the cultural and creative sectors as key drivers of reconciliation and regional cooperation. In 2022, 21 new projects were signed to support regional cooperation between civil society organisations and rule of law, good governance and anti-corruption, human rights, green transition, good neighbourly relations, and media freedom. The regional technical assistance for civil society organisations programme organised more than 40 trainings, consultations and people-to-people events for more than 1 600 participants in 2022. In November 2022, in the margins of the Berlin process Summit, western Balkans leaders signed three regional agreements on freedom of movement with identity cards, on recognition of higher education qualifications, and on recognition of professional qualifications for doctors of medicine, dentists and architects. The EU contributed to this achievement by supporting regional negotiations and meetings as part of its EUR 12.5 million IPA II action grant, implemented by the Regional Cooperation Council.
• These 2014-2020 Interreg IPA programmes are important because they can address issues that need both a territorial approach and a coordination between all policies and funding instruments so that all go in the same direction. Whilst transnational programmes focus more on ‘soft’ projects (e.g. studies, etc.), the cross-border ones emphasize rather on ‘concrete’ projects. This can for instance be illustrated through the management of extreme coastal high-water events, which require a wide scope at sea level for which the transnational approach is the most suitable; and then complemented by concrete investments in border regions (e.g. through for instance the #3WATCHOUT project funded by the Italy–Albania–Montenegro cross-border cooperation programme providing early warnings about the flooding risk). To be noted that none of the 12 programmes (10 cross-border programmes and 2 transnational programmes) suffered a decommitment from 2022, and consequently no additional measures are planned beyond the normal close monitoring by the European Commission via regular contacts with the Managing Authorities and the Joint Technical Secretariats and usual attendance at the monitoring committees.

Contribution to the sustainable development goals