

WOMEN IN THE LABOUR MARKET

1. INTRODUCTION

This factsheet focuses on increasing women's participation in the labour market and decreasing pay and earnings gaps. In all EU countries, women's labour participation is lower than men's. Women in employment tend to work fewer hours, work in lower-paying sectors, and occupy lower-ranking positions than resulting in considerable gender pay and earnings gaps. These differences are to extent due to deep-rooted traditional gender roles, but also due to economic incentives.

Increasing women's participation in the labour-force and raising their employment rate are paramount to meeting the Europe 2020 headline target for 75% of the population aged 20-64 to be employed by 2020. These can provide a boost to economic growth¹ and mitigate the social and public finance risks related to population ageing. Continuous efforts are also needed to tackle gender gaps and move towards a dual model where both men and woman can be earners and carers.

The EU has been promoting greater gender equality in the labour market through a mix of legislation, policy guidance and financial support.

This factsheet is structured as follows.

Section 2 reviews the performance in EU countries with regard to female labour participation and the gender pay and earnings gaps.

Section 3 discusses the available evidence on potential policies to effectively address the challenges of low female participation and their specific conditions, and reviews the approach on this taken at the EU level.

Section 4 sketches good policy practice to increase female labour participation and reduce gender inequalities among EU countries.

This factsheet focuses on participation of women in the labour market. For a more information on the gender pension gap, please refer to the factsheet on *Adequacy* and *Sustainability of Pensions*.

2. CHALLENGES: AN OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN EU COUNTRIES

2.1. A significant employment gap between women and men

2.1.1. Women experience lower employment rates and higher levels of part-time employment


In all Member States, employment rates of women are lower than those for men, with big variations across the EU. The Social Scoreboard headline indicator for gender equality in the labour market is the gender employment gap,

¹ GDP per capita losses attributable to gender gaps in the labour market have been estimated at up to 10% in Europe (Cuberes and Teignier-Baqué, 2016).

which reached 11.5 pps for the EU- 28^2 in 2016 with a 76.8% employment rate for men and 65.3% for women (Figure x and Table 1 in the Annex). This is despite the fact that women are increasingly well


qualified and even out-performing men in educational attainment. In 2016, 44% of women (aged 30-34) had tertiary education or higher, compared to 34% of men.

Figure 1 — Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 and percentage of part-time workers by gender (F/M) in 2016



Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note: Share of part-time workers over the total working population in each gender group. Countries ordered by increasing values of female employment rate.

Figure 2 — Gaps between male and female full-time equivalent employment rates (FTER) and employment rate (ER) in 2016



Source: Eurostat, LFS and European Commission, own calculations. Note: data refer to women and men aged 20-64. Note that full-time equivalents are calculated with regard to the working time of a full-time full-year employee.

² The countries covered by data in this factsheet are the EU-28, unless otherwise specified.

A few Member States have female employment rate of 60% or below, with high differences between female and male employment rates (Greece, Malta, Croatia, Spain and Romania, see Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 1 in the Annex). Most of these Member States also face demographic ageing prospects³ and have strong potential for increasing labour supply by bringing more women into the workforce. Malta, Italy, Greece, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg also suffer from a large gap between male and female employment rates, with Malta having the largest (27.6 pps, or even 32.6 pps if considering full-time equivalent rates). In addition, the employment rate is also strikingly low for older women (age 55-64) in some cases⁴.

The gender gap in part-time work remains high. As it is most often women who carry the bulk of caring responsibilities, they tend to reduce their working hours. One third (31.4%) of women in employment in the EU worked on a part-time basis in 2016, a much higher proportion than the corresponding share for men (8.2%). This results in a gender gap in full-time equivalent rates of 18 pps in the EU (see Figure 2 and Table 1 in the Annex). The gap is particularly high in the Netherlands (where more than 75% of employed women work part-time) and Malta, but also in Italy, Germany, the UK, Greece and Austria (see Figure 1). On average across the EU, men spend more than 6 hours a week more in paid work than women (Table 1 in the Annex).

Particular attention needs to be given to the labour market participation of vulnerable categories of women, such as older women, single parents, women with a disability, women with a migrant background and women from ethnic minorities.

2.1.2. The unbalanced sharing of caring responsibilities between women and men

More than 50% of the potential female workforce (aged 25-49) in 2016 is inactive because women are looking after children or incapacitated adults in Cyprus, Ireland, Spain, Estonia, Malta, and the UK (see Figure 7 in the Annex).

The **impact of parenthood is reflected** by the employment rate of women with children under the age of 6. The employment rate for women in the EU in this category is on average more than 8 pps lower than the employment rate of childless women (see Figure 3). In Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the gap is over 30 pps, while in Estonia, Germany, the UK and Finland it is above 15 pps. The gender gap in part-time work is also more acute for parents, with 38.9% of mothers working part-time as compared to 5.8% of fathers.

Similarly, the low employment rate of older women (aged 54-64) may reflect the fact that women are more likely than men to assume care responsibilities for elderly or dependent family members with long-term care needs and are thus far more likely to reduce their working hours or exit employment altogether.

³ According to demographic projections, the population of working age is projected to decline in a majority of Member States, and especially in Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Croatia and Hungary (see European Commission (2015), Ageing report) http://ec.europa.eu/economy/finance/publications/european economy/2015/pdf/ee3 en.pdf.

As shown in Figure 6 in Annex, it is below 35% in Malta, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Luxembourg.

Figure 3 — Employment impact of parenthood in 2015

Source: Eurostat, LFS (Ifsi_emp_a) and European Commission, own calculations. Note: data refer to women and men aged 20-49.

2.1.3. Economic disincentives for women to work

Women may also face economic disincentives to labour-force participation. The design of the tax and benefit systems can affect both the decision to participate in the labour market and the number of hours worked. Such disincentives to work can be particularly high for second earners. Available evidence indicates that there is a significant negative impact from an increase in the relative marginal effective tax rate for second earners on female labour-force participation⁵. The contribution of labour taxation to the inactivity trap⁶ is highest in Belgium, Germany and Denmark. The low-wage trap⁷ is highest in

Belgium, Germany and Austria (see Table 2 in the Annex).

In addition, high out-of-pocket costs for childcare and long-term care services can result in women with caring responsibilities having an even greater financial disincentive to work. This is particularly the case in Ireland, Poland and the Netherlands, where the childcare-related costs represent more than 20% of net family income for a couple with median earnings (see Figure 11 in the Annex). The situation is even worse for low-income families.

Finally, high gender pay gaps between women and men may further detract from women's financial incentive to work. **The gender pay gap remains high in Europe (16.3% in 2015 in the EU)** and is particularly high in Estonia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, the UK and Slovakia (see Figure 5 and Table 3 in the Annex)⁸. It reflects the difference between

Thévenon (2013), Christiansen et al. (2016).

⁶ The inactivity trap is the implicit tax on returning to work for inactive persons. It measures the part of additional gross wage that is taxed away if an inactive person takes up a job.

The low-wage trap is the rate at which taxes are increased and benefits withdrawn as earnings rise due to an increase in work productivity. The tax burden on second-earners is considered very high if: (1) the contribution from labour taxation to the inactivity trap is

very high AND/OR (2) the low-wage trap is very high.

⁸ This is the 'unadjusted gender pay gap', as it does not take into account all of the factors that impact the gender pay gap, such as differences in education, labour market experience, hours worked, type of job, etc.

men's and women's pay, based on the average difference in gross hourly earnings of all employees. The gender pay gap is a secondary gender equality indicator in the Social Scoreboard.

The various potential drivers of the gender pay gap differ in size and impact⁹. These include observable factors such as differences in work experience due to the low employment level of women described above. They also include imbalances in the type of job (vertical segregation) or the sector of employment (horizontal segregation). For the EU, such imbalances as a whole are relatively high, reaching 24.3% for occupational and 18.9% for sectoral imbalances¹⁰. Other factors

as discrimination may also widen the gender pay gap. Moreover, the high prevalence of part-time work among female workers also contributes to the gap, as part-time-work is associated with significant lower hourly wages in most countries.

High gender pay gaps contribute later on to **high pension gaps for women** in several Member States due to lower pension contributions (see Figure 4). This is especially the case in Romania, Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria (Figure 4). This contributes to putting women at higher risk of poverty or social exclusion in old age¹¹.




Figure 4 — Gender gap in pensions; pensioners aged 65-79 in 2015

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2015 data, except IE (2014). The figure for the EU-28 is an estimate.

⁹ Boll, C., Leppin, J., Rossen, A., Wolf, A. (2016), 'Magnitude and impact factors of the gender pay gap in EU countries', Report prepared for the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender-pay gap/2016 factors gpg en.pdf.

¹⁰ Eurostat (2015). Gender imbalances in occupations/sectors are calculated as the average national share of employment for women and men applied to each occupation/sector; differences are added up to produce the total amount of gender imbalance, expressed as a proportion of total employment (ISCO classification/NACE classification).

Further analysis of the drivers of the pension gap can be found in the European Semester thematic factsheet on pensions.

3. POLICY LEVERS TO ADDRESS WOMEN'S UNDERREPRESENTATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET

There are a number of policy levers that are intended to tackle the challenges of women's low participation in the labour market. These include work-life balance policies such as well-designed, gender-balanced family-related leaves, flexible working arrangements and formal care services, as well as policies to limit the economic disincentives for women to work.

3.1. Work-life balance policies to address the unbalanced sharing of caring responsibilities

3.1.1. Gender-balanced family-related leaves

The provision of compensated familyrelated leave tends to boost female labour-force participation by:

- helping women to reconcile work and family life;
- allowing them some time off when they have a young child to care for;
- strengthening their attachment to the labour market.

Evidence also shows that effective protections against dismissal for pregnant workers or workers returning from leave can have an important role in keeping women in the labour market. On the other hand, excessively long leaves have been shown to have a harmful effect on women's careers, making it more difficult for them to re-enter employment¹².

A balanced use of leave entitlements between women and men after childbirth has also been shown to have positive effects on the distribution of household and care responsibilities and on female labour market outcomes. The use of leave arrangements by fathers reduces some of the burden of care on mothers,

The duration of what constitutes excessively long leave is subject to some academic debate. The OECD has cautioned against leaves longer than 2 years because of skill deterioration and long career interruptions which make it more difficult for them to re-enter employment.

OECD (2012) Closing the gender gap.

and thus enables women to return to the labour market sooner. However, fathers' take-up of paternity and parental leave is generally very low and when fathers do take leave, the periods of leave are usually very short. The level of the benefit and the degree of flexibility (i.e. whether or not a leave can be taken on a piecemeal or part-time basis) can help to improve fathers' take-up of leaves. Reserving leave periods for fathers (paternity leave and non-transferable parental leave) can also increase the take-up of leave by men.

Adequate leave to take care of other dependent relatives can also have a positive impact on female employment. Where there is no provision for carers' leave, it is generally women who will work part-time or drop out of the labour market to take care of their relative for a short period of time.

3.1.2. Flexible working arrangements

Insufficient availability of **flexible working arrangements** — such as telework and flexitime — and of reduced working **hours** (part-time work) can lead people with caring responsibilities, particularly women, to exit the labour market. Eurofound has reported that more than half of inactive mothers would prefer to part-time¹³. Key drivers work effectiveness are the presence of consensus among the social partners that flexibility is valuable, a workplace culture supportive of flexible working, responsiveness to changing needs over the course of one's life.

However, the availability of part-time work can lead to gender wage gaps and in the longer run reinforce the gender pension gap. This is because women often take on part-time work due to their higher share of caring responsibilities¹⁴. Ensuring both

¹³ Eurofound (2014), Third European Quality of Life Survey — Quality of life in Europe: Families in the economic crisis.

¹⁴ Just under one third (31.4%) of women aged 15-64 who were employed in the EU-28 worked on a part-time basis in 2016, a much higher proportion than the corresponding share for men (8.2%).


the quality of flexible work and a genderbalanced take-up of these arrangements is key to ensuring gender equality.

3.1.3. Accessible, affordable and quality formal care services

Formal care services are important tools to remove obstacles to employment. The headline indicator of the Social Scoreboard for early childhood care is the enrolment of children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare. In 2015, only 31% of children under 3 were enrolled in formal childcare, which is below the

Barcelona target of 33%. In five Member States even less than 10% of children under 3 were enrolled (see Figure x). Low attendance rates may reflect possible shortfalls in the provision of formal childcare services, especially for children up to 3 years of age. In addition to a lack of available places, difficulties in access (distance, opening hours, strict eligibility criteria), the high out-of-pocket cost of these services and poor quality have all been shown to be obstacles to the use of these services.

Figure 5 — Share of children cared for by formal arrangements as a percentage, out of the total number of children in the respective age group, 2015



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.

Demographic ageing leads to a rise in demand for **long-term care services**, one that is expected to continue in the future. However, these services remain underdeveloped in many Member States. The lack of adequate long-term care arrangements negatively affects the labour market participation of informal carers, a disproportionate share of whom are women.

3.2. Policy levers to address economic disincentives for women to work

3.2.1. Adjusting tax-benefit systems to reduce financial disincentives for second earners

A key feature of the tax-benefit system affecting the work incentives for second earners is the degree of jointness of taxation and eligibility for benefits, transferable tax credits and dependent spouse allowances. In most EU countries, the unit of taxation is the individual. However, in some countries couples are taxed jointly (e.g. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal) or couples may opt for joint taxation (e.g. Spain). Shifting from joint taxation systems to individual taxation systems can help reduce disincentives (in particularly in countries with high progressivity taxation). Eliminating transferable tax credits between partners can also help to reduce work disincentives for the lower earner, as well as eliminating dependent spouse allowances.

3.2.2. Tackling the gender pay gap

Part-time work and career breaks for care responsibilities have a negative impact on women's hourly wages and on their career prospects¹⁵. The policy levers mentioned in Section 3.1 can also have a positive impact on addressing the gender pay and pension gaps.

Strengthening public awareness of antidiscrimination laws, promoting pay transparency and improving enforcement

 15 OECD (2012), Close the gender gap: act now.

of equal pay provisions also contribute to reducing wage inequalities¹⁶.

Initiatives to tackle gender imbalances in education, training and in the labour market¹⁷ can help women access higherwage professions and sectors. Policies to improve students' awareness of fast-growing industries and high-paying jobs may reduce gender stereotypes in the choice of field of study at university and increase female representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Raising awareness among men about some of the top growth occupations that are predominantly occupied by women can also help¹⁸.

4. CROSS EXAMINATION OF POLICY STATE OF PLAY

Many Member States have been undertaking reforms to enhance work-life balance policies and increase the labour-force participation of women.

To increase the provision of childcare, most Member States have committed to **providing a childcare place for all children**, either by establishing a legal entitlement to these services or by making attendance compulsory for at least the last pre-primary year (three countries, namely Italy, Lithuania and Slovakia, have not yet introduced either of these measures). Nevertheless, in many Member States gaps¹⁹ remain between the end (maximum

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender pay gap/c 2014 1405
en.pdf
Texamples include laight death and the

¹⁷ Examples include 'girls' days' and 'boys' days' in companies, wider initiatives attracting women into ICT and science, and general awareness-raising measures such as equal pay days.

¹⁸ See the European Vacancy Monitor, which shows that primary school and early childhood teachers and personal care workers in health services are among the top growth occupations.

¹⁹ These gaps can be identified in national legislation. However, in practice there may not be significant problems with childcare availability during these 'gap months', even if availability is not guaranteed by law. It is therefore important to analyse the childcare gap together with data on childcare use.

duration) of adequately paid leave (maternity or parental) and the start of childcare entitlement or compulsory school age. Currently only six Member States (Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia and Slovenia) do not have such a gap²⁰.

In many Member States, reforms are currently ongoing to significantly **expand childcare.** For instance, in April 2014 Malta introduced a free childcare scheme for children under the age of 3 to incentivise more parents, particularly mothers, to return or to remain in work. This reform has contributed to a significant increase in the number of children enrolled in childcare centres²¹. In 2017 Member States have also introduced measures to services children for disadvantaged communities (Hungary) and for job-seekers' children (France). Austria has announced investments to increase the number and availability of places in all-day schools, and to improve the quality of their services²².

Some Member States have launched reforms to encourage a more equal family-related sharing of leave entitlements between women and men. In 2016 Luxembourg adopted a reform of its parental leave system to make it more flexible and better compensated. In 2017, the Czech Republic and Cyprus both introduced entitlements to paternity leave and Portugal extended the period of leave. In 2016/2017, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Italy introduced measures

facilitate more flexibility in the organisation of work.

Some Member States have introduced targeted measures to encourage women to re-enter the labour market while their child is still very young. For instance in 2017 Bulgaria adopted a measure to provide some childcare benefit to mothers with children under 1 year old who return to employment. Similarly, in Romania such benefits have increased in 2017 (the incentive is granted up to when the child is 3, if the parents start working at least 60 days before the child turns 2 years old). Other Member States have developed schemes targeted at women who have already taken lengthy career This is the case of the breaks. 'Returnships' scheme in the UK, launched in 2017. Likewise, Luxembourg passed a law to strengthen the principle of equal pay for women and men, and supported awareness-raising campaigns and other actions to eliminate barriers to female employment.

Date: 8.11.2017

²⁰ Although in some cases, despite the introduction of legislation to address this, availability can still be an issue (this is the case for Estonia for children under 3 years of age). ²¹ According to the national data, between April and December 2014, the number of children attending childcare increased from 1 800 to 2 917. Peer Review on 'Making work pay for mothers', 18-19 May 2015, Malta.


²² Childcare policies, particularly high quality early education, have a greater positive impact on children from disadvantaged backgrounds such as migrants or low-income households, and can in particular improve the school readiness of disadvantaged children. — Cascio (2015), Dustmann et al. (2012).

5. REFERENCES

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
ANNEX

Figure 6 — Employment rate by gender, 55-64 years old, 2016 (% of women and men aged 55-64)




Source: Eurostat, LFS (Ifsi_emp_a)

Figure 7 — Inactivity due to looking after children or incapacitated adults or other family and personal responsibilities, 2008-2016 (women aged 20-64)




Source: Eurostat, LFS, (Ifsa_igar)

Figure 8 — Percentage of inactive women aged 25-49 and 55-64 inactive in 2016 on the grounds that they are looking after children or incapacitated adults



Note: no data for women aged 55-64 for Denmark, Romania, Sweden, Lithuania and Latvia Source: Eurostat, LFS, (Ifsa_igar)


Figure 9 — Percentage of women aged 20-64 years old working part-time in 2016 on the grounds that they are looking after children or incapacitated adults




Source: Eurostat, LFS, (Ifsa_igar)

Figure 11 — Components of net childcare costs, 2015







Panel B: Couple with low earnings



Panel C: Lone mother with median earnings



Panel D: Couple with median earnings



The low (median) earnings level is the 20th (50th) percentile of the gender-specific full-time earnings distribution. Two earners are assumed for couples, male and female. In all cases, the family has two children (aged 2 and 3) is using full-time centre-based childcare. All costs and benefits are shown as a percentage of net family income before deducting any childcare expenses.

Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models.

Table 1 — Employment rate, employment rate in full-time equivalents and average number of usual weekly hours of men and women, 2016

	Employment rate (20-64 years old)		Full-time equivalent employment rate (20-64 years old)		Average number of usual weekly hours for all employees in the main job		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	
BE	63.0	72.3	53.3	70.1	32.8	40.3	
BG	64.0	71.3	63.0	71.1	39.8	40.5	
CZ	68.6	84.6	66.4	84.7	37.1	40.8	
DK	74.0	80.7	65.1	76.4	30.8	36.0	
DE	74.5	82.8	58.1	79.2	30.4	39.3	
EE	72.6	80.8	69.6	79.7	36.5	39.4	
IE	64.2	76.5	54.9	73.2	30.8	39.3	
EL	46.8	65.8	43.8	63.9	38.0	42.9	
ES	58.1	69.6	51.6	68.1	33.9	39.5	
FR	66.3	73.8	58.5	70.9	32.9	38.6	
HR	56.6	66.2	54.9	65.1	37.5	39.1	
IT	51.6	71.7	44.4	69.3	32.2	39.4	
CY	64.1	73.9	59.1	69.6	36.2	39.4	
LV	71.8	74.7	70.1	74.2	37.5	39.3	
LT	74.3	76.2	72.7	75.5	37.2	39.2	
LU	65.1	76.1	57.1	74.8	33.6	40.6	
HU	64.6	78.6	62.9	78.0	37.8	39.7	
MT	55.5	83.1	49.9	82.5	33.9	40.3	
NL	71.6	82.6	48.9	76.1	26.0	36.7	
AT	70.9	78.7	55.8	75.6	30.5	39.0	
PL	62.2	76.4	60.5	76.8	37.7	41.4	
PT	67.4	74.2	63.9	72.6	36.4	39.3	
RO	57.4	75.0	55.9	73.7	38.0	39.4	
SI	66.7	73.3	63.2	72.2	37.0	39.8	
SK	62.7	76.9	60.5	75.5	37.4	39.8	
FI	71.7	75.0	67.4	72.6	33.5	37.9	
SE	79.2	83.0	71.8	80.7	33.1	37.5	
UK	72.1	83.1	58.9	79.3	31.0	39.7	
EU	65.3	76.8	56.2	74.4	33.0	39.4	
EA19	64.3	75.5	54.3	72.7	32.2	39.2	

Source: Eurostat, LFS, European Commission

Table 2 — Gender-specific labour market situation and tax burden on second earners

	Inactivity	/ trap (2015)	Low wage	Employment	
	Trap 67% AW	Contribution of taxation	Trap 33%- 67% AW	Contribution of taxation	rate female (2016)
BE	48.5	48.5	59.9	59.9	63.0
BG	35.7	21.6	50.2	21.6	64.0
CZ	31.1	31.1	27.6	27.6	68.6
DK	45.2	40.1	40.1	40.1	74.0
DE	46.0	46.0	48.0	48.0	74.5
EE	22.9	22.9	22.9	22.9	72.6
IE	28.2	23.7	34.5	34.5	64.2
EL	8.4	26.0	17.8	33.0	46.8
ES	22.5	22.5	21.4	21.4	58.1
FR	31.6	30.6	44.3	38.8	66.3
HR	33.2	25.7	28.1	28.1	56.6
IT	31.0	26.3	40.8	40.2	51.6
LV	35.0	35.0	31.1	31.1	71.8
LT	26.7	20.4	27.0	27.0	74.3
LU	33.9	33.9	42.0	42.0	65.1
HU	34.5	34.5	34.5	34.5	64.6
MT	17.6	17.6	15.9	15.9	55.5
NL	19.7	26.0	35.3	39.1	71.6
AT	31.4	31.4	44.2	44.2	70.9
PL	30.1	29.5	30.3	30.3	62.2
PT	29.7	23.4	42.8	31.2	67.4
RO	36.5	27.7	32.7	32.7	57.4
SI	58.4	31.9	48.1	35.2	66.7
SK	8.7	29.9	-9.9	33.1	62.7
FI	24.0	29.7	36.1	34.3	71.7
SE	22.2	29.8	28.7	35.4	79.2
UK	20.1	20.1	32.0	32.0	72.1

Source: Commission, OECD. AW stands for average wage. Notes: Employment rate for age group 20-64 years. Inactivity trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 100% of average wage, second earner with 67%; low-wage trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 100% of average wage, second earner moving from 33% to 67% of average wage. Contribution of taxation refers to the contribution to the respective trap in percentage points (other contributors are, e.g. withdrawn benefits, social assistance and housing benefits). No recent data are available for Cyprus.

Table 3 — Gender pay gap

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Difference between 2015 and
	10.1	10.2	0.4	0.2	7.5	6.6	6.5	2009
BE	10.1	10.2	9.4	8.3	7.5	6.6	6.5	-3.6
BG	13.3	13.0	13.2	15.1	14.1	14.2	15.4	2.1
CZ	25.9	21.6	22.6	22.5	22.3	22.5	22.5	-3.4
DK	16.8	15.9	16.4	16.8	16.5	16.0	15.1	-1.7
DE	22.6	22.3	22.4	22.7	22.1	22.3	22	-0.6
EE	26.6	27.7	27.3	29.9	29.8	28.1	26.9	0.3
IE	12.6	13.9	12.7	12.2	12.9	13.9		!
EL		15.0						
ES	16.7	16.2	17.6	18.7	17.8	14.9	14.9	-1.8
FR	15.2	15.6	15.7	15.6	15.5	15.5	15.8	0.6
HR	:	5.7	3.4	2.9	9.0	10.4		
IT	5.5	5.3	5.7	6.5	7.0	6.1	5.5	0.0
CY	17.8	16.8	16.1	15.6	14.9	14.2	14.0	-3.8
LV	13.1	15.5	14.1	14.9	16.0	17.3	17.0	3.9
LT	15.3	14.6	11.5	11.9	12.2	13.3	14.2	-1.1
LU	9.2	8.7	7.9	7.0	6.2	5.4	5.5	-3.7
HU	17.1	17.6	18.0	20.1	18.4	15.1	14.0	-3.1
MT	7.7	7.2	7.7	9.5	9.7	10.6		
NL	18.5	17.8	18.6	17.6	16.5	16.1	16.1	-2.4
AT	24.3	24.0	23.5	22.9	22.3	22.2	21.7	-2.6
PL	8.0	4.5	5.5	6.4	7.1	7.7	7.7	-0.3
PT	10.0	12.8	12.9	15.0	13.3	14.9	17.8	7.8
RO	7.4	8.8	9.6	6.9	4.9	4.5	5.8	-1.6
SI	-0.9	0.9	3.3	4.5	6.3	7.0	8.1	9.0
SK	21.9	19.6	20.1	20.8	18.8	19.7	19.6	-2.3
FI	20.8	20.3	19.1	19.2	18.8	18.4	17.3	-3.5
SE	15.7	15.4	15.6	15.5	14.6	13.8	14.0	-1.7
UK	20.6	19.5	19.7	21.2	20.5	20.9	20.8	0.2
EU			16.4	16.9	17.3	16.8	16.7	
EA19			17.0	17.3	17.6	17.1	16.9	

Source: Eurostat; unadjusted; industry, construction and services (except public administration, defence, compulsory social security). Note: The figures show the difference between men's and women's average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings — for paid employees, unadjusted for personal or job characteristics.