

# **Analytic Report**

Participatory Citizenship in the European Union  
Institute of Education

---

Bryony Hoskins, David Kerr, Hermann J. Abs, Jan Germen Janmaat, Jo

Morrison, Rebecca Ridley, Juliet Sizmur

Report 2

European Commission, Europe for Citizens Programme

Submitted 10<sup>th</sup> May 2012

## Commissioned by the European Commission, Europe for Citizens Programme, Brussels

Tender No. EACEA/2010/02

### Contact information

Name: Bryony Hoskins  
Address: Southampton Education School, University of Southampton, UK  
Email: [B.Hoskins@soton.ac.uk](mailto:B.Hoskins@soton.ac.uk)

Name: David Kerr  
Address: Citizenship Foundation, London, UK  
Email: [David.Kerr@citizenshipfoundation.org.uk](mailto:David.Kerr@citizenshipfoundation.org.uk)

Name: Hermann J. Abs  
Address: University of Giessen, Germany  
Email: [Hermann.J.Abs@erziehung.uni-giessen.de](mailto:Hermann.J.Abs@erziehung.uni-giessen.de)

Name: Jan Germen Janmaat  
Address: Institute of Education, London, UK  
Email: [g.janmaat@ioe.ac.uk](mailto:g.janmaat@ioe.ac.uk)

Name: Jo Morrison  
Address: NFER, Slough, UK  
Email: [j.morrison@nfer.ac.uk](mailto:j.morrison@nfer.ac.uk)

Name: Rebecca Ridley  
Address: Southampton Education School, University of Southampton, UK  
Email: [rmr1e11@soton.ac.uk](mailto:rmr1e11@soton.ac.uk)

Name: Juliet Sizmur  
Address: NFER, Slough, UK  
Email: [j.sizmur@nfer.ac.uk](mailto:j.sizmur@nfer.ac.uk)

### Acknowledgments

We would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this report, in particular those who collected data from European countries. A complete list of contributors is in Appendix E.

All the reports for this study are available on the Europe for Citizens website:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/studies/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/studies/index_en.htm)

Electronic copies may be obtained from Dr Bryony Hoskins (B.Hoskins@soton.ac.uk), to whom any queries relating to the copyright of this series should be addressed.  
Analytic Report: Participatory Citizenship in Europe

ISBN 9780854329380

## **Organisation of Participatory Citizenship in Europe study**

This study was commissioned by the European Commission, **Europe for Citizens Programme**. It was led by the Institute of Education, University of London

**Project leader, Bryony Hoskins, School of Education, University of Southampton**  
**Co-leader, David Kerr, Citizenship Foundation, London**

The consortium partners:

**Denmark: Aarhus University, Department of Education**  
Hans Dorf

**France: European Institute for Education and Social Policy (EIESP)**  
Jean Gordon  
Antoine Bevort  
Alain Michel

**Germany: Institute for School Pedagogy and Citizenship Education, University of Giessen**  
Hermann J. Abs  
Tilman Kammler

**Italy: Roma Tre University**  
Bruno Losito  
Paola Mirti

**Slovenia: Faculty of Education, University of Ljubljana**  
Janez Krek  
Mateja Peršak

**Netherlands: University of Humanistic Studies, Utrecht**  
Wiel Veugelers

**UK: Institute of Education, University of London**  
Germ J. Janmaat  
Christine Han  
Andy Green  
Yvette Ankrah

**National Foundation of Education Research**  
Juliet Sizmur  
Jo Morrison

**Southampton Education School, University of Southampton.**  
Rebecca Ridley

## Contents

Acknowledgments .....	2
Executive Summary .....	5
Introduction .....	5
Chapter 1. Policy overview .....	12
Chapter 2. Rates and trends of participation.....	23
Chapter 3. Drivers of participatory citizenship.....	36
Chapter 4. Barriers and key challenges.....	44
Chapter 5. Relationship between Participatory Citizenship at different levels .....	55
Chapter 6. Relationship between different forms of participation .....	61
Chapter 7. Towards identifying models of citizenship in policy and engagement .....	68
Chapter 8. Conclusions from the analytical investigation.....	74
Appendix A. Introduction – European perspective interviews.....	79
Appendix B: Chapter 2 – Rates and trends of participation.....	80
1.Voting: National elections.....	81
2.Civil Society and Volunteering: Participation in unpaid work in environment, conservation and animal rights organisations .....	83
Civil Society and Volunteering: Participation in unpaid work for trade unions or youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union .....	85
Protest: Participation in peaceful protests .....	87
Protest: Signing a petition/collecting signatures .....	89
Ethnic tolerance: Migrant groups have the same chances to jobs.....	91
Gender equality: Men and women have equal chances to jobs.....	93
Appendix C: Chapter 6 – Relationship between different forms of participation .....	95
Appendix D: Chapter 7 – Towards identifying models of citizenship in policy and engagement .....	96
Appendix E: Contributors to the country fiches and good practices .....	98

## Executive Summary

This report provides a detailed investigation of participatory forms of citizenship across the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) covering policy, practice and engagement.

Our findings show that across the EU **the economic crisis has led to an increasing focus on internal politics rather than a broader European perspective. Policies in all areas have focused almost entirely on economic competitiveness.** Policies regarding Participatory Citizenship have yet to be placed at the forefront of policy solutions to the economic crises and those policies which have emerged are situated in terms of the economic benefits. **The consequence of the economic crises on the field of Participatory Citizenship has been cuts to funding.** The effects have been felt at all levels, challenging the sustainability of policies and practices that have previously supported the participation and engagement of citizens in decision making.

**The effects of the economic crises on citizens can already be seen in terms of a loss of faith in political institutions with a dramatic reduction in trust in national and European institutions in particular in Spain, Ireland and Greece.** Citizens across European countries are continuing to believe in the democratic process but consider that the current political leaders are not working for them. We could speculate that this lack of trust may well have implications for voter turnout in the European elections in 2014 if the issues of trust are not addressed.

The findings of this study show that **Participatory Citizenship, economic competitiveness and social cohesion are interrelated factors that may well mutually reinforce each other.** Thus countries that have the characteristics of being highly competitive tend also to be highly participatory with high levels of social cohesion, for example, the Nordic countries. We can posit from this evidence that **focusing only on the short term economic imperative may miss the broader and long-term perspective. Strategies that include innovative participatory and social cohesive elements that move beyond job related skills could prove a useful balance, particularly for young people in periods of high youth unemployment.**

### Effective learning strategies

The findings consistently point towards the fact that **situated forms of learning of citizenship tend to be the most effective in facilitating all dimensions of participatory forms of citizenship.** Situated learning means that the learning takes place in an environment relevant to the content. In a school this means that learning citizenship is effective when situated in a real life civic context, such as influencing decisions that have real consequences for and influence on the lives of students and the how the school is run.

One situated form of learning is volunteering. The findings show that volunteering can increase the likelihood of voting. As expected, the relationship is stronger if the volunteering is politically orientated. Further research is needed on how to facilitate the political learning and political aspirations of volunteers.

In addition, the **evidence suggests that there are links between different levels of participation**, for example if you vote at a local and national level you are more likely to vote at European level.

**In the report we propose a European strategy to support democracy during the continued economic crisis and beyond.**

**The role of the European Commission (EC) in this strategy is as a leader on promoting and raising awareness of the importance of Participatory Citizenship.**

The second major role of the European Commission is the **continuation of funding of participatory projects** across the sectors involved, including the new 2014–20 Europe for Citizens Programme, and the youth and education programmes within the 2014–20 programme ‘Erasmus for All’.

The third major role of the European Commission is to **fund, stimulate and share research and evaluation on developments in innovative and effective types of citizenship practice**, with the purpose of informing policy and practice.

Specific policy recommendations may be made in terms of short, medium and long-term solutions.

### **Short/medium term policies**

#### ***2013 European Year of Citizens***

The year should be **led by citizens at national and local level and be focused on a ‘Year of Listening to EU Citizens’ and/or raising ‘Questions about European Participatory Citizenship’**. This would help the EU to get more in tune with changing needs at local and national level and to use that learning to adapt their policies, practices and rhetoric.

#### ***2014-2020 The Europe for Citizens Programme***

The programme should be oriented towards providing **sustainable support for civil society organisations, focused on funding what is known to be effective and targeted on needs and innovative practice**. The ‘valorisation’ dimension of this programme should focus on developing, enhancing and sharing the evidence base of innovative and effective practice.

### **Longer term policies**

The European Commission can take a lead on **using innovative Participatory Citizenship practices as a policy tool to combat long-term challenges** such as those identified in the EU 2020 strategy e.g. economic growth and competitiveness, climate change, globalisation and migration. **If European institutions can be reconstructed to be part of a democratic, caring and listening solution that involves citizens in co-constructing the policy agenda, one could posit that this would enhance a sense of belonging and regain trust in Europe and its institutions.**

## Introduction

The aim of this report is to provide a picture of the state of play of policies and practices concerning participatory forms of citizenship in Europe as well as the trends and rates of actual engagement. It will present an analysis of the current policies and practices to facilitate Participatory Citizenship across the 27 European Union (EU) member states. In addition, it will offer an assessment of current rates and trends of participation for adults and young people across Europe over the last 10 years. It will also highlight the main drivers of Participatory Citizenship and the barriers and challenges that are currently being faced by policy and practice, with a particular focus on the impact of the economic recession.

The focus of the report will be to bring evidence together for consideration by the European Commission (EC) to help underpin and support developments in the planning and conduct of the new Europe for Citizens Programme 2014–2020, the 2013 European Year of Citizens, the 2014 European elections and the Europe Union 2020 strategy more broadly. In this context the report will attempt to provide answers to the following questions set by the European Commission (EC) for this study:

- What is the relationship between local, national, regional and European forms of Participatory Citizenship?
- What are the most effective drivers and approaches to fostering participatory forms of citizenship at the different levels?
- How is it possible to overcome the barriers towards European Participatory Citizenship at various levels taking into account the quantity and diversity of European citizens?
- How does Participatory Citizenship contribute to achieving the EU 2020 goals in the social and economic sphere?
- What is the nature of the relationship between individual and collective action?
- What is the nature of the relationship between Participatory Citizenship and education, lifelong learning and intercultural competence?
- What is the relationship between EU citizenship rights and Participatory Citizenship?


The report is the second deliverable from the EU study on Participatory Citizenship in Europe. The first deliverable was a **contextual report** that highlighted the limitation of the concept of citizenship as a purely legalistic phenomenon (Hoskins et al. 2011). It demonstrated that having legal rights is insufficient to enable equal possibilities for all citizens to activate their rights. Participatory forms of citizenship require the capability to exercise rights. It also highlighted that the legal definition of citizenship focuses on the relationship between the state and the individual, and ignores the relationship between citizens and the associations they form, as well as the importance of associative life in the balance of democracy. In this regard, citizens need to participate in civic and political life in order to ensure the accountability of the state, and the legitimisation of democracy.

In the contextual report we defined **Participatory Citizenship** as:

***Participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterised by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy.***

Thus the definition includes participation in the broad sense of the word, encompassing traditional political engagement to new and often less formal civil society actions as well as protest activities that maintain accountability of national governments, European institutions and international corporations. The definition indicates that engagement is preferably informed and underpinned by some knowledge of the political, economic, social and cultural situation. The limitations regarding actions that can be classified as Participatory Citizenship are the values encompassed by the actions, for participation *per se* is not always supportive of democracy and human rights but can actually be harmful. Consider, for example, the impact of actions by far-right groups and individuals against minorities and migrants. In our

definition, the values of democracy and human rights are considered a necessity with regards to engagement. This conceptual understanding of value base engagement builds from the CRELL research project on Active Citizenship which defined active citizenship in a similar way (Hoskins 2006) and produced a composite measure combining these different aspects of active citizenship in order to identify levels of engagement (Hoskins and Mascherini 2009). The results of the first composite measure showed a two speed Europe with adults engaging in much higher levels in north west Europe compared to south east Europe (Hoskins and Mascherini 2009). This report will investigate if this remains the situation through an examination of recent data and trends on Participatory Citizenship.



Results from the Active Citizenship Composite Indicator from ESS data 2002  
(Green equals high levels of engagement, red equals low levels of engagement and white refers to regions where no data was collected)

The definition of Participatory Citizenship was described within the contextual report to encompass the different traditions of citizenship within Europe. The contextual report highlighted **three major citizenship traditions**: the **liberal model** (with a focus on community and volunteering at the local level), the **civic republican model** (centred on voting and political engagement at the national level and common values) and the **critical model** (looking to produce critical and engaged citizens based on the values of social justice). This report will be a first chance to examine and see which countries in Europe favour the different models in terms of policies, practices and people's attitudes and behaviour regarding Participatory Citizenship.

The contextual report concluded that there should be greater consideration given to providing a clearer conceptual framework underpinning the European dimension of Active Citizenship, and how this relates to the terms of Participatory Citizenship in terms of theory, policy and practice. In this report we will provide a first step towards providing an explanation as to how this can be achieved in practice.



## Methods

The analysis for this report is based on two types of data; **qualitative data** that we have collected on current policies and practice from each of the 27 member states in the form of country fiches and through interviews with key experts and cross-European networks, and **quantitative data** from existing European and international studies, including the recent IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) and European Social Survey (ESS). For this report we have conducted fresh analysis on this quantitative data. The mixed methods approach is challenging to combine, synthesise and report. Both the quantitative and qualitative datasets have their strengths and weaknesses for, while the statistical data provides more rigorous findings that can be tested, it lags behind in terms of the time frame compared with the more recent qualitative data gathered for the policy analysis. Thus, the effects of the economic crises can be seen more clearly in current policy chapters based on the qualitative analysis than on the levels and trends data on attitudes and behaviour. However, the levels and trends provide a helpful background in gauging the extent to which the current economic crises form merely a blip in Participatory Citizenship or mark a watershed in terms of policies and behaviours in this area.

### Information on up-to-date policy and practice

As part of this study, in 2011 we collected fresh information on policy and practice from the 27 member states of the European Union in the form of a **country fiche**. These were either guided by or written by experts in these countries (the list of contributors is in Appendix E). The material gathered was on the following topics: contextual information on democratic traditions, concepts and definition of Participatory Citizenship, current policy emphasis and funding opportunities, educational practices and evaluation of impact and finally current and future policy challenges. Between thirty and ninety pages of information and data were collected on these topics and compiled in a country fiche for each country.

In addition, and in order to gain the perspective from those working at a European level, interviews were conducted with people working in European networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Europe for Citizens contact points (the list of the interviewees is in Appendix A).

### **Quantitative Analysis**

The fresh analysis of existing quantitative data on people's attitudes and behaviours comes from the following **European and international studies**:

#### ***International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS)***

Data was collected for this study from over 140,000 Grade 8 students (pupils approximately 14 years of age, although some were above and below this age), 62,000 teachers and 5,300 school principals from 38 countries (<http://iccs.acer.edu.au/>). Twenty-four European countries took part in the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) comprising 75,000 Grade 8 students from those European countries. The international component of the study comprised a cognitive test for students measuring civic and citizenship knowledge, analysis and reasoning, and an attitudinal questionnaire measuring civic attitudes, identities, dispositions and behaviours. In addition there were linked regional instruments for Europe, Latin America and Asia that attempted to measure civic and citizenship issues pertinent to that region. The European regional instruments were made up of a cognitive test which measured the extent of students' knowledge and understanding about the European Union (EU) and its policies and procedures. There was also an attitudinal questionnaire that measured civic attitudes, identities, dispositions and behaviours to issues such as European identity, intercultural understanding, the movement of peoples in Europe and the future of the EU. The data in Europe was collected in 2009.

### ***World Values Survey: Developments in values and citizenship***

The World Values Survey measures all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics, and from economic to social life. Since 1981, five studies have been carried out. Between 2005 and 2008, the latest survey was implemented in 54 countries among 77,000 respondents ([www.valuessurvey.org](http://www.valuessurvey.org)). Most European Union countries have participated in at least the last two rounds of this study. The study is on adults and is a household survey.

### ***European Social Survey (ESS)***

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a bi-annual survey to chart changes in social values and civic behaviour throughout the adult population in Europe that began in 2002 ([www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)). The aim is to measure changes in public attitudes and behaviour patterns over time and across nations. The 2010 data was available for some European countries at the time of completing our analysis.

### ***Eurobarometer: Public opinion on social, cultural and political issues***

The Eurobarometer is a set of survey studies that answers questions about social, cultural and political issues in Europe ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion)). It published reports on the findings from the data such as the Spring 2011 report on Public Opinion in the European Union. Data from this year was used where possible.

## **Guide to the report**

The report is divided into **eight chapters**. It begins with two chapters to set the scene and map out the current policies and engagement levels concerning Participatory Citizenship in Europe, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data sources.

**Chapter 1** begins with an **overview from the information and data in the country fiches** of the existing state of policies on civic engagement across Europe at various levels (local, national, regional and European). It explores up-to-date policy in the four domains of political, civil society, community life and values and gives a sense of the trajectory of such policy within and across the 27 EU member state countries. It focuses on the growing impact of the global economic and financial recession and the new policies introduced by recently elected governments (often centre-right in political outlook) that promote increased community activity and volunteering.

**Chapter 2** establishes the **state of play regarding actual levels of engagement**, drawing on analyses of the European and international datasets. It provides information on level and trends for adults and youth for the basic units of analysis, namely conventional political participation, community activities, political civil society activities and values of democracy, human rights, social cohesion and tolerance. It focuses on the differences between older and newer democracies and how patterns of adult and youth engagement differ in these contexts.

The next four chapters attempt to answer the major questions of the study by identifying key barriers and actions that facilitate Participatory Citizenship from the results for a range of analyses carried out for this study.

**Chapter 3** addresses the question on the **most effective drivers and approaches to fostering participatory forms of citizenship**. It identifies factors that relate to participatory forms of citizenship for both adults and young people. The purpose of the chapter is to identify specific strategies that could be implemented by policy makers and practitioners to encourage higher levels of engagement.

**Chapter 4** explores the questions regarding **barriers to Participatory Citizenship**. It draws from the qualitative data on policies and practices from the 27 country fiches to highlight the short, medium and long-term barriers to the facilitation of Participatory Citizenship and then

offers different proposals for overcoming these barriers at local, national, regional and European level. **Chapter 5** addresses the question about the **relationship between local, national, regional and European forms of Participatory Citizenship**. It draws from the different types of data collected concerning how local and national policies interrelate with the European level and the extent to which individual national engagement correlates with individual European participation.

**Chapter 6** attempts to answer the question on the **relationship between individual and collective action**, and in doing so explores the **relationship between volunteering and voting**. This question is particularly relevant in the context of an increasing policy shift in many countries in Europe towards volunteering more than political literacy.

The next chapter, **Chapter 7**, is an exploratory chapter that **brings the three sets of information together** – the theory from the contextual report on models of citizenship, the policy emphasis from the country fiches and the statistical data on actual levels of engagement to try to understand the models of citizenship that are present within Europe.

The **outcomes and implications** of the report are drawn together in final concluding chapter, **Chapter 8**, that highlights the answers to the major questions in this study. It begins to set out areas and aspects of policy and practice that the EC should focus on and prioritise, particularly in relation to the 2013 European Year of Citizens, the new Europe for Citizens Programme 2014–2020, the 2014 European elections and more broadly towards the EU2020 strategy. The conclusions and recommendations provide the basis for the **next report**, and the third deliverable from this study, which will turn these areas and aspects of policy and practice into more concrete **policy recommendations** for the EC to consider.

# Chapter 1. Policy overview

This chapter provides an **overview** of the current state of play regarding **policy on participatory forms of citizenship** across the 27 member states of the European Union (EU). The overview is based on an in-depth review and analysis of the information and data in the **country fiches** for each of the 27 countries<sup>1</sup>. The country fiches were compiled by experts within the study consortium, working in collaboration with a number of national experts in each member state. They were structured using a common template of **five interrelated sections**:

- 1) country context
- 2) concepts, definitions and goals
- 3) policies, funding and targeting
- 4) practices, processes and impact
- 5) challenges and barriers.

The policy overview in this chapter is based on information and data from the first three sections of the country fiches and, in particular, that on 3) policies, funding and targeting.

Following this introduction, the chapter outlines the **contextual factors** that need to be taken into account in considering the policy overview and considers the extent of overarching policy aims and goals across countries for Participatory Citizenship. It then examines **differing levels of policy emphasis** within and across countries in relation to each of the **four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship** used by the study, namely:

- **Conventional political participation** – promotion of involvement in traditional politics, voting in elections, political education, membership of political parties
- **Community activities** – promotion of volunteering and/or voluntary organisations offering welfare and support, and cultural activities
- **Political civil society activities** – support for actions, activities and organisations that provide the checks on government and government policy.
- **Values of democracy, human rights, social cohesion and tolerance.**

The chapter ends by drawing **conclusions** from the current policy emphases given to Participatory Citizenship by the 27 EU member states.

## Data coverage

As noted above, the chapter is based on data from the **27 country fiches**, particularly in relation to the section on policies, funding and targeting. The country fiches sought to detail the nature and extent of policies in each country in relation to the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship listed above. In order to ensure consistency of information and comparative review, policy in each of these four dimensions was examined through seven cross-cutting aspects:

- 1) **emphasis in education and training (i.e. National Curriculum, lifelong learning policies, youth policies, training for migrants);**
- 2) **financial and material incentives (e.g. specific funding programmes);**
- 3) **political rhetoric (e.g. political debates and policy discussions – no money);**

---

<sup>1</sup> Between thirty and ninety pages of information for each country

- 4) **legal framework;**
- 5) **e-participation and e-learning and the use of new technologies to enable participation;**
- 6) **emphasis on 'hard to reach groups' (e.g. minorities, Roma, migrants, 2nd/3rd generation migrants), and**
- 7) **economic issues, including entrepreneurship accountability of banks and personal finance.**

It should be remembered in reading this chapter, and as was explained in the contextual report, that evaluating policy emphases on dimensions of Participatory Citizenship is not an exact science. The country fiches can only provide **informed perspectives** from experts within the consortium and from experts in the 27 countries on country-specific policy features. The analysis draws upon these perspectives. However, such perspectives are extremely useful for the study in terms of their depth and currency. They enable policies and policy emphases in countries to be situated within a deeper historical, social and cultural context. They also provide the most up-to-date information on the trajectory of policy, including that of new and emerging policy directions, particularly where there are newly elected governments and/or major events such as the current global economic crisis which impact on policy formation and implementation. It is important that the outcomes from the qualitative component of this study, as described in this chapter, are viewed together with the outcomes from the quantitative components, as described in Chapter 2, rather than in isolation.

### **Contextual factors**

The first thing to note when examining policy is the important role of **contextual factors**. What is clear in reviewing and analysing the information in the 27 country fiches is that these factors help to explain the differing policy emphases and priorities given by countries to the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship explored in this study. The main contextual factors that need to be taken into account when providing a policy overview on Participatory Citizenship in EU countries are those concerning: the **history and length of time as a democracy**; the **cultural and ethnic mix**; the **political system** and organisation of government; the **government and its political philosophy**; the **length of time** a government has been in power; and the **current economic and financial crisis**. The effect of each of these factors is explained briefly in turn, using information from the fiches.

The country fiches highlight how the **history of a country** and the **length of time as a democracy** have had an impact on the strength and longevity of the dimensions of Participatory Citizenship. They reveal, for example, that in northern and western European countries, such as Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK), which have a long history of democracy the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship have had time to evolve and take root. This is in contrast to the newer democracies in central and eastern Europe, such as Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, where such dimensions are still relatively young and fragile, particularly concerning institutions in civil society. The fiches also show how the cultural and ethnic mix in countries can also impact on dimensions of Participatory Citizenship, presenting challenges to the formation of coherent policies in this area. For example, the country fiche for Cyprus highlights the on-going impact of the de facto division of the island and the conflict between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community. In many countries, the relationship between the majority population and minorities, both native and new entrants, is a further factor that impacts on the policies and policy emphases in this area.

The **nature of the political system** and **organisation of government** can also affect policies on Participatory Citizenship. This can be both positive and negative and can both facilitate and present barriers to policies for forms of Participatory Citizenship at local, national and regional levels. For example, the country fiches in federal systems such as those in Austria and Germany note that the strength of the federal and local regions can be both a facilitator of and barrier to policy. It can stimulate a diversity of policies at individual regional or *Lander* level, while at the same time meaning there is no overarching policy at country or national level. The same is true in Spain in the relationship between central government and the autonomous regions regarding this policy area. Sometimes the central government and autonomous regions have similar policies and sometimes there are differences within particular autonomous regions. Meanwhile, the country fiche for Belgium notes the effects of the administrative separation between the Flemish and French-speaking parts of the country on developing coordinated policies for Participatory Citizenship. Also, in countries that have increasingly devolved responsibility down to country/regional and local levels, such as in the UK, with the devolved administrations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, or the Scandinavian countries, with their long history of local democracy, there is the potential for new policies and emphases to develop at regional and local level and then filter back up through to national level.

The **type of government** and its **political philosophy** are also important contextual factors that need to be taken into account in any policy overview. There can be a marked difference in policy approach and emphases, in relation to the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship depending on the philosophy of governments.

For example, centre-left, liberal democratic governments, such as those who have been in power across parts of Europe for the last decade, often emphasise political participation, social and community cohesion, democratic values of universal human rights, respect and tolerance. They give education and training, particularly through formal education, a central place in developing citizenship competences. This is often referred to as 'Big Government and Small Society'.

Meanwhile, centre-right, neo-liberal and neo-conservative governments often emphasise community involvement and volunteering, democratic values that are more rooted in the national community rather than the global and education and training through non-formal and informal education and activities in the community. This is often referred to as 'Small Government and Big Society'.

The country fiches highlight how elections in the last five years have seen a considerable shift in power and philosophy across EU members states, from predominance of centre-left governments to an increasing number of replacement centre-right governments, often formed through coalitions of parties. They detail how this shift is having an effect on the nature of and emphases given to Participatory Citizenship. This is the case, for example, in the UK, Spain, Finland, Hungary and Estonia, to name but a few countries. Denmark has bucked the trend with a shift from a centre-right to a centre-left government in the recent elections. Related to this factor is the length of time a government has been in power. New governments are often keen to make their mark with considerable shifts in policy. It is noticeable that new governments were elected in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the UK and Belgium in 2010 and in Finland, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia and Ireland in 2011, leading to a degree of uncertainty and on-going policy shift in those countries.

The final contextual factor that should be considered when reading this chapter is the impact of the **current global economic and financial crisis** on policy in general in EU countries and on policies on Participatory Citizenship in particular. Many of the country fiches make reference to the **negative impact of the recession** on the economic, cultural, social and political fabric of society alongside the **cuts** that are being made to spending by governments, private sponsors and others in order to balance the books. The **irony is that when policies**

**that promote Participatory Citizenship are most needed in society, they are in the most danger of being cut or not initiated.** In the case of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, these cuts are to meet the costs of international bail outs. The country fiches also suggest that in challenging times for governments Participatory Citizenship does not have such a high policy emphasis as other areas such as the basics in education and training, the economy and infrastructure. They also note the turn in many EU Member States to **focus more on local and national priorities, as opposed to a broader European dimension.** The overriding **conclusion** is that the backdrop of the economic recession is continuing to have a growing negative impact on the nature and extent of policy emphases for Participatory Citizenship across EU Member States both now and in the coming years.

### **Policy aims and goals**

The information in the country fiches reveals the **diversity** in how European countries define the concept of Active or Participatory Citizenship. There is no single definition that fits all countries. Rather, Participatory Citizenship is an **umbrella concept** that contains within it a number of **common dimensions** that are found across European countries. For example, in Greece Participatory Citizenship is about rights and obligations, and action and responsibility. Its goal is to create 'informed and responsible citizens who are aware of their rights and obligations while they promote solidarity and participate actively in the broader society'. This is similar to Spain, where it is about 'an individual's fundamental right to participate and exercise influence on the development of society'. Participatory Citizenship in Spain, as in many countries, incorporates a political dimension (democracy, duties, freedom, respect and participation), a cultural dimension (identity, diversity, multiculturalism, interculturalism) and a social dimension (equality, cohesion, pluralism).

The country fiches show how EU member states give differing degrees of emphasis to these dimensions in the aims and goals of policy that support Participatory Citizenship. Overall, Participatory Citizenship remains a central concept in policy for governments across European countries, although the economic recession is having an increasing impact on how central this area is in policy terms. It is also a concept that is developed through policies **across government departments** in the majority of countries. Though there is a stronger emphasis on policies in education in many EU countries, there are also policies which are pursued through other government departments that deal with domestic, home or social affairs, foreign or European affairs, local government, integration, law and justice, arts and culture, work and labour and economic affairs. A policy overview on Participatory Citizenship needs to take account of this breadth and complexity of policy approach and emphasis in many countries.

### **Policies on Participatory Citizenship**

The chapter now goes on to use the information from the 27 country fiches to review the **differing policies and policy emphases** within and across countries in relation to each of the **four dimensions** of Participatory Citizenship used by the study:

#### ***'Conventional' political participation***

This dimension concerns the **promotion of involvement in what is traditionally considered as 'politics', voting in elections, political education and membership of political parties.** Of the countries that stated a degree of policy emphasis of this dimension: five countries have it as a **major emphasis** (Austria, Germany, Finland, Greece and Sweden); eight countries have it as having **some emphasis** (UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria and the Netherlands) and six countries have it as a **minimal emphasis** (Denmark, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia).

The major emphasis in many European countries in terms of policy for this dimension of Participatory Citizenship is its **promotion through education and training policies.** The intention is to educate and prepare people, particularly young people, for their roles and

responsibilities in terms of political participation. This can be seen in the inclusion of citizenship and human rights in the school curriculum in many countries, either as a separate curriculum subject and/or through other subjects, and/or as a cross-curricular component. A number of European countries have introduced citizenship into the national curriculum in the past decade, including the UK, Italy, Spain and Ireland. There is also a focus in many countries on promoting democratic structures for young people in and beyond schools. A number of countries set their education and training policies within the context of lifelong learning, including schools, higher education and the youth sector, and the promotion of competences, including civic and social competence. For example, Finland had a specific Civic Activity Programme from 2003–07, while Bulgaria has a National Youth Strategy (2010–20) and a National Children's Strategy (2008–18). Countries also participate in a range of EU programmes, including the Europe for Citizens, Youth in Action and Education and Lifelong Learning programmes.

There is a mixed picture in terms of **funding** for this dimension. A number of countries, including France, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Austria and Germany, provide state funding for political parties and also sometimes for political youth organisations. Some countries also have a history and culture of funding to support political participation at national and local level, such as in Sweden, Germany and Austria where there are strong political organisations at the federal and local level. Countries in eastern and central Europe, often the newer democracies, have a range of funding for this dimension involving state funding alongside that provided by private donor, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international and European organisations. A number of countries also note involvement in the EU Europe for Citizens Programme as a source of funding. Political rhetoric for the dimension is variable, and those countries that give it greater emphasis are primarily those that also have the strongest political rhetoric.

The dimension of conventional political participation is reflected in all countries in **legal frameworks** through the constitution: laws governing aspects such as the right to vote and to join political parties, as well as rights to establish political parties and trade unions. The other common representation in legal frameworks is through education laws and statutes controlling schools and the curriculum, such as the Organic Law of Education in Spain which saw the recent inclusion of the new subject of citizenship in the school curriculum.

**E-participation** is an area of growing policy interest and activity in many European countries. Governments, at local, regional and national level, as well as political parties and groups, are increasingly using new technologies (websites, blogs, social media networks) to inform and make information available to citizens. A few countries have taken this a stage further through the adoption of national programmes and initiatives that attempt not only to provide information to citizens but to facilitate dialogue with citizens, i.e. to get their real participation in decision making. According to the country fiches there are major programmes and initiatives in this area currently underway in Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden and the Czech Republic aimed at promoting more open government, including e-government and e-gateways, as well as digital convergence between citizens and state institutions.

For example, in Estonia the website '*osale*' provides participation opportunities for any citizen to make suggestions to the government on policies and practices while in Lithuania there is an e-government gateway which provides citizens with access to 75% of government services electronically. Recent research has shown that 23% of Lithuanian citizens currently access public services on-line, with the figure expected to continue to increase in the coming years. Similar access to public services and information is being made available in Greece through the '*Di@vegia*' programme of open government, as well as at municipal level in places such as Kozani, while in Sweden the SALAR network promotes the use of e-petitions to enable citizens to have a dialogue with politicians at national and local level. The speed of growth of these services within and across countries means that there is a lack of robust data, as yet, on their reach, use by differing ages and groups and their impact. It is one thing



making information and services available to all citizens and quite a different thing to encourage citizens to use them to engage in meaningful participation.

There are also policies under this dimension which are aimed at **'hard to reach'** groups in society. What is noticeable is the different ways that countries classify 'hard to reach' groups in their national context. The majority of European countries have policies aimed at migrants, particularly new entrants, and minorities (such as Roma in central and eastern Europe and Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states, for example). The aim of such policies is to educate those groups, starting with young people, so that they develop the capability needed to participate in society. A number of countries have also begun to place more emphasis on policies that reach more marginalised groups in society and seek to close the socio-economic gaps in society. This is the case in the UK, Ireland and Denmark. For example, in Denmark concern about declining participation and voting levels among socially marginalised groups in society, who are often not connected to the labour market as well, has led to the promotion of a number of initiatives at national and local level to close the participation gap. They include a national 'Action Plan for Prevention of Extremist Attitudes and Radicalisation among Youths', as well as an internet for youth on democracy and radicalisation. Meanwhile, the local integration council in Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city, launched a campaign to publicise and reverse declining participation rates among disadvantaged groups in collaboration with the Danish Youth Council. The UK has had similar initiatives through the policy area of Community Cohesion at national and local level, now incorporated by the new Coalition government within integration policies as part of the Big Society initiative. There is, as yet, little evidence of the impact and effectiveness of such policies because they are still relatively new and untested.

There are also signs that the **current global economic and financial crisis** is beginning to influence policy in this area, particularly in those countries that have felt the effects of the crisis most severely. This is in relation to a growing economic and entrepreneurial component to this dimension, with countries trying to encourage financial capability and entrepreneurship as part of participating in modern, democratic society. There is evidence in the country fiches of such an approach in Greece, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland, and other countries may follow suit in the coming years. For example in Ireland the new five year plan, the Government for National Recovery 2011–16, seeks to rebuild not only Irish society in the wake of the crisis but also the Irish economy. Social entrepreneurship is being introduced into the curriculum via schools, with a central role for education policy to 'build a knowledge society. Education is at the heart of a more cohesive, more equal and more successful society, and it will be the engine of sustainable economic growth'.

### ***Community activities***

This dimension of Participatory Citizenship is concerned with the **promotion of volunteering and/or voluntary organisations**, the **offering of welfare and support**, and the **provision of cultural activities**. Of the countries that stated a degree of policy emphasis of this dimension, 8 countries have it as a **major emphasis** (Denmark, Bulgaria, Estonia, , Portugal, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary and the UK); 9 countries give it **some emphasis** (Germany, Ireland, Finland, Romania, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Latvia, Belgium and France); and 6 countries give it **minimal emphasis** (Sweden, Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg).

This dimension of Participatory Citizenship is seen in countries in terms of **education and training**, as an extension of policies and activities concerned with political participation. Community activities build from work in schools by continuing and broadening such activities in communities and with other groups in society (youth, older people, migrants and minorities) in a lifelong learning perspective. The dimension is concerned with three main policy thrusts across European countries, namely:

- 1) **the strengthening of community cohesion and integration of groups into society**
- 2) **the promotion of volunteering, and**
- 3) **the encouragement of cultural activities.**

European countries give differing degrees of emphases to these three thrusts, and in very few countries are all three present.

The **movement of peoples within and across Europe**, as well as migration from other parts of the world into Europe, over the past decade has heightened policy activity in many European countries on community cohesion and integration. For example, Spain, Denmark, Portugal and the UK have initiated programmes and actions plans to address this issue, termed variously Prevent (UK), Action Plan for Prevention of Extremist Attitudes and Radicalisation among Youths (Denmark), National Plan for Citizenship and Integration (Spain) and Plan for Immigrant Integration (Portugal). Many other countries have initiated programmes and initiatives to address similar issues. Although framed by national governments, many of these plans, programmes and initiatives are marked by being run and developed at regional and local level in municipalities and communities at local or grassroots level. Indeed, policy in this dimension is often devolved, in terms of its operation, to the regional/local level.

**Volunteering** is a policy emphasis in a number of countries, particularly those with a tradition and infrastructure that can offer lots of volunteering opportunities, such as Austria, and those with a new centre-right government such as the UK where there is a strong policy push on strengthening communities through volunteering and citizen participation. In the UK this is termed the Big Society and has seen the introduction of pilot schemes to stimulate the volunteering of young people in communities through the National Citizen Service (NCS). Indeed, volunteering is generally promoted as taking place beyond schools in communities, with little or no evidence of European countries promoting volunteering for young people in schools. Volunteering policies are often targeted at particular groups in society who are seen as benefiting from such experiences, such as young people and 'hard to reach' groups – migrants, minorities and the socially disadvantaged. The intention is to strengthen community cohesion and improve the personal and social skills of participants as well as their suitability for employment, particularly in a tough economic climate. In some countries, such as in Sweden and the UK, there is evidence of an increasing use of volunteers across society. This has led to concerns in some quarters that, in an age of austerity when governments are cutting back on public services, volunteers are not used to fill in the gaps in service provision formerly provided by paid employees. Often volunteering policies and schemes are organised on the ground by NGOs and civil society organisations.

In some countries, notably Germany and Greece, there is a strong tradition of and policy encouragement to **cultural activities** as part of policy activity around communities. This is often encouraged alongside efforts to build community cohesion and increase volunteering in society.

The **financing of policies** for community activities is a complicated mix of national and local government funding, European funding and funding by private donors and businesses in many European countries. In no European country is such policy activity funded solely by central government, but rather there is a push to match government funding through other sources. This is the case in Denmark, for example, where there is a National Strategy for Civil Society funded in this way. Often money is given to or raised by local communities and activities carried out by NGOs and civil society associations. A number of countries, including Greece, Italy, Estonia, Slovakia and Denmark, note the important role of European funding, through the European Social Fund and the European Youth in Action programme, to stimulate such activities. There are also growing signs in European countries of the impact of the **current global economic and financial crisis** on the funding of and volume of activity

in this dimension. One of the first things that governments cut is the funding of community activities and the funding given to NGOs, local government and civil society associations. This is putting a question mark over the viability and sustainability of policies, programmes and initiatives across many European countries at present.

**Political rhetoric** about community activities is often in line with the extent of policy emphasis in a country: the higher the policy emphasis, the greater the political rhetoric at both national and regional/local level. However, in the current economic crisis there is a danger that this can lead to mixed messages. For example, it is noted that in the country fiche for the Netherlands that politicians continue publicly to support and promote cultural activities and community participation, while at the same time introducing funding cuts for such activities. There are similar criticisms in other countries where policy emphasis is not matched by appropriate funding.

In terms of legal framework, most European countries use programmes and action plans, rather than specific laws to support and promote this dimension. However, in the Netherlands a new law has recently been passed that states that all new citizens with non-European background should learn the Dutch language, Dutch democratic values and Dutch culture. It will be interesting to see how other European countries view this decision.

There is growing encouragement to promote **e-participation** in community activities across European countries. The internet and social media and networking sites are seen as ideal vehicles to keep citizens informed about their communities and also to stimulate activity and interaction between differing groups of citizens. Such activity is often bottom up coming from municipalities, young people and community groups themselves. In a number of countries there is central government funding to stimulate such activity. For example, in Austria there are platforms and e-participation projects, while in Greece electronic platforms promote volunteering and local authorities provide free internet access to citizens.

Much of the policy activity in this dimension in European countries is targeted at **'hard to reach groups'**. Although these groups are classified differently across countries, the common groups targeted in many European countries are migrants or new entrants, young people and socially disadvantaged groups. By far the greatest policy emphasis in EU member states has been on policies and programmes aimed at integrating migrants into society and in local communities, socially, culturally, politically and economically. In a number of countries including Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland and the UK there is a growing, explicit economic and entrepreneurial aspect to community activities, with the intention to improve the employability of participants. For example, in the UK the government's new flagship National Citizen Service (NCS), which promotes volunteering for young people in their local community, has within its programme an entrepreneurial strand where participants learn from entrepreneurs and are encouraged to pilot such activities in their local area.

### ***Political civil society activities***

This dimension of Participatory Citizenship is concerned **with support for actions, activities and organisations that provide the checks on government and government policy**. It should be noted that this is the dimension where the information is most limited in the 27 country fiches. This may be for a number of reasons, most notably the breadth, diversity and range of possible civil society associations in countries and the challenge of finding out information about them. The extent of policy emphases in this dimension is also dependent on the degree of strength of civil society in European countries and the reaction of national governments. For example, in those countries where civil society is traditionally strong there may be less perceived need for government policy intervention, given that activities are dependent on the on-going actions of NGOs and civil society organisations. Meanwhile, in those countries where civil society is less strong there may not be much for government to promote and support, for example as in the newer democracies in central and eastern Europe. This does not excuse lack of government intervention and assistance but

may explain it. The other thing to note in analysing this dimension is the overlap between this dimension and the other dimensions of Participatory Citizenship. Political civil society activities do not take place in isolation, but are influenced by actions and policies concerning political participation, community activities and values. Indeed, it may be similar civil society organisations involved in all four dimensions rather than just one.

Of those European countries that provided an assessment of the degree of policy emphasis of this dimension: one country said it was a **major policy emphasis** (Greece); 11 countries assessed it as having **some policy emphasis** (Germany, Sweden, Malta, Austria, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Poland and Lithuania); and 10 countries said it has **minimal policy emphasis** (Ireland, Denmark, France, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Luxembourg, the UK, Romania and Hungary). Policy emphasis in this dimension, in relation to **education and training**, is about supporting the activities of civil society associations, particularly NGOs. There is little or no explicit reference to supporting activities that provide direct checks on government and government policy. However, in Austria, where civil society is strong citizens have access to the '*Bürgerkarte*' (citizen card) to enable them to keep track of government policies. There is also mention in some countries of the recent protest movements, where citizens, sometimes in collaboration with civil society organisations, mobilised to express their anger and concern about the current economic crisis and its impact on society and government policy, particularly public sector cuts.

There is no reference to this dimension requiring support through **legal frameworks**, beyond constitutional laws that permit the formation of civil society organisations. **Funding** for civil society activities is either non-existent from governments, because the funding comes from other sources, or is a mixture of government funding alongside funding from private donors and international and European organisations. Finland and Sweden are two countries where there is state funding of NGOs and civil society associations, particularly through cultural and youth activities. **E-participation** is often down to what NGOs and civil society associations do in terms of their membership and activities. But there are signs that in many countries these organisations are using new media and technologies to stimulate activities and campaigns. In some countries activities are aimed at **'hard to reach'** groups, particularly migrants, youth and minorities such as Roma. There is little or no mention of activities in this dimension having an economic or entrepreneurial focus.

### ***Values of democracy***

This dimension is concerned with **the support and promotion of values, such as human rights, social cohesion, respect, intercultural learning, equality and tolerance**. Not all European countries expressed the degree of emphasis given to this dimension in policy. However, of those countries that did, 8 countries said it was a **major policy emphasis** (Ireland, France, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania and Austria); 9 countries said that there was **some policy emphasis** (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Italy, the Czech Republic, the UK, Poland and the Netherlands); and 2 countries said that there was **minimal policy emphasis** (Romania and Slovakia). The policy emphasis in this dimension, in terms of **education and training**, is focused on the role of education in helping young people to understand the central place of the values of democracy in society. There is a strong focus on schools inculcating these values through their policies and practices, both in the curriculum and in the school community. National curricula in most European countries have such values as part of their overall aims and ambition. Increasingly, in many countries these values are framed within the broader international policy context around international and European conventions and standards such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education.

It is also noticeable that this dimension underpins policy in the other three dimensions of Participatory Citizenship being investigated in this study. Values are fundamental to policies for Participatory Citizenship, community activities and political and civil society and underpin

attempts to boost participation and strengthen social and community cohesion. **Finance** for this dimension is a mixed model of central government, private donor, international organisation and European funding. In many countries government funding is limited and policy impact low. However, a number of countries have targeted government funding, for example in the newer democracies of Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where such funding is seen as crucial in the transition to building stronger civil society and greater social cohesion in the country. This is the dimension where there can be the largest gap between the political rhetoric and the actual policy and practice, particularly where the level of rhetoric is not matched by the level of policy funding and support. Legal frameworks that support this dimension see fundamental, democratic values enshrined in the constitution and underpinned in laws governing education and work. **E-participation** activities in other dimensions often support democratic values, particularly in terms of equality of opportunities. The policies, programmes and initiatives in the other dimensions are underpinned by democratic values and therefore policies and initiatives in this dimension tend to reinforce those elsewhere. This is particularly the case with **'hard to reach'** groups, where many European countries target policies and activities that will educate migrants, minorities and marginalised, socially disadvantaged groups about the importance of democratic values in society, particularly in relation to social and community cohesion. A small number of countries are beginning to introduce the notion that **economic and entrepreneurial values are a part of democratic society and that young people need to be educated about them.**

## Conclusions

This chapter has provided an **overview** of policies for Participatory Citizenship in the 27 EU member states. It has underlined the importance of **contextual factors** in the framing of and emphasis given to policies across European countries. It has also highlighted the growing influence of two key contextual factors on the nature and extent of current policies for Participatory Citizenship, notably:

- 1) **the political philosophy of governments** and the shift in Europe to more centre-right governments, and
- 2) the growing impact of the **global economic and financial crisis** in many countries.

These two contextual factors are likely to have a growing influence on policies for Participatory Citizenship in Europe in the coming years.

The chapter has shown that Participatory Citizenship is a **complex area** in terms of policy in Europe. What is also clear is the **commonality** of broad policy approaches to Participatory Citizenship. Many countries have similar policy aims, work with the same organisations in society and target the same groups to enhance Participatory Citizenship. For example, all countries give **education and training** a central role, in a lifelong learning perspective, in laying the foundations for Participatory Citizenship. This process starts in schools with young people and builds from there. They also finance policies through a mixed economy approach, blending central government funds with those at the local level and from private donors, business and European and international organisations. In many countries, particularly in central and eastern Europe (the newer democracies), European funding is crucial for the delivery of programmes and initiatives. There is also evidence that political rhetoric about Participatory Citizenship is often not matched by the levels of action and funding. Finally, it is often the same 'hard to reach' groups who are targeted in policy approaches in this area, notably migrants or new entrants, youth, the marginalised and socially disadvantaged, in an attempt to strengthen social and community cohesion in society.

Looking at each of the **four dimensions** of Participatory Citizenship in turn, it is not easy to pick out clear patterns across Europe because of the diversity of approach. However, it is noticeable that **political participation** is a minimal policy priority for a number of the newer democracies, which instead put more policy emphasis on democratic values. There is also a major policy emphasis on **community activities** with the targeting of migrants, in particular, in communities across Europe. Here it is left up to those at local and regional level (councils, NGOs, civil society associations) to work out how best to implement policy for the local/regional area. **Political and civil society activities** is the dimension that does not have a major policy emphasis in any country, suggesting that civil society is either sufficiently robust or sufficiently weak in some countries not to require policy support. This is also the dimension that is most at risk of funding cuts in the current economic crisis. There continues to be strong policy support for promoting the **values** of democracy, human rights, social cohesion and tolerance which underpin Participatory Citizenship.

The chapter also reveals the **trajectory of policy travel** of certain European countries, particularly those that have had recent changes of government, with a shift, in particular, from more conventional political participation to more community and civil society activities. However, herein there lies a potential policy dilemma and disconnect going forward for, while the rhetoric of strengthening communities and civil society is strong in these countries, it is not matched by policy and funding support. Indeed, there is a concern that in those countries most affected by the global economic recession in Europe that Participatory Citizenship may be declining in policy importance and funding while energies are directed at rescuing the economy, cutting public spending and delivering the basics and employability skills through education and training. Ironically, at a time when the fabric of society (political, cultural, economic and social) needs greater support as communities struggle with impact of the economic recession, there is a danger that political support and funding is being withdrawn. This is a worry not only in terms of the effect on 'hard to reach' groups but on social and community cohesion. There is a concern, in some countries, that more extremist and nationalistic elements in society could take advantage of the situation.

Finally, we may compare the results of the policy overview with the **four models** of active or Participatory Citizenship posited in the study's contextual report, namely:

1. **The liberal model** – emphasises civil society and volunteering;
2. **The civic republican model** – emphasises voting and political engagement at national level and common values;
3. **The communitarian model** – emphasises identity in local communities; and
4. **The critical model** – emphasises critical, engaged citizens based on the values of social justice.

We see that all four models are currently present in policy approaches to Participatory Citizenship in Europe to differing degrees. The traditional **civic republican model** remains historically strong in older democracies and has been promoted in newer democracies, while the **critical model** has also been promoted in the newer democracies in the transition to democracy. However, there are signs of a waning of policy support for these models and more of a shift to **communitarian** and **liberal models** as new governments with changing political philosophies have come to power in recent years. The challenge will be how robust these models remain in the face of the growing economic crisis, where in many cases the cuts and impacts are affecting the local community and civil society the most. It will be interesting to see the potential for new policies and forms of Participatory Citizenship that may grow from the approaches that countries take to resolving the economic crisis.

# Chapter 2. Rates and trends of participation

Participatory Citizenship and the different dimensions from which it is composed (political, civil society and community engagement and democratic values) are the basic units for this study. In this chapter we have explored the levels and trends of Participatory Citizenship for adults and youth across Europe in order to provide a picture of the state of Participatory Citizenship across Europe. To achieve this aim we have examined adults' responses from the European Values Study (EVS) from 1990 to 2008, and the responses of young people (Grade 8, about 14 years old) from European countries using the IEA citizenship studies in 1999 and 2009 (for technical details regarding data coverage, items from survey used and details of the results, please see Appendix B).

In previous studies we have used composite indexes to measure active citizenship (Hoskins and Mascherini 2009) or civic competence (Hoskins et al. 2008, Hoskins et al. 2011). In this study, in order to examine trends we have chosen to select individual indicators to represent the different dimensions of Participatory Citizenship. As far as possible we have selected survey questions that are similar in both the adult (EVS) and youth (ICCS) studies.

## Selected indicators

- Political Participation
  - Voting intentions
- Political, Civil Society and Community Participation
  - Volunteering in environmental organisations
  - Volunteering for a trade union
  - Protest
  - Signing a petition
- Values
  - Ethnic tolerance
  - Gender equality

Below we will visit each of these indicators in turn, examining levels and trends of Participatory Citizenship. In this chapter we describe the headlines and not the details (for detailed information, please read Appendix B).

## Political participation

### *National elections*

The findings concerning the voting intentions of adults showed that in the **newer and less wealthy democracies in eastern Europe approximately 20% fewer citizens intend to vote compared to most western European countries**. Data on trends in voting in national elections show that voter turnout in western Europe has declined only slightly from 1945 to the early 2000s. There are differences between countries in western Europe. There has been a decline in 'Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Finland, Italy, UK and Luxembourg' (Rose 2004, cited in Stoker 2011, p. 16) and there has been relatively little change in 'Greece, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Germany and Ireland'.


In contrast, **overall young people's (aged about 14) future intentions to vote have increased over the last 10 years**. For the youth age group there were less obvious distinctions between newer and older democracies, for example, Lithuanian youth had one of the highest levels of intentions to vote in future elections. That said, the levels of certain

intention to vote in elections in the Czech Republic were very low and below 20%. For a smaller number of countries over the last decade there were some notable downward trends for their youngsters' intentions to vote. **In Cyprus their youngsters have decreased in intentions to vote by 40%, from having the highest rate in 1999 to being closer to the lowest levels of European youngsters.** Greek and Slovakian youth have also followed similar downward patterns. For further details, see Appendix B.

Key to maps


- EU Countries with lowest percentage
- EU Countries which fall in-between
- EU countries with highest percentages

Adults



*EVS 2008: 'If there were to be a general election tomorrow would you vote?' (percentage of respondents who would vote)*

Youth



*ICCS 2009: Intention to vote in a general election when an adult (percentage that would certainly vote)*

Note: For all **youth maps** the percentages only represent **England** although the whole of Great Britain is coloured. For all adult maps Great Britain is representative of itself. For specific information on Northern Ireland refer to the graphs in the appendix. **Tables that indicate the direction for trends of adults only include countries that have participated in all 3 rounds.**

Table 2.1. Youth: Intention to vote in a general election

Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Sweden	↗
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Slovakia	↘
England	→




**Civil society and community participation**

**Volunteering in environmental organisations**

**Nordic countries and the Netherlands are most active** in volunteering in environmental organisations with about 5% – 15% of adults engaged. **Many newer democracies in both southern and eastern Europe have less than 1% of the adult population engaged** in environmental organisations. **The trends over the last 10 years mostly show an increase** in the percentage of respondents who volunteered in environmental organisations with **Denmark increasing the most**, up by 13%. In contrast, **Greece became less active** in environmental organisations, the figures dropped by 8%.


In a contrasting pattern to the adult population, **youngsters in southern and eastern European countries have engaged the most in environmental organisations**, for example, **the highest level was reached in Poland with almost 50% of youngsters saying that they had volunteered for environmental organisations**. Most of the surveyed countries show an increase in engagement over the last 10 years with **high increases across central and eastern Europe**. In contrast, the **level of youth engagement in Nordic countries is low and falling during the last decade**. For further details, see Appendix B.

**Adults**



*EVS 2008: 'Are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for conservation, environment, ecology or animal rights?'<sup>2</sup> (Percentage of adults that do this).*

**Youth**



*ICCS 2009: 'Have you been involved in an environmental organisation?' (Percentage that have within the last 12 months)*



*Table 2.2. Adults: Participation in conservation, environment, ecology and animal rights sectors*

Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1999 and 2008
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Northern Ireland	↗
Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,	↘

<sup>2</sup> Italy was not included in the map due to an outlying observation

Great Britain	
---------------	--

Table 2.3. Youth: Participation in an environmental organisation


Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	
Denmark, Sweden	

### Volunteering for trade unions or youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union

Almost all EU countries have low rates of adult volunteering for trade unions and there was a complex mix of countries across the range. Denmark had the highest participation rate at 7% and also the greatest level of increase across the last 20 years. There was less than 1% engagement in Spain, Hungary, Malta, UK and France.


Young people's involvement in youth organisations affiliated with political parties or unions is higher than adults' level of engagement in unions with more than 10% of youth engaging in Cyprus, England and Lithuania. Finland had the lowest levels of engagement at 2%. Concerning trends; most of the surveyed countries showed an increase over time in particular for central and eastern European countries, for example, Lithuania shows the largest increase of 10%. For further details, see Appendix B.

#### Adults



EVS 2008: 'are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for trade unions?' (percentage that are)<sup>3</sup>

#### Youth



ICCS 2009: Youth that have been involved in a youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union (percentage who have in the last 12 months)

<sup>3</sup> Italy was not included in the map due to an outlying observation

Table 2.4. Adults: Participation in trade unions








Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia	
Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain	
Belgium, Slovakia, Sweden, Great Britain, Northern Ireland	
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal	

Table 2.5: Youth: Participation in organisation affiliated with a political party or union.


Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	
Cyprus	
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Sweden	

## Protest


For adults' engagement in legal protest activities **there is an east/west divide, with the majority of eastern European countries having levels of engagement below 10 per cent, whilst most western European countries range between 15 and 30 per cent.** France achieves the highest rates with almost 45 per cent of the population having been engaged in legal protests and Denmark and Spain are also above the 30 per cent level. In the last decade up to 2008 most countries showed a decrease in adult engagement in legal protest activities. However, we believe that the current debt crises and government cuts may have increased the motivation and levels of engagement in protest activities across Europe and that in 2011 these levels will most likely increase again.

Once more, there is a contrast between the adult data and the youth data. **Young people in southern and eastern Europe intend to protest the most with many of these countries having about one quarter of the youth population intending to do this.** Countries such as Greece and Cyprus continue to maintain high levels of dispositions towards protest across the decade whilst in eastern European countries there has been a particularly large rise in interest to protest amongst the younger generations. For further details, see Appendix B.

**Adults**



**Youth**



*EVS 2008: Adults that have taken part in political action by attending lawful demonstrations (percentage of respondents that have taken this type of action)*

*ICCS 2009: Youth expected to take part in a non-violent or peaceful process in the future (percentage that would certainly do this)*

*Table 2.6. Adults: Participation in lawful demonstration*

Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain	↗
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia	↘
Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden	↘
Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Great Britain	→

*Table 2.7. Youth: Participation in a peaceful protest*


Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia	↗
Cyprus, Italy, Poland, Sweden	↘

## Signing a petition/collecting signatures

A similar pattern applies for signing a petition as for protest activities. **The Nordic and other western European countries including France and the UK have high levels of engagement in petitions with about 60% or more of citizens engaged. In contrast, there are low levels of engagement in eastern Europe with around 15% of the population engaged.** As with other protest activities there has been a general decrease for most countries in the last 10 years and **for seven countries mostly from southern and eastern Europe there has been a steady decline for the last 20 years.**


In contrast to adult participation rates, for young people **there has been a rise in interest in collecting signatures during the last decade in most European countries.** As with protesting it is **southern and eastern European youth who demonstrate the most enthusiasm for collecting signatures for a petition** with about one quarter of students in these countries disposed towards doing this. There have been some dramatic increases in eastern Europe with increases of about 20% in Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. **In contrast the Nordic countries youth disposition is closer to 10% (which is similar to their low levels 10 years ago).** For further details see Appendix B.

Adults



*EVS 2008: Take political action by signing a petition (percentage of adults that have taken this type of action)*

Youth



*ICCS 2009: Youth expected to collect signatures for a petition (percentage that would certainly do this)*

Table 2.8. Adults: Sign a petition








Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008
Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, Slovenia, Spain	
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Northern Ireland	
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, Great Britain	
Estonia, Germany.	
Poland.	

Table 2.9. Youth: Collect signatures for a petition.

Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia	
Denmark, Italy, Poland, Sweden	

## Values

### ***Ethnic tolerance***


Regarding tolerance towards migrants, it is the **Nordic countries and the Netherlands that have the highest rates of tolerance towards migrants with about 60% of adult in these countries indicating tolerance towards migrant groups and employment.** Adults in Denmark have dramatically increased their levels of tolerance during the last 20 years increasing almost 30%. In contrast, in **the UK the levels have decreased by almost 20% over the last 20 years.** In **southern and eastern European countries the rates of responses that indicate tolerance are much lower than northern and western Europe,** with Lithuania, Malta, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia and Hungary all having rates below 10%.

In contrast with the adult population, again **it is the young people from eastern Europe who are demonstrating the highest rates of tolerance with about 45% of youngsters in Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria and Slovenia all giving the most positive responses on questions of giving equal chances for migrants to get good jobs. There have been increases in youth tolerance across many countries in Europe in particular in eastern Europe.** There has been an almost 20% increase in Estonia and about 15% increase in Slovenia and Bulgaria. The story for eastern Europe is not all positive, however, with **some of the lowest rates also coming from this region: in particular, Czech Republic and**




**Latvia.** In addition, some countries in western Europe show a decrease in youth tolerance across the 10 years between 1999 and 2009. Youth tolerance in Cyprus decreases by about 20% and in England and Finland about 10%. For further details, see Appendix B.

**Adults**



*EVS 2008: When jobs are scarce Employers should give priority to (nation) people over immigrants' (percentage that disagree with this statement – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude)*

**Youth**






*ICCS 2009: 'All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get good jobs in this country' (Percentage that strongly agree with this statement – the higher the agreement the more positive the attitude)*

*Table 2.10. Adults: When jobs are scarce, (nation) people should have right to a job over immigrants (upwards arrows indicates an increase in gender-equal attitudes, not an increase in agreement with statement)*

Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008
Austria, Denmark, France, Spain, Romania	↗
Bulgaria, Great Britain, Northern Ireland	↘
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden	↙
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	↖
Lithuania, Malta,	→

Table 2.11. Youth: All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get good jobs


Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden	
Cyprus, Czech Republic, England, Finland, Poland	
Greece, Latvia	

### Gender equality

The results for attitudes towards gender equality show that it is the **Nordic countries and the Netherlands that again show the highest rates of positive attitudes towards gender equality** with 85% or above of **adults** in all these countries displaying these attitudes. The **lowest rates were in south and east Europe** with adults in Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania and Malta all giving less than 60% positive results. However, Poland and Hungary have made notable and significant increases by about 15% during the last 10 years. In addition, **most countries surveyed displayed an increase in positive attitudes**. This could potentially indicate that adults in many countries are displaying increasingly positive attitudes towards gender equality. However, this is not the case in **Greece where positive attitudes towards gender equality decreased** by about 15% during the 10 year period up to 2008.


This time the results were more consistent between adults and youth. For the youth age group it is also the **Nordic countries and England who have the highest rates of positive attitudes towards gender equality** and all of these countries have about 60% of **young people** giving the most positive responses towards gender equality. Sweden showed the largest rise over the last 10 years with an increase of close to 25%. The countries where **young people are less concerned about gender equality are in eastern Europe** with many of these countries having 30% of young people having positive attitudes towards gender equality. For further details, see Appendix B.

#### Adults



*EVS 2008: 'When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women' (percentage of respondents who disagree – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude to gender equality).*

#### Youth



*ICCS 2009: 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women' (percentage that strongly disagree with this statement – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude towards gender equality).*



Table 2.12: Adults: When jobs are scarce men have more right to a job than women (upward arrows indicate an increase in gender equal attitudes not an increase in agreement with statement)







Countries	Change across time: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Great Britain, Northern Ireland	
Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia	
Germany, Spain	

Table 2.13. Youth: When jobs are scarce men have more right to a job than women (upwards arrows indicates an increase in gender equal attitudes not an increase in agreement with statement)

Countries	Change across time: CIVED (1999) & ICCS (2009)
Sweden, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Greece, Denmark, Lithuania	
Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Cyprus, Slovakia	
Bulgaria, England	

## Conclusions

### Adults

Concerning almost all participatory forms of citizenship, **the overall general trend** indicates that **adults are engaging less in countries that are less prosperous and in younger democracies**, in particular in eastern Europe, and that **levels of engagement** also tend to be **decreasing across time**.

**Southern European countries**, which also have shorter histories of democratic rule and are poorer than their northern neighbours, also **tend to have low levels of adult engagement in peaceful protests, petitions and volunteering in environmental organisations**. However, adults in these countries do tend to participate more in traditional political forms of engagement, including voting and volunteering in unions. Concerning trends, **Greece has shown a decrease in engagement for adults across all the different forms of Participatory Citizenship where we have trend data**.

Adults in the social democratic, more prosperous and stable democracies in Scandinavia tend to participate the most. These patterns that we have found in the research that we have conducted are supported by the literature (Westholm et al. 2007, Amnå and Zetterberg 2010, and Hoskins and Mascherini 2009). As we discussed in the contextual report, a country's wealth is theorised to support the cultural development of values prioritising individual self-expression over collective goals and enhancing critical thinking towards the state. In line with this, we would therefore expect that the more wealthy countries in Europe to participate more in peaceful protests, petitions and volunteering in environmental organisations (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, and Amnå and Zetterberg 2010).

**However, a new finding from this research is that for many countries in eastern Europe, adult levels of engagement have decreased in the last 10 year period. Considering that in this period these countries joined the European Union and have benefited from European Structural Funds, declining levels of engagement should be a cause for concern for European policy makers.**

### ***Youth***

For young people aged 14, the situation is quite different.

**Southern and eastern European youth tend to engage or plan to engage in the future much more than their contemporaries in northern and western Europe.** This is rather surprising, as it is almost the reverse of the pattern in the adult population. This pattern has also been observed in a growing body of literature on youth engagement and transitions (Hoskins et al. 2011 and Amnå and Zetterberg 2010). In addition, **youth in many countries in eastern Europe (but not all) have dramatically increased their disposition towards engagement over the last 10 years.** Two pertinent examples of this are **involvement with environmental NGOs and collecting signatures for petitions**, where many eastern European countries have the highest levels of dispositions towards engagement and the largest increases across the last 10 years. The eastern European countries were in 2009 even higher than the southern European youth from Cyprus and Greece who were the most disposed to engagement in these activities in 1999. **In contrast, the Nordic countries youth are the least inclined to participate in environmental NGOs and to collect signatures for petitions** in 2009 and for Finland also in 1999.

It is more difficult to explain these trends. It has been argued that in more democratically unstable and poorer countries youth are more strongly motivated to engage (Hoskins et al. 2011). An optimistic possibility may be that greater youth participation in southern and eastern Europe now will lead to greater adult participation in the future, but this has yet to be proved. The little research available on this topic suggests that there are large regional differences in transitions for politically engaged youth. For example, Amnå and Zetterberg (2010) find that in southern and eastern Europe young people aged 14 years old are much more interested in engaging in politics than the same cohort in early adulthood; whilst in Nordic and western European countries young people become more interested in politics over this period. In addition, they find that while the expectation to protest is a good predictor for their levels of adult engagement in protesting in the Nordics, it bears no relation to adult protesting in eastern and southern Europe in the sense that it vastly overestimates the numbers (Amnå and Zetterberg 2010).

**In all likelihood, opportunities and structures for engagement, wealth and democratic traditions become increasingly important to determine whether young people actually start to engage in Participatory Citizenship as they get older. For policy makers in southern and eastern Europe the creation of opportunities and structures for engagement of young adults in the formative years between the ages of 16–25 could be a useful strategy which may then help to tackle the downward trend of adult engagement.**

Young people's intentions to vote, which was found by Amnå and Zetterberg (2010) to be a better predictor of adult engagement, is lower than adult intentions; but **for most countries youth trend for voting is on an upwards trajectory, which is a positive development.**

**However, the intentions of young people to vote are rather low in Estonia 25% and the Czech Republic 15% and going down in Cyprus, Greece, Poland and Slovakia. Greek, Cypriot and Slovakian youth used to be some of the most positive youngsters towards voting in Europe and their rapid decline in intention to vote should be a major of cause for concern amongst policy makers in these countries.**

## **Values**

Concerning levels of ethnic tolerance, adults from southern and eastern Europe tend to be less tolerant than Nordic and western European countries. For youth, it is eastern Europeans that appear at both extremes, being the most and least tolerant. **However, also notable is the decrease in ethnic tolerance in England for both youth and adults.**

It is the **Nordic adults and youth who believe most in gender equality.** Adults and youth in the southern and eastern European countries believe the least in gender equality, with the trends for youth showing a downward pattern. **Policies that enhance beliefs in gender equality would be most likely to benefit these countries.**

# Chapter 3. Drivers of participatory citizenship

This chapter will identify factors that are associated with participatory forms of citizenship for both adults and young people. The purpose of the chapter is to identify possible strategies that could be implemented by policy makers and practitioners to encourage higher levels of engagement. In addition, it will also highlight the characteristics of Participatory Citizenship which are much more difficult to change, but are nevertheless important to take into consideration.

The datasets used in this chapter are the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS) and 2008 European Values Study (EVS) for adults and the 2009 IEA International Citizenship Civic Education Study, (ICCS) for youngsters (14 year olds). **The results of the analysis<sup>4</sup> are shown in Table 3.1.**

## Adults

We examined the following Participatory Citizenship dimensions for adults, using ESS/EVS data:

Participatory Citizenship Dimensions	Type of action/participation/values
Political participation	in the last 12 months: -contacted politician -worked in political party -member of a political party (ESS)
Political participation - voting	-voted in last election (ESS)
Civil society – protest	in the last 12 months: -worked in another organisation or association -wore a campaign badge or sticker -signed petition -demonstrated -boycotted products (ESS)
Civil society - Politically oriented volunteering	Participation in: -labour unions -political parties or groups -local political action-groups -human rights groups -environmental, conservational, animal rights groups -women’s groups -peace movement (EVS)
Community - Less politically oriented or ‘service delivery oriented’ volunteering including	Participation in: -social welfare service for elderly -people with disabilities or deprived people -religious or church organisations -education, arts, music or cultural activities -professional associations

<sup>4</sup> For the analysis of the ESS and EVS data we employed multi-level linear and logistic regression with individual and national level factors taken into account for the prediction of an individuals’ Participatory Citizenship. For the analysis of the ICCS data we used multi-level logistic regression with individual and classroom-level explanatory factors included in the model. **The results of the analysis are in Table 3.1.** For Information on the creation of these scales including the principal component analysis and reliability statistics, please contact the authors.

	-youth work -sports or recreation -work organisation concerned with health (EVS)
Values – Equality	-gender equality (measured by a question on whether men should have better chance for jobs than women in times of crises) -equality for gays and lesbians (measured by a question on whether gays and lesbians should be free to live as they want) -ethnic equality (measured by a question on whether people from a different race or ethnic group should be allowed to come and live here) (ESS)

The results show that higher levels of education of adults are positively related to every aspect of Participatory Citizenship (see Table 3.1) and evidence from the literature also supports this finding (Hoskins, d’Homber and Campbell 2008).

Household income (higher levels of wealth), use of internet (the more hours using it), watching politics on TV and engagement in lifelong learning all relate to engagement in conventional forms of politics, voting, civil society protest activities and having a more positive attitude to equality (see Table 3.1).

Reporting to have a strong religious affiliation has a positive relationship with all conventional political engagement and all forms of volunteering. However, it has a negative relationship with the values of equality (see Table 3.1).

Age (the older you are) is positively related to all forms of political engagement, including volunteering in political organisations and civil society protest activities – a similar finding to Mascherini, Macca and Hoskins (2009). However, older respondents espouse less positive attitudes towards equality (from this analysis we cannot be sure if this is a generation or an aging effect).

We also found that being a first generation migrant has a negative relationship with conventional political engagement, civil society protest actions and also on the values of equality. Being a second generation migrant, however, is positively related to civil society protest activities and to beliefs in equality.

Women are more likely to participate in civil society protest activities and have a stronger belief in the value of equality whereas men are more likely to participate in conventional political participation and non-political volunteering (usually sports organisations) (see Table 3.1).

We examined a variety of country level factors that might influence participatory forms of citizenship. These included:

- GDP (countries wealth)
- Democratic traditions (years of democracy)
- Equality of wealth (Gini)
- Ethnic diversity
- Levels of migration

Of these, it was only GDP that was related to participatory forms of citizenship. GDP was found to have a positive relationship with all forms of volunteering as well as a stronger belief in the value of equality. However, it does not relate to voting and other conventional forms of Participatory Citizenship. This finding provides evidence for Inglehart and Welzel (2005) theory that in prosperous countries individualised and self-expression forms of participation, such as the less conventional forms of political engagement, prevail.

Table 3.1: Drivers of Participatory Citizenship outcomes among adults

Drivers	Political participation			Volunteering		Values
	Non-conventional	Conventional	Voted in last election	For political organisations	For non-political organisations	Equality and tolerance
<b>Individual level</b>						
First generation*	--	--	--			ns
Second generation*	++	Ns	-			+
Gender (1 male; 2 female)	++	--	ns	ns	--	++
Household income	+	+	++	ns	++	++
Level of education	++	++	++	++	++	++
Age	++	++	++	++	ns	--
Religiosity	ns	++	++	+	++	--
Use of Internet	++	++	+			++
Watching TV: politics	++	++	+			++
Lifelong learning	++	++	++			++
Mother born in country (0-no; 1-yes)				ns	++	
Father born in country (0-no; 1-yes)				ns	Ns	
Country nationality (0-no; 1-yes)				++	++	
<b>Country level</b>						
GDP per capita 2009	++	Ns	ns	++	++	++

\* Reference category: native born population

Note:

- ++ positive relationship significant at .001 level
- + positive relationship significant at .05 level
- ns no significant relationship
- negative relationship significant at .05 level
- negative relationship significant at .001 level
- (empty) not included in the model

## Policy implications

The evidence indicates that **higher levels of education, lifelong learning and informal learning** from watching politics on the television are **all positively related to aspects of Participatory Citizenship**. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that **improvements in any, or all, of these areas would be likely to impact positively on civic participation** in the future. If this is combined with the evidence on the benefits of the use of the internet, we suggest that an increase in access to the internet, which offers both learning opportunities and access to networks, would also be a beneficial strategy.

In order to maximise Participatory Citizenship, **younger adults would benefit from strategies that promote and support a focus on politics, whereas older persons would probably benefit more from a specific strategy aimed at enhancing beliefs in the value of equality.**

## Youth

For youth we have investigated the following dimensions of Participatory Citizenship:

<b>Participatory Citizenship Dimensions</b>	<b>Type of activity:</b>
Political participation	-join political parties -trade union -stand as candidate -campaign
Political participation – voting	-future voting in national and local elections - get information on candidates
Community	Participation in: -youth organisation -environmental organisation -human rights organisation -voluntary community group -organisation collect money -cultural organisation -religious group -young people campaigning
Civil society – protest	-Writing a letter to a newspaper -Wearing a badge or t-shirt expressing an opinion -Contacting a politician -Peaceful protest -Collecting signatures -Ethical consumption

The results of this analysis are in Table 3.2 on over page.

Table 3.2: Drivers of Participatory Citizenship outcomes among adolescents

Drivers	Political participation			Civic participation in the community
	Intention to vote in adulthood	Expected participation in political activities	Expected participation in future legal protest	
<b>Individual-level</b>				
Gender (0 boy; 1 girl)	ns	--	++	++
First generation immigrant*	--	ns	-	ns
Second generation immigrant*	--	ns	-	ns
Foreign language spoken at home	ns	ns	ns	++
Expected future education	++	ns	ns	-
Social background	++	ns	ns	ns
Number of books at home	- (at extremes)	ns	+	++
Civic knowledge	++	--	++	--
Civic participation in the community	++	++	ns	ns
Civic participation at school	++	++	++	++
Views on good citizens: conventional	ns	ns	+	++
Views on good citizens: social movement	ns	ns	++	++
Citizenship self-efficacy	++	++	++	++
Self confidence in politics	++	++	++	++
Open climate for classroom discussion	++	ns	++	++
Perceived value of student participation in school	++	-	++	ns
Trust in political and civic institutions	ns	++	ns	ns
<b>School-level</b>				
School mean social background	ns	--	+	-
School mean books at home	ns	ns	-	+
Percentage speakers of other languages	ns	ns	ns	ns

\* reference category: native born population

Note:

- ++ positive relationship significant at .001 level
- + positive relationship significant at .05 level
- ns no significant relationship
- negative relationship significant at .05 level
- negative relationship significant at .001 level
- (empty) not included in the model

The study of young people, IEA ICCS 2009, focuses on aspects of learning from schools. For young people, one of the characteristics that relates to all forms of Participatory Citizenship is



the scale **Civic participation at school** (see Table 3.2 above), which includes the following items:

- Voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities outside of regular lessons
- Active participation in a debate
- Voting for 'class representative' or 'school parliament'
- Taking part in decision-making about how the school is run
- Taking part in discussions at a 'student assembly'
- Becoming a candidate for 'class representative' or 'school parliament'.

**This suggests that possibilities for trying out participatory forms of citizenship in school could well be an important factor in developing participatory attitudes and behaviours.** The research on situated learning of citizenship provides further evidence for this (Hoskins, Janmaat and Villalba 2011, and Edelstein 2011). In a similar way, having an **open classroom climate for discussions** across the school curricular is significantly and positively related to three out of the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship but not for political activities such as joining a political party. A strategy combining a whole school approach to learning democratic citizenship as described by the Council of Europe (Bîrzéa et al. 2003, and Gollob, Krapf 2007–10) continues to be supported by this latest evidence.

**Self-efficacy** (the belief in your own ability to participate in citizenship issues and politics) is also found to be related to all aspects of Participatory Citizenship – a finding supported by the research of Haste (2004) and Veugelers (2011).

**Levels of civic knowledge** gave mixed results, relating positively to future voting and protest activities but negatively to participation in other political activities and community participation.

**Expected education levels and the socio-economic status of parents** have a positive influence only on voting. This is a rather surprising result considering that wealth and actual levels of education are related more broadly to Participatory Citizenship for adults.

The **cultural capital of students (measured through books at home) is positively related to future protest and community engagement.** However, the extremes of either high or low levels of cultural capital are significantly negatively related to voting.

Concerning gender, **boys are more likely to intend to participate in conventional forms of political activities whilst girls are more likely to intend to participate in civil society protest activities and participate in the community.** Although there is no gender difference on voting, when it comes to standing for candidates and joining political parties, girls continue to be less interested to engage. **Targeting programmes at getting more girls interested in conventional politics could well be a useful strategy.**

**First or second generation migrant** students are less likely to participate in voting and legal protest, but they do not differ from the native group in terms of their civic participation in the community. In fact, those among the immigrant students whose home language is not those of the test have higher levels of civic participation. It could be that civic participation reflects participation in one's own ethnic community for this group.

The results for the **influence of peers** at a student's school are complex. Young people who go to a school where students are from more privileged social backgrounds are less likely to become politically engaged or participate in the community, they are however more likely to take part in legal protests. Students in schools where levels of cultural capital are higher are more likely to participate in the community and less likely to take part in legal protest.

### ***Policy Implications***

The evidence suggests that **having opportunities across the whole school to be engaged in civic and participatory forms of citizenship and being able to engage in debates in the classroom is related to the different forms of Participatory Citizenship.** Ensuring and supporting such opportunities may well be a useful strategy to develop and increase young people's level of engagement. In addition, further strategies that promote self-confidence in politics and citizenship related activities would also be beneficial.

The evidence points towards the fact that males continue to participate more in conventional politics than females and further strategies are needed to support, in particular, young women's interest and engagement in conventional politics.

Whilst improved civic knowledge is likely to support young people in making informed choices, the evidence does not suggest that it enhances all forms of Participatory Citizenship and further strategies, beyond simply focusing on knowledge, need to be developed to increase young people's engagement in political and community activities. The factors shown to relate most highly with intended participation in political activities were **citizenship self-efficacy** and **self-confidence in politics**, whereas for civic participation in the community it was **civic-participation at school**. **It would appear, therefore, that these would be important areas to promote and develop from an early stage inside and outside school.**

### **Comparing adults with youth on the characteristics of participatory citizenship**

The variables available in each of the datasets are not particularly useful for comparisons between the age groups. In addition, where there is commonality in the datasets (e.g. education, wealth, gender and minority status) there were few similarities amongst the characteristics of the older and younger age groups for those who engaged. However, there was some common ground for the characteristics regarding intended voting and gender differences regarding forms of participation.

For voting we can note that:

1. **Education** either measured by actual levels gained (for adults), by the civic knowledge test (youth) or by expected years of education (youth) **is positively and significantly related to the intention to vote**; and
2. **Wealth** either measured by actual income (adults) or through the social economic status of parents (youth) **is also significantly related to voting**.

Education and wealth, however, do not have the same relationships with other forms of youth participation (in conventional political activities such as standing as a candidate for election, in protest activities like signing petitions and participation in the community like volunteering) . This would suggest that there are opportunities to prevent inequalities in these other forms of participation as the inequalities shown in the adult data are not yet found in these youth cohorts. Gender was not significant for either age groups for intended voting, and both first and second generation migrants were less likely to indicate an intention to vote.

With regards to conventional forms of political participation which for both age groups contained items on joining political parties then there were similar gender differences. Females of both age groups prefer to participate in protest activities and continue to be less interested in political parties and standing as candidates.

### ***Policy Implications***

The policy implications from the comparison between adult and youth characteristics is that **citizens who are poorer, less educated and or migrants are less likely to be represented in government as they are less likely to vote.** Women may also be excluded as they engage less in political parties. **This process of exclusion starts already by the age of 14** where young people from poorer social backgrounds, and who have lower academic expectations, already start to discount themselves from the formal democratic procedure. **Attention should focus on strategies for preventing disengagement of disadvantaged groups from an early age regarding voting.**

The social economic status of parents and expected education are less of a factor for activities other than voting (other political activities, protest and civic engagement in the community) which is a positive sign towards democratic inclusion. However, the evidence suggests that these are factors that influence adult engagement and therefore more attention should be given towards keeping the less educated and poorer youth engaged during their formative years into adulthood.

### **Conclusions**

The results from the analysis conducted for this chapter have presented us with a number of findings that can inform policy on Participatory Citizenship, in particular practitioners who support the learning of citizenship.

The evidence supports the fact that **learning is an important factor for enhancing Participatory Citizenship with higher levels of education, lifelong learning and informal learning from watching politics on the television** all having been shown to be positively related to adults engagement. Thus, enhancing learning opportunities is likely to impact positively on civic participation in the future.

The evidence on learning citizenship in schools suggests that **having opportunities across the whole school to be engaged in civic and participatory forms of citizenship and being able to engage in debates in the classroom can support the development of positive attitudes towards future engagement.** In addition, further strategies that promote self-confidence in politics and citizenship related activities would also be beneficial.

There have also been some important findings regarding representative politics. **Citizens, who are poorer, less educated and or migrants are less likely to be represented in government as they are less likely to vote.** The evidence suggests that this process of exclusion begins by the age of 14 where young people from poorer social backgrounds, and who have lower academic expectations, already start to discount themselves from the formal democratic procedure. Methods for tackling this process of exclusion need to be sought.

## Chapter 4. Barriers and key challenges

This chapter will reflect on **barriers and key challenges** to Participatory Citizenship in European countries. It will do this by drawing upon and analysing both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data comes from information provided in recent months by consortium and country experts in the country fiches for each of the 27 EU member states. The quantitative data comes from two European survey series, the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer. The qualitative data provides a broad policy perspective on barriers and key challenges to Participatory Citizenship both now and in the future. The quantitative data takes a more focused view on barriers and challenges in relation to political participation, institutional trust and democratic values between 2008 and 2010. It does so from the perspective of ordinary citizens in European countries over those two years.

The currency of the data sources is important. The last two years have seen European countries affected by the **global economic and financial crisis**. Therefore, it is helpful to know to what extent that crisis has had an impact on barriers and challenges in this area, as well as knowing what other barriers and challenges remain. Meanwhile, knowing what the main barriers and challenges are for policy not only now, but also in the coming years is extremely useful in planning on-going and future policy and practice. Taken together, the two perspectives provide a sound, up-to-date, overview of what are the main barriers and key challenges currently facing Participatory Citizenship across European countries and how they could be resolved moving forward.

Following this introduction, the chapter describes the results of the analysis of information on barriers and key challenges from the **27 country fiches**. It does so in relation to short, medium and long term barriers and key challenges. It also reviews **solutions** that country experts put forward to overcome these short, medium and long term barriers and challenges. Finally, it details the suggestions from country experts as to **actions** that the European Commission (EC) could take to help countries to overcome the barriers and key challenges. The chapter then goes on to outline the findings from analysis of data from the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer concerning the effect of the economic crisis on political participation, institutional trust and democratic values. It seeks an answer to the question of the extent to which the current global economic and financial crisis has shaken the trust, values and participation of citizens across European countries. It does so by measuring such attitudes and behaviours both before and following the onset of the economic recession. In the final section this chapter addresses how Participatory Citizenship relates to wider economic and social policy goals and in particular the EU 2020 strategy. We analyse data from the European Social Survey data to identify these relationships to establish the policy needs on for Participatory Citizenship. The chapter finishes by drawing **conclusions** about the barriers and key challenges for Participatory Citizenship in EU member states and how they might be overcome.

### **Barriers and key challenges – a policy perspective**

The findings are based on an analysis of information contained in the **country fiches** of all 27 EU member states. The country fiches contained five sections, the final one of which was entitled 'Challenges and barriers to active citizenship and ways to overcome them'. This contained a series of questions that asked experts from the study consortium along with national experts to set out the **main barriers and key challenges** to Participatory Citizenship in each country and to state the **main actions** that needed to be taken to overcome these barriers and challenges. The questions were sub-divided into **short term** barriers and challenges (i.e. in the current year of 2012), **medium term** (i.e. in the next two to three years i.e. 2013 to 2015) and **long term** (i.e. in the following five to ten years i.e. 2016 to 2020). There was also a specific question about what actions the **European Union (EU) institutions** – European Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament

and MEPs – should take in relation to Participatory Citizenship in order to overcome these barriers and challenges.

It should be noted that the answers provided are from the perspective of experts in each country who are involved in policy, practice and research in Participatory Citizenship. It should also be pointed out that while there were detailed responses from the majority of European countries, experts found it easier to list the short and medium term barriers and challenges than the long term. This may be a sign of the **rapid change** in policy these days in some countries where potential changes in government make it difficult to predict with any certainty beyond the next two to three years. A number of respondents saw certain barriers and challenges, particularly those concerned with policy priority, funding and political support, as cross-cutting and being short, medium and long term issues. Some also found it hard to list precise actions for the European Union institutions. This was particularly the case in countries where they were focused on overcoming the immediate effects of the economic recession and responding to government policies, or where they did not see the need or value of a strong European dimension as defined by the EC, such as in Ireland, Greece and the Netherlands.

### ***Short term barriers and challenges***

The short term barriers and key challenges to Participatory Citizenship **over this year (2012)** in European countries were a mixture of country specific and broader challenges across all four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship. Interestingly there was considerable commonality of **agreement on main barriers** and challenges across countries. One key barrier in many countries to developing policies and practices to encourage Participatory Citizenship is the **lack of monitoring and evaluation** and of the existence of a robust and reliable evidence base upon which to make policy decisions going forward. Countries who participated in the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) and in the European Social Survey (ESS) valued such participation and the evidence it provided. There were also evaluations of local and national programmes in some countries. However, overall, and in spite of such research studies, the evidence base was neither systematic nor extensive enough to cover all the dimensions of Participatory Citizenship.

Other common barriers and challenges concerned the need to maintain Participatory Citizenship as a **current policy priority** (Ireland, Austria and the UK). There were also a number of countries that cited the challenge thrown up by the economic crisis and the uncertainty it brought to policy, practice and funding (Spain, the Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania, Germany and Ireland). They were particularly concerned about the negative impact on social cohesion and the strength and viability of civil society as cuts in public spending took effect and government funding to communities, 'hard to reach' groups, NGOs and civil society associations was drastically cut back. This was summed up in the Finnish country fiche which spoke of 'the general stress in society, the insecure labour market and the economic stress, are major obstacles and challenges to Participatory Citizenship'.

A number of countries identified barriers and challenges concerning **education and training**. These included challenges to citizenship in the school curriculum (UK, Estonia and Latvia), to civic competencies (Austria) and funding for training and support (UK and Latvia). There was also coalescence around challenges facing policies concerning **integration and the combating of radicalism and extremism** (Cyprus, Sweden, Denmark and Malta). Two other areas that were mentioned as barriers and challenges concerned declining levels of support, confidence and **trust** in politics and politicians (France, the Czech Republic, Finland, Austria, Germany and Slovenia) and a lack of **real dialogue** between governments and civil society (the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary). Other barriers and challenges identified included e-democracy, defining what is meant by 'entrepreneurial' and combating nationalism and xenophobic, nationalist parties (Finland, Sweden, Latvia and Denmark)

### ***Medium term barriers and challenges***

As has already been noted many of the medium term barriers and challenges to Participatory Citizenship for the **next two to three years (2013–15)** were the same as those identified by countries as short term barriers and challenges. Other barriers and challenges included concern about the **sustainability of and resources** for existing policies and the need for new ones concerning volunteering and civic participation (Malta, Bulgaria, Ireland, the UK and Poland); **civic participation in schools** (Bulgaria, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Finland) and **e-participation**. Barriers and challenges were also identified around the strength, maintenance and viability of structures that underpin Participatory Citizenship in communities and society, such as local structures, civil society associations, NGOs and the space for dialogue with and between citizens (Finland, France, Sweden, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovenia). There was a particular concern from countries in eastern Europe that European structural funding should continue beyond 2013 and onto 2020 in order not to undermine on-going efforts to promote Participatory Citizenship (the Czech Republic and Poland). Finally there was an awareness in some countries that one of the challenges over the next few years was ensuring that there was a **Europe wide** view of Participatory Citizenship and of issues such as European identity and belonging (*Spain, Denmark, Ireland and Poland*).

### ***Long term barriers and challenges***

A number of long-term barriers and challenges over the next **five to ten years (2016–20)** were the same as those identified as short and medium term. Other barriers and challenges identified concerned the need to ensure that countries were aware of and worked together, at a European level, to address issues and challenges as they arose in society. These included the challenges posed by **global economic development** (the UK and Latvia), climate change (Sweden), an **ageing population** (Sweden), **corruption** (Bulgaria) and an **enlarged EU** with more citizens (Belgium and Finland).

## **Overcoming the barriers and challenges**

There were fewer suggestions from country experts in the 27 EU member states as to how the barriers and challenges identified in the previous section could be overcome. The suggestions that were put forward were also more individual rather than collective. This suggests the potential for European countries to engage in more work together on overcoming barriers and challenges concerning Participatory Citizenship.

### ***Overcoming short-term barriers and challenges***

Solutions to overcoming short term barriers and challenges to Participatory Citizenship from European countries included; **strong political leadership** at all levels to overcome the economic crisis and take on divisive nationalist movements (Finland); policies designed to **bolster politics** in society and trust and confidence in politicians (Austria); increased **funding** for NGOs and volunteering (Slovakia and Slovenia); a strengthening of citizenship in the **curriculum**, in schools and beyond (Ireland and the UK) and more **citizen-oriented projects** (Sweden).

### ***Overcoming medium-term barriers and challenges***

Solutions to overcoming medium term barriers and challenges to Participatory Citizenship in the next two to three years are largely to do with issues of infrastructure, funding and approach. They include: **strengthening and consolidating civil society** and its structures through improved funding, more NGOs and civil associations (Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovenia); promoting more **transparent, open and consultative democracy at all levels** that includes local participatory models, debates and deliberative democracy (Finland, Sweden, Germany and Austria); and **strengthening education** and political literacy for all citizens (Sweden, Finland and Bulgaria). Experts in a number of countries that are experiencing considerable turmoil due to the economic crisis also suggested the need to reconfigure the perception and approach of the European Union institutions, so that they are seen by countries as understanding the effects of the crisis.

Through such understanding the EU institutions have a greater chance of being viewed as part of the **solution** to the economic crisis rather than part of the problem i.e. seen more as political rather than economic institutions (Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands).

### ***Overcoming long-term barriers and challenges***

Countries found it harder to look ahead five to ten years and suggest solutions to barriers and challenges to Participatory Citizenship. The main solutions concerned **broad approaches** to policy and perspective; to keep Participatory Citizenship high on the **political agenda** (Ireland) and to strengthen the **European dimension** through increased collaboration and a great sense of European identity (the Czech Republic and Austria).

### ***European Union actions to overcome barriers and challenges***

Interestingly when asked to set out actions that the European Union (EU) institutions should take to overcome the barriers and key challenges facing Participatory Citizenship experts in countries came up with a raft of suggestions. Many of these are along similar lines concerning actions around improved **co-ordination, funding, facilitation** and **leadership**. On a positive note they confirm the value that European countries place on the role of the EU institutions and of a European dimension in approaching Participatory Citizenship.

Some of the main actions it is suggested that the EU institutions could take to overcome barriers and challenges are those concerning:

- **co-ordination** – the coordination of countries with similar issues and challenges and the sharing of information and solutions (Belgium, Slovenia, Poland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Latvia, the UK and Estonia)
- **funding** – the funding of projects and programmes that create spaces for more cross-European dialogue and activity particularly among NGOs and citizens at grassroots level (the UK, Poland, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, France and Portugal); funding to provide greater information and access for young people and 'hard to reach' groups in countries and to encourage the sharing of experiences and solutions through exchange programmes (Bulgaria and Slovenia); to make funding easier and more accessible particularly for NGOs, citizen groups and civil society associations by reducing the bureaucracy (Bulgaria, the UK, Slovakia, Belgium and Romania); fund more cross-Europe research such as the IEA ICCS study in order to strengthen the evidence base on which to make policy decisions (the Netherlands)
- **facilitation** – encourage links between EU and non-EU countries in Europe, including accession countries (Greece and Belgium); work closely with other European organisations such as the Council of Europe to make the most of joint expertise and resources and to ensure a Pan-European approach (Estonia, Belgium, Poland, Ireland and the UK)
- **leadership** – provide stronger leadership by addressing head-on anti-EU sentiments concerning the current economic crisis in countries so as to ensure that the EU and its institutions are seen to be vital to the solution going forward rather than continuing to be part of the problem. This entails the EU and its institutions showing that they understand and feel the difficulties and suffering being experienced in countries, it cannot be 'business as usual' (Spain and Ireland); sharpen the European dimension so that it is understandable to ordinary citizens in Europe by initiating debates on the future of Europe and its political, social, cultural and economic identity that involve ordinary citizens in and across countries (the Netherlands, Slovakia and France); show a lead in pressurising countries that fail to meet minimum standards in participation while offering encouragement and support to those that do.

### **The effect of the economic crisis – a citizen perspective**

Periods of economic downturn are often said to be harmful to Participatory Citizenship. The argument is that in times of crisis people become more concerned about job stability and other bread and butter issues affecting themselves and their immediate surroundings at the expense of non-material values and global concerns (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). People, in other words, tend to narrow their horizons, withdraw from public life and develop a defensive attitude towards social change. Such change is often perceived as threatening and groups of people associated with this change, such as immigrants, are met with hostility. Additionally, people tend to lose trust in the institutions of democracy as these are seen as incapable of providing the necessary social protection and reviving the economy. Often, populist parties offering easy solutions and advocating isolationism fare well in national and European elections.

We compared **survey data** of two points in time, one before and one after the economic crisis of the autumn (fall) of 2008, to assess whether the processes described above can be observed in the member states of the European Union. To assess changes in **political participation**, we compared the 2006–07 to the 2010 round of the **European Social Survey (ESS)**. Changes in **institutional trust and democratic values** were examined by comparing the May 2008 with the December 2010 **Eurobarometer**.

Trust in democratic institutions has indeed declined in most member states (for details of the results please contact the authors). The declines, moreover, are much more dramatic than the increases as many of them are in double figures. Most spectacular are the changes for trust in the national parliament and the European Union. In Spain, Ireland, Cyprus and Greece the percentage of people saying they tended to trust these institutions declined by more than 20%. These same countries top the ranking orders of the other institutions (the press, political parties and the army) in terms of falling trust levels. As these countries also suffered most from the economic crisis, the connection between economic performance and institutional trust is evident.

Remarkably, changes in support for **democratic values** do not mirror the trends in institutional trust (for details of the results please contact the authors). In fact, the percentage of people stating that human rights, democracy, the rule of law and solidarity are amongst their most important personal values has risen in the vast majority of states. Only in the case of **tolerance** are there more states recording a decline than an increase in terms of the percentage of people mentioning it as an important personal value. Thus, while people may become much more critical of democratic institutions in times of crisis this does not mean that they lose faith in the *principle* of democracy. This refutes the gloomy predictions of observers who claim that the economic crisis has increased support for authoritarian forms of government. It further shows that support for democracy as system of government should be carefully distinguished from confidence in existing democratic institutions (Easton 1965; Klingemann 1999). Evidently people can be critical of the functioning of existing democratic institutions without discarding democracy altogether.

No clear trends emerge with respect to **political participation**, which is encouraging news for observers who are concerned about falling levels of political engagement. On balance there are more EU member states where the percentage of people voting in national elections and signing petitions has declined than there are member states recording increases in these forms of political participation, but the rates of change are not substantial, staying well within single figures. Moreover, the declines have not occurred in the same group of countries, nor in European countries which have been hit particularly hard by the economic crisis, which suggests that these declines are not related to the economic crisis. In sum, **the economic crisis appears to have had negative effects on institutional trust only**, while other dimensions of Participatory Citizenship across European countries seem to be more resilient to periods of economic downturn and hardship. It will be interesting to see how far these trends continue to be mirrored in future sweeps of the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer from 2011 onward, particularly as the economic recession and its effects are likely to be felt for some time yet.



**Participatory Citizenship: before and after the autumn 2008 financial crisis**

**Key:**

Change across time	
Increase more than 20%	
Increase more than 10%	
Increase more than 0%	
Decrease more than 0%	
Decrease more than 10%	
Decrease more than 20%	







**Trust in the EU**

*Table 4.1: Changes in trust towards the EU between 2008 and 2010*

EU country	Change in % between EB May 2008 and Dec 2010
Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia	
Belgium, Czech, Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Netherlands, Sweden	
France, Malta, Romania, Slovenia	
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Spain	




## Trust in national parliament

Table 4.2: Changes in trust in national parliament between 2008 and 2010

EU country	Change in % between EB May 2008 and Dec 2010
Hungary	
Italy, Sweden	
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, UK, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland Slovakia.	
France, Germany, Lithuania	
Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Malta, Romania Slovenia	
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Spain	

## Values: Human rights

Table 4.3: Changes in values towards human rights between 2008 and 2010

EU country	Change in % between EB May 2008 and Dec 2010
Portugal, Spain	
Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Romania Slovenia	
Latvia, Slovakia, Sweden	

## Values: Democracy

Table 4.4: Changes in values towards democracy between 2008 and 2010

EU country	Change in % between EB May 2008 and Dec 2010
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden	↗
Portugal, Spain	↘

## Participation: Voted in last national election

Table 4.5: Changes in voting in national election between 2006 and 2010

EU country	Change in % between ESS 2006–07 and ESS 2010
Estonia	↗ ↗
Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden	↗
Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain	↘

## How does Participatory Citizenship contribute to the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy in the social and economic sphere?

In the context of the economic crises we have noted that the policy focus has turned almost entirely towards economic policy. In this section we will examine the relationship between Participatory Citizenship and wider economic and social goals.

Although Participatory Citizenship can be considered a desirable objective in and of itself, it is interesting to explore whether it helps to achieve other positive outcomes as well. Two of such outcomes are particularly valuable to examine since they are often presented as mutually incompatible objectives – **competitiveness and social cohesion**. There are good reasons to think that Participatory Citizenship has positive effects on both competitiveness and social cohesion and can contribute to reconcile both objectives. Engaged citizens who take responsibility and can mobilise others to work together are likely to be more productive employees than disengaged workers. Their high levels of participation and volunteering are

likely to enhance social cohesion by fostering trust, solidarity, social inclusion and mutual understanding (European Volunteer Centre 2010).

We examined the links between Participatory Citizenship on the one hand and competitiveness and social cohesion on the other, by aggregating the data on the six indicators of adult Participatory Citizenship, as described in the previous section, to the national level and by correlating this data with a number of national-level indicators for competitiveness and social cohesion. These indicators are:

**Competitiveness**

- Country ranking on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)\*
- Country ranking on the Innovation Index (II)\*
- Percentage engaging in lifelong learning in the last 12 months\*\*
- Percentage of internet users\*\*

**Social cohesion**

- Mean of trust in the national parliament (10 point scale)\*\*
- Mean of trust in the European Parliament (10 point scale)\*\*
- Mean of trust in other people (10 point scale)\*\*
- Percentage not feeling discriminated against\*\*
- Mean of feeling safe walking alone after dark (4 point scale)\*\*

***Policy Implications***

The correlations show that **Participatory Citizenship is strongly related to both competitiveness and social cohesion** (see Table 4.6 below). All the indicators of Participatory Citizenship, except having voted in the last elections, are positively related to all indicators of the two outcomes (barring feeling discriminated against). However, as the correlations represent cross-sectional analyses, we cannot be sure about the direction of causality. In all likelihood the relationships represent mutually reinforcing links between Participatory Citizenship on the one hand and competitiveness and social cohesion on the other. However, whatever the direction of causality, **Participatory Citizenship is clearly inextricably linked to major economic and social objectives, which underlines the relevance of the phenomenon for policy makers.**

Table 4.6. Links between Participatory Citizenship, competitiveness and social cohesion (correlations)

	Indicators of Participatory Citizenship					
	Equality and tolerance	Voted in last election	Conventional political participation	Less conventional political participation	Voluntary work: political	Voluntary work: non-political
Competitiveness						
GCI	.80**	ns	.40*	.78**	.50**	.75**
Innovation	.71**	ns	.39*	.70**	.47*	.71**
Lifelong learning	.81**	ns	.55**	.81**	.65**	.84**
Internet use	.53**	ns	ns	ns	.50**	.63**
Social cohesion						
Trust in parliament	.51**	.48*	.57**	.66**	.42*	.54**
Trust in EP	ns	ns	.50**	ns	.46*	.38*
Trust other people	.80**	ns	.58**	.78**	.64**	.81**
No discrimination	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Feeling safe	.65**	.39*	.64**	.69**	.39*	.57**

\*\* Correlation significant at the .01 level; \* correlation significant at the .05 level.

Note: N = 28 for all correlations

## Conclusions

This chapter has reflected on the barriers and key challenges for Participatory Citizenship in European countries using qualitative data from the 27 country fiches and quantitative data from the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer surveys. Together the two sets of data provide a **sound overview of the main barriers and challenges**, both preventing citizens from participating and also barriers preventing policy makers from addressing this area, and how they can be addressed both now, in 2012, and in the coming years. It is interesting to note the volume of and consistency in identification of barriers and challenges across the 27 EU member states at short (one year i.e. 2012), medium (two to three years i.e. 2013 to 2015) and long term (five to ten years, i.e. 2016–20) levels.

- At short-term level the main barriers and key challenges are: **lack of monitoring and evaluation**, which is preventing policy makers from being able to identify needs and best practices, and, as a result, develop a strong evidence base on which to take decisions; the impact of the **economic crisis** on policy, the continuity of programmes and organisations and funding and the great level of surrounding stress and uncertainty; the important role of **education and training**; and, the declining levels of **trust** and confidence in politics and politicians.
- At medium-term level the key barriers and challenges concern the need to strengthen, maintain and stabilise the **structures** that underpin Participatory Citizenship, particularly in communities and civil society, and the recognition of the importance of the **European dimension**.
- At long-term level the main barrier and key challenge concerns the need for awareness of new problems and challenges in the face of incessant **global change** at and beyond European level.

There is less volume and consistency in the responses of European countries as to how these barriers and challenges can be overcome now and in the future. This leaves room for much greater collaboration between European countries. Many of the **solutions** are the flip side of the barriers and key challenges such as reversing cuts in funding. The main suggested **short term** solutions recommend the need for strong and decisive political leadership at all levels to guide European countries through and out of the current economic and financial crisis and an overall strengthening of Participatory Citizenship as part of this process of recovery. The solutions at **medium term** level seek to address issues of infrastructure, funding and approach. They include a strengthening of communities and civil society, more open and transparent government at all levels and a repositioning of the European Union and its institutions so that they are perceived to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The main solution at **long term** level is about strengthening the European dimension.

European countries were also clear about the key role for the European Union and its institutions in relation to Participatory Citizenship. They came up with a wide range of actions that the EU and its institutions should take, both now and in coming years, to help to solve the main barriers and key challenges for Participatory Citizenship in Europe. This underlines a **recognition of and support for the EU and its institutions as part of the solution going forward**. The key actions for the EU concerned those around the themes of **co-ordination, funding, facilitation and leadership**. They suggested the need for the EU to help with grassroots movements, to link up developments within and across countries so that good practice and solutions could be shared, and to work proactively together with countries to evolve a stronger European dimension to which ordinary citizens could relate.

The analysis of the quantitative data from the European surveys shows a **decline in trust in democratic institutions** in European countries, particularly those that are suffering the most from the effects of the economic recession. **However, levels of trust in democratic values and participation remain largely unaffected**. This chimes with the results from the analysis of the qualitative country fiche data at policy level. It suggests that people in European countries still believe in the **democratic values** that underpin Participatory Citizenship. What they want to do is to find solutions, in partnership with each other and with politicians and political institutions, including the European Commission, to reinforce those democratic values, in the face of the economic recession, and build stronger democratic society and communities at all levels from local through to European and global. It is perhaps through involvement in such partnerships that citizens can become involved in reconfiguring democratic institutions, from the grassroots up to the European level, in ways that they understand so that such institutions are seen as working for them and for their communities and interests and not against. If successful, the result would be that such citizen involvement in this process would help to rebuild trust in democratic institutions across Europe that has been damaged by the current economic recession.

In the final section of this chapter we found that engagement in **Participatory Citizenship is strongly related to the EU 2020 policy goals of competitiveness and social cohesion**. The likely interpretation of the results is that the relationships represent mutually reinforcing links between Participatory Citizenship on the one hand and competitiveness and social cohesion on the other. Whatever the direction of causality, **Participatory Citizenship is linked with major economic and social objectives, which strongly underlines the relevance of this phenomenon for policy makers**.

# Chapter 5. Relationship between Participatory Citizenship at different levels

This chapter will explore the relationship between Participatory Citizenship at different levels, namely between local, regional, national and European forms of Participatory Citizenship. It will do so by drawing on two data sources. First, qualitative data from the country fiches from the 27 EU member states and from telephone interviews with experts in European networks and European umbrella organisations and second, quantitative data from the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS).

Following this introduction the chapter goes on to explore the qualitative data from a range of perspectives. It begins by summarising the main findings from the policy overview (Chapter 1) and barriers and key challenges to Participatory Citizenship (Chapter 4) in relation to local, regional, national and European levels. It then focuses on the relationship between the 'European dimension', as defined by the EU, and local, regional and national perspectives. This is achieved in two ways. The first is by summarising the views of national experts as to the policy strength of the '**European dimension**' in each European country and the reasons for the differences in strength across countries. The second concerns EC plans to designate 2013 as the European Year of Citizens and a summary of country views as to what the focus of this 'Year of' should be. Finally, the views of experts, who have considerable experience of networking across European countries, are set out on the interrelationship of Participatory Citizenship at different levels.

The chapter then examines the quantitative data and the findings from a short analysis on the drivers of trust and political participation for young people. It seeks to find out the extent of any relationship between what they do at a national and a European level. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion which summarises the main points arising about Participatory Citizenship at different levels and, in particular, between the European and other levels.

## Policy emphases

The **country fiches** were designed to gauge the emphasis, nature and extent of policies concerning Participatory Citizenship across the 27 EU member states. They were compiled by experts in the consortium working with national experts in each country. The experts collected information and data concerning the range and types of policies which were being developed at differing levels – local, national, regional and European – within and across European countries. The main outcomes of this policy overview were set out in detail in Chapter 1 of this report. There are five main outcomes that relate explicitly to the differing levels of policy activity. The overview found that:

- 1) the effect of **the current economic recession** is that European countries, particularly those that are most affected by the recession, are increasingly turning inward to local, regional and national policies and issues and away from the European dimension;
- 2) the European dimension is strongest through **EU funded programmes**, where European funding triggers national funding and encourages cross-country collaboration, and that such programmes and funding are important in central and eastern European countries;
- 3) most policy activity is focused on the **local, regional and national** level (i.e. it is country specific) rather than European level;

- 4) the European dimension is considered in policy terms where it **bisects** local, regional and national concerns, for example in the case of the movement of people across Europe that then throws up issues of social and community cohesion which need to be addressed within countries and communities; and
- 5) certain **aspects** of Participatory Citizenship have a broader European dimension such as the growing emphasis on the economy and entrepreneurship in an attempt by countries to become more competitive in Europe.

### **Barriers and key challenges**

The country fiches also explored the nature of the **barriers and key challenges** concerning Participatory Citizenship as seen by national experts in each country. A considerable number of **short** (over the next year i.e. 2012), **medium** (over the next two to three years, i.e. 2013 to 2015) and **long term** (over the next five to ten years, i.e. 2016–20) barriers and key challenges were identified, as well as suggestions as to how they might be overcome going forward. In terms of barriers and key challenges for Participatory Citizenship at different levels there were three pertinent findings:

- 1) immediate, **short-term** barriers and key challenges were focused on the level of local, regional and national, in other words they were **inward looking** at country level rather than outward looking at European level;
- 2) barriers and key challenges at **medium** and **long term** were focused not just on local, regional and national issues but also recognised the importance of the **European dimension**. However, countries suggested that for the European dimension to help overcome barriers and challenges that it needed to be **redefined** so that it fitted better with the national context for policy makers, organisations and citizens in European countries; and
- 3) the European dimension should be seen in **pan-European** not just EU terms and should include involvement other European organisations, such as the Council of Europe, and EU accession and non-EU countries.

### **The European dimension**

The country fiches also contained a question in Section 2 on Concepts, Definitions and Goals in relation to policy for Participatory Citizenship about the priority given to the European dimension. Table 5.1 below summarises the responses from experts in the 27 European countries.

*Table 5.1: Policy priority of the European dimension*

<b>Priority given to European Dimension</b>	<b>Country</b>
<b>High priority</b>	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania (5 countries)
<b>Medium priority</b>	Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Spain and Sweden (8 countries)
<b>Low priority</b>	Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, the UK (14 countries)

It reveals that the European dimension is a **low policy priority** in over half of EU member states. Many of these countries are in western and northern Europe, and are stable, long-established democracies who have been member of the EU for a considerable period of time. The group also contains three countries, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia, who were admitted as EU members only recently in 2004. It is a **medium policy priority** in a further eight



countries, who are drawn from across Europe. It is a **high policy priority** in only five countries. Interestingly, these countries are the newest members of the EU having joined from 2004 onwards. The table suggests that relative time of joining the EU influences the extent to which the European dimension remains a high policy priority.

Country experts in EU member states were also asked to give reasons for the priority given to the European dimension. This helps to shed light on the reasons why the relationship between the European dimension and local, regional and national perspectives is stronger in some countries compared to others.

In those countries that classified the policy priority to be **high** the main reasons given for this classification concerned; the newness and pride of being an EU member state (Estonia, Lithuania and Romania) and the opportunity to participate in EU projects and policy, particularly in education and lifelong learning (Cyprus, Lithuania and Bulgaria).

The main reasons given in those countries where the policy priority was classified as **medium** were those about: the opportunity provided to link local, regional, national and European levels (Greece); to understand what it means to be a citizen of the EU (Hungary, Poland and Malta); the chance to learn about integration and intercultural understanding, particularly in relation to migrants (Spain); and helping new member states and challenging anti-EU populist sentiments (Austria).

The main reasons given by those countries who rated the policy priority for Europe as **low** were concerned with: an emphasis more on local, regional and national issues rather than European ones (Finland, Latvia, Slovenia, Belgium, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Ireland, the UK, Slovakia and Luxembourg); anti-European sentiments, particularly by xenophobic nationalist elements (Denmark, Latvia, Ireland and Finland); and, a lack of understanding of and/or a poor definition of the European dimension in relation to national citizenship (Finland, Slovenia, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK).

This suggests that the degree of strength of the European level in European countries is determined, to a large extent, by how far it is understood within the perspective of local, regional and national levels and how far it contributes to those levels. The greater the understanding and contribution, the stronger is the interrelationship between European, national, regional and local levels of Participatory Citizenship. Conversely, the interrelationship is weaker where there is less understanding and contribution. In the policy lens of European countries the European level is viewed very much within the perspective of the national and local.

### ***2013 European Year of Citizens***

The country fiche also contained questions concerning the EC proposal to designate **2013 as the European Year of Citizens (EY2013)** and asked for suggestions from those in member states to the EC as to what the focus of and activities for the year should be. This was as an attempt to gauge the degree of support for the European level in the medium term coming years (i.e. 2013 to 2015). A positive finding is that there were no countries that thought the proposal was a waste of time; rather many welcomed it as an opportunity to boost the profile of Participatory Citizenship as a policy priority at all levels – local, national, regional and European. If the EC deemed the EY2013 to be important then it might convince countries to do likewise. However, some countries expressed reservations about its purpose, aims, levels of funding and likely success of the EY2013. This was based on their experience of involvement with other European ‘Years of’ in recent years, such as most recently the European Year of Volunteering. There were particular concerns that the EY2013 might be high on rhetoric but low actual, realisable activities, would have limited financial support from Europe and that there would be insufficient planning and preparation time to make the most

of the year. However, despite these reservations the majority of those who contributed to the country fiches in European countries came up with a range of suggestions for what the EY2013 should seek to do, how it should be organised and what outcomes it should aim for. This underlines continuing recognition of the need to link local, regional and national levels with the European level, particularly in the medium and long term in future years.

The suggestions contained a number of **common themes**. They included: the need for **real funding and financial support** at European level that those at national, regional and local level could access; having a **clear aim, purpose, message and motto** for the EY2013 and a **firm idea of the target audiences**. Those in countries were clear: that the year should be **led by citizens** at national and local level and be focused on a 'Year of Listening to EU Citizens' and/or raising 'Questions about European Participatory Citizenship' to help the EU to get more in tune with changing needs at local and national level and to use that learning to adapt their policies, practices and rhetoric; about the importance of taking a **pan European stance** and working with other organisations such as the Council of Europe and non-EU countries; about the need for a **'bottom up' focus** on what citizens and countries wanted from the year rather than a 'top down' view imposed by the EC (It was felt that if it was the latter, the 2013 Year could fail, cause further damage the standing of the EU in countries, and be likely to exacerbate anti-EU sentiments); and focus on **grassroots projects and initiatives** across countries with the aim of identifying and sharing good practice.

Suggested **practical activities and actions** for the 2013 European Year of Citizens included: Participation Days; information campaigns; training events for teachers on European democracy, institutions and EU citizen rights and responsibilities; focus groups in every country with key audiences, such as schools, young people, NGOs and youth groups focused on common topics and themes and pulling the outcomes together using the internet and new social media and networking; a publication on economic and entrepreneurial interdependence in Europe; a Handbook on the History of Democracy in Europe; and intercultural activity weeks, among others.

The support and suggestions for the EY2013 highlight the importance of the European level of Participatory Citizenship chiming with issues and perspectives at local, regional and national level. There is a strong sense in the suggestions that those in European countries feel that the European dimension, particularly as conceived and promoted by the EC, is in danger of being out of kilter with how Participatory Citizenship is conceived and viewed at local, regional and national level, particularly with the negative effects of the current economic crisis on the fabric of many European countries. There is a desire to bring the European level into line with thinking and practice at local, regional and national. However, for this to happen there needs to be much **clearer dialogue and listening between the EC, member states and citizens**.

### ***Cross European work – bridging the divide between European and national and local level practices***

It is perhaps not surprising that the European level is of **clear importance** to those who are involved in European networks and with European umbrella NGOs. The European dimension is central to their work and facilitating the feeling of European identity explicitly or implicitly forms part of their everyday practices. The reasons given for the importance of the European level is that it provides innovation and activates participatory forms of citizenship on issues, such as human rights and equality, where national and local level funding is less available. The experts interviewed stated that it is important for their members because they **meet people from other European countries, share new perspectives, learn from alternative solutions to common problems and find out new ideas of what is possible**.

However, the local level is considered the base from which change takes place and the connection from the local to the European level is sometimes missed, for example, the

European citizens' initiative is often unheard of on the local level. In general, **at the local and national level there is a limited knowledge of the benefits of European dimension** to citizenship engagement projects and little understanding of European citizenship beyond free movement across borders.

For European NGOs and networks bringing the European level together with the national level has its difficulties as there are often **national restrictions** such as: the time of teachers to be available for European projects; the national curricula that need to be taught in a specific country; national funding criteria that do not facilitate or even restrict other European partners; and, different or no accountability on the national and local level. These restrictions **often create barriers to the long term sustainability of projects with a European dimension**. The current economic crisis has enhanced these problems further as the national and local partners of European networks and NGOs have often to spend so much time trying to raise money to stay afloat that they are unable to focus on the work of the NGO let alone making the connections with Europe. All these difficulties lead to frustration for national and local level partners, who already understand the positive benefits of the European level, as they are unable to achieve it within their everyday practices.

### **Relationship between Participatory Citizenship at the local, national and European levels**

We also carried out a short analysis of data from the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) to understand the relationship between different levels of participation. The analysis sought to investigate the extent of any relationship between what young people do or intend to do at a local, national and European level. We ran some statistical models (using multilevel logistic regression) on the IEA ICCS data on young people aged 14. The first model was to examine the relationship between different levels of voting and in particular factors that facilitated dispositions towards voting in European elections. The results showed that by far the **strongest relationship with intentions to vote in the European elections is the intention to vote in national elections** (for details of the results please contact the authors). The second highest relationship is with voting in local elections. This suggests that there is a relationship between voting at the different levels although we cannot say from this analysis the direction of this relationship. **Interest and trust in the European Parliament were also related to voting in European elections.**

In a second model we looked at the relationship between trust at different levels (national, European and global level). We used a similar statistical analysis (multilevel logistic regression) but this time we focused on trust in the European Parliament. The results show that there was a strong relationship between trust of national civic institutions and trust in the European Parliament (for details of the results please contact the authors). The strongest relationship, however, was between trust in the United Nations and trust in the European Parliament. This suggests that trust on one level supports trust at another level but again we cannot state the direction of this relationship. The relationships with other variables were very small in comparison to these two factors.

### **Conclusions**

This chapter has sought to explore the nature of the relationship between Participatory Citizenship at local, regional, national and European levels, using qualitative and quantitative data. It has found that European country policy emphases are largely driven by **national and local level perspectives**. These perspectives link with the European level only where the European dovetails with priorities and issues at local and national level and/or where there is access to EU projects and funding. Barriers and key challenges to Participatory Citizenship are also largely conceived from a local and national level, though there is a recognition among European countries that the European level is part of the solution to these challenges

in the medium (next two to three years) and long term (next five to ten years). However, it is suggested, particularly in light of the current economic crisis and the need to make the most of scarce resources and time, that the European dimension would benefit from a **pan-European** level approach that includes the EC working in collaboration with other European organisations, such as the Council of Europe, as well as non-EU countries.

In terms of policy priority for the European dimension, currently more countries give this level a low policy priority rather than a medium or high. This is because of a growing lack of understanding of what is meant by the European dimension and how it fits with the local and national. There is support for the idea of **2013** being designated as the **European Year of Citizens**. However, that support is conditional on the year succeeding in changing the current European dimension, as conceived by the EU, and dovetailing it more closely with local and national Participatory Citizenship policies, practices and needs. The EY2013 also needs to have a clear aim, outcomes and real funding if it is to have impact and legacy. There are frustrations among those involved in cross-European network and NGOs that **cross European working** through projects, initiatives and programmes is not as effective, or as 'joined up', as it should or could be.

Finally, the analysis of ICCS data reveals how for young people the values they hold and actions they take at national level, in terms of trust and participation, influence what they value and how they act at a European level. This confirms the central finding in this chapter that it is vital to maintain and strengthen links between the perspectives on Participatory Citizenship at local, regional, national and European levels. However, evidence outlined in this chapter indicates that, despite goodwill on the part of experts in European countries, it is becoming harder to maintain and strengthen such links in the current climate. The dual impact of a shift in governments across European countries in recent years, some of whom have vocal nationalist minorities who have anti-EU sentiments, and the impact of the current economic crisis which is forcing countries to focus even more on national and local issues and perspectives, is making it difficult to ensure a connect with the European level.

# Chapter 6. Relationship between different forms of participation

The aim of this chapter is to provide policymakers with evidence about the relationship between different forms of Participatory Citizenship. The particular focus regarding this question is the relationship between collective actions such as volunteering and individual actions such as voting. As we have seen from the policy overview in Chapter 1 there is an increasing policy emphasis on community volunteering as a method of learning citizenship. In this context, this chapter explores the extent to which **community volunteering increases the chances of political volunteering and whether volunteering per se increases the likelihood of voting**. The hypothesis for this chapter is based upon theories of social capital (Putnam 2000). According to social capital theories community volunteering forms the basis of confidence, self-efficacy and trust that leads to political participation and voting.

**Classification of categories**

For this chapter we categorise voluntary activities into two groups. One group represents community volunteering; the other represents political volunteering.

Community volunteering	Political volunteering
Social welfare service for the elderly, disabled and/or deprived people	Labour unions
Religious or church organisations	Political parties or groups
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	Social political action-groups
Professional associations	Human rights groups
Youth work	Environmental, conservational, and/or animal rights groups

The analysis below compares the degree of community volunteering with political volunteering in European Union member states and examines how strongly these two forms of volunteering are related.

**Method**

For this analysis we used data from the last wave of the 2008 European Values Study (EVS). We constructed two indicators according to the above mentioned groups of volunteering (for details please contact the authors). Thirdly we used a single item asking the intention to vote in the next general elections.

**Results**

At first glance, the general levels of volunteering could be understood to be relatively low compared to other surveys (see Figure 6.1, Appendix C). This is probably because individuals are being asked if they are currently involved in volunteering.

The second impression gained from the results is that there **are huge differences between European Countries. For instance in the Netherlands almost half of the population is volunteering in one or the other way, yet in Poland this is only true for less than ten**


**per cent.** The countries with the highest levels of volunteering are the Nordic and the Benelux countries and Slovenia. The countries with the lowest levels of volunteering are those of eastern Europe and some Mediterranean countries with recent experiences of totalitarian regimes.

When examining those who volunteer, a general result is that there is **more participation in community volunteering compared to political volunteering.** In countries with higher levels of volunteering this can be seen more clearly.

Compared to the more varied and generally higher rates of participation in community volunteering, across different countries **the rates of political volunteering seems to be more consistently low.** Only in countries, with recent (since the Second World War) experiences of totalitarian regimes, can we find similar or even higher proportions of political volunteering compared to community volunteering. This can be explained by the theory that **political upheavals can lead to more political participation.**

The Slovenian country fiche explains that in phases of political upheaval people that have not been involved in the political field before but have been active in the community and civil society tend to then engage also in the political domain for a while. These people (who may have strong ties with specific cultural groupings and/or religions) may substitute the political elite for a while, but tend to go back to their fields once a new political system is established. Exceptional historical periods offer new opportunities for political participation, while at the same time the political elites of the past are eliminated or denied access. In this situation it seems more possible for people from **community volunteering** to find a place in **political volunteering.** In addition people may feel the need to get more actively involved in politics in times of political transformation. In this sense **community volunteering could be interpreted as an assurance for the stability of a political system.**

Figure 6.1: Countries ranked by participation in voluntary work (ranked by either form of voluntary work)




In order to analyse the link between **political volunteering** and **community volunteering** we calculated correlations between the volunteering activities in both sectors and between the volunteering and the intention to vote in the next general elections.

The first result of this analysis is that within the population of **all European countries a positive and statistically highly significant correlation exists between community and political voluntary work** (see Figure 6.2. below). Howard and Gilbert (2008) found similar results on the basis of ESS 2002, but they did not provide country specific information. With regard to the strength of this correlation we do not see a consistent link to different European regions, current political situation or historical experiences.

The correlation between each of the two forms of voluntary work and the intention to vote (see Figure 6.2) gives an important result that in no country is there a significantly negative correlation between either form of voluntary work and the intention to vote. **This means that volunteering especially in community areas does not absorb citizens' energy for voting.** But it is also true that volunteering per se does not necessarily lead to voting. In less than half of the EU member states we find a **significantly positive correlation between volunteering and the intention to vote; namely in Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Slovakia.** In a majority of countries we do not find a significant result regarding this correlation.



Figure 6.2: Correlation community with more voluntary work



In order to analyse the effect of volunteering on voting in more depth we calculated the relative chance for developing the intention to vote for different groups of people (odd ratios). We distinguish within each country people that are participating in political volunteering and community volunteering as well as people who are not involved in volunteering at all (see Table 6.1).

### **Results**

The results show that:

**Political volunteering is connected with at least a three times higher chance to develop an intention to vote** in one third of the European Union member states. These countries cover far more than half of the EU population. In the rest of the countries the results are also positive, but on a lower level.

**Community volunteering is connected with at least a two times higher chance to develop an intention to vote** in 10 EU member countries. Again these countries cover more than half of the population of the EU. For the rest of the countries the results are also positive on a lower level.

In 11 EU member states **those who do not volunteer** have about as **half as high, or even smaller, chance to develop a positive intention to vote** in the next election. Again these countries cover more than half of the EU total population. For the rest of the countries the results are less clear.

**Overall, volunteering seems to be a positive context for voting**, but it is also true, that volunteering does not explain a high amount of variance in people's intentions to vote.

### **Conclusion**

The relationship between political volunteering and community volunteering is complex and the direction of the relationship is not established. In most countries community volunteering is much more common than political forms. Also, in most countries the majority of people volunteering in political fields tend also to be volunteering in the community. **We could suggest therefore that community volunteering within a society can provide more than support for services. It could be argued, building from this analysis, that community volunteering can provide a positive context for individuals to develop the competences for political engagement.** However, when and how to facilitate community volunteers to engage politically needs further investigation. Currently it is not happening everywhere.

**Participation in volunteering increases the probability for voting for more than half of the European population.** This result supports the theories of social capital development espoused by Putnam 2000. However, as yet, we do not know why this result is statistically significant for only half of the European population. In addition, for those countries in which there is a positive relationship between volunteering and voting we do not know the processes involved. One possibility from social capital theory is that volunteering helps to increase confidence, self-efficacy and trust which then lead to greater political engagement (Amna and Zetterberg 2010).

## Policy Implications

We have found evidence that supports the idea that **community volunteering can enhance political engagement**, or at least develop a resource for political engagement should political mobilisation be necessary in times of political upheaval. **Thus there is some evidence to support strategies on volunteering that are aimed at learning citizenship more broadly.** However, these strategies would benefit from more detailed research of the processes involved between volunteering and political engagement.

Table 6.1: Relative chance to find the intention to vote in the next election for different groups of people

People participating in political volunteering	People participating in community volunteering	People who do not volunteer
Austria	Austria	Austria
Belgium	Belgium	Belgium
Bulgaria	Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Croatia	Croatia	Croatia
Cyprus	Cyprus	Cyprus
Czech Rep.	Czech Rep.	Czech Rep.
Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
Estonia	Estonia	Estonia
Finland	Finland	Finland
France	France	France
Germany	Germany	Germany
Great Britain	Great Britain	Great Britain
Greece	Greece	Greece
Hungary	Hungary	Hungary
Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
Italy	Italy	Italy
Latvia	Latvia	Latvia
Lithuania	Lithuania	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
Malta	Malta	Malta
Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands
Northern Ireland	Northern Ireland	Northern Ireland
Poland	Poland	Poland
Portugal	Portugal	Portugal
Romania	Romania	Romania
Slovakia	Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia
Spain	Spain	Spain
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden

NB: Overview on the relative chance for the intention to vote in the next election on the basis of different forms of volunteering: Highlighted in green are odd ratios greater than 3; highlighted in yellow are odd ratios greater than 2; highlighted in pink are odd ratios smaller than 0.5

# Chapter 7. Towards identifying models of citizenship in policy and engagement

The aim of this chapter is to begin to identify different models of citizenship that occur within Europe. The idea for the development of models is based on typologies that have been developed on welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and social cohesion (Green et al. 2009). In this chapter we attempt to identify regimes of citizenship based upon the civic republican, liberal, communitarian and critical citizenship models which we first described in the contextual report. This chapter is slightly experimental as we try to bring together the different types of data that we have collected for the Participatory Citizenship study. From the contextual report we draw on the models of citizenship, from the country fiches the different levels of policy emphasis on the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship (political participation, community engagement, political civil society and democratic values) and from this report, the 2008 European Values Survey data on levels of adult engagement.

## Citizenship models

We will begin with a brief overview of the four models of citizenship that we have described:

- The liberal model of citizenship,
- The communitarian model of citizenship,
- The civic republican model of citizenship,
- The critical model of citizenship.

### *The liberal communitarian model of citizenship*

**The recent liberal focus on actively constructing civil society through volunteering has led to an amalgamation of liberal and communitarian theories in the development of policy.** The **liberal model** of citizenship has historically been considered the least demanding. Citizens' involvement in public life is minimal, and is primarily enacted through the vote (Carpini and Keeter 1989). However, even this political activity is not an obligation. The liberal model posits that, if the state is kept to a minimum, civil society will flourish. Recently, and influenced by Putnam's theories of social capital, liberal policies have emerged that directly encourage local level community engagement and volunteering.

The **communitarian model** has always taken communities as its starting point, rather than the nation of the civic republican model. Citizenship in this context focuses on the identity and feelings of belonging to a group (Jochum 2010). Communitarian ideas have led to an emphasis on the responsibility and duties of individuals to others in their community, as well as the need to support structures that undergird and maintain communities and shared values (Etzioni 1993).

Since the two theories are increasingly intertwined, for the purposes of this chapter, we will combine the liberal and the communitarian models of citizenship as the **liberal communitarian** model of citizenship. The assumption would be that countries that fit this model would put greater policy emphasis **on volunteering and the community and less on political engagement**. In addition, these countries would **have higher than average levels of volunteering**.

### ***The civic republican model of citizenship***

The civic republican model of citizenship emphasises the need for citizens to **act politically within the public sphere**, and to be actively engaged within a political community as equal and free citizens. Thus the notion of civic responsibility developed from this view. Compared to the liberal tradition, this approach places more of an obligation and value in political engagement and involvement in political decision making in particular on a national level.

The civic republican approach also highlights the need for citizens to learn common values, including the values of public spiritedness, solidarity, and the responsibility to act for the common good (Honohan 2002, p. 147), often referred to as 'civic virtues'.

The assumption would be that the major policy emphasis for countries that apply this model would be either **on political engagement and/or on common values**. If the policy emphasis is in keeping with the values and practices of people in these countries then we would expect that there would be comparatively high levels of political engagement and/or high scores towards the values which the policymakers are advocating.

### ***The critical model of citizenship***

The critical citizenship model **emphasises the need for critiquing and improving society through social and political action based on the ideas of empowerment and social justice**. This model focus on a more dynamic view on democracy that is formed from critical and engaged citizens focusing on equal participation in the power relations of democracy. The values promoted are equality and justice.

We would expect that the policy emphasis for countries that follow this model would focus on policies that facilitate political civil society activities. In addition, there would also be a policy emphasis on the values of equality and social justice.

In summary our three models are based on the assumption that there could be two forms of the **civic republican model**, one that focuses on political participation and one that focuses on common values, a **liberal communitarian model** that would focus policy emphasis on community activities such as volunteering and finally, a **critical citizenship model** that would focus on encouraging political civil society activities.

### **Methods of analysis**

In order to find out from a policy perspective **which citizenship model is more prevalent**, in the country fiches a question was asked about the strength of policy emphasis on political participation, community engagement, political civil society and democratic values. We asked the experts to give a level for policy emphasis to each one (major emphasis = 3, some emphasis = 2, little emphasis = 1, no emphasis = 0). This question was asked for the areas of education policy, availability of funding for citizenship projects and political rhetoric. We only selected countries where the experts provided a clear guidance on the levels of policy emphasis. The scores were added together from the three areas (education policy, finance of citizenship projects and political rhetoric) in order to provide a general guide to policy emphasis in a country (See table 7.1 in Appendix D). The comparisons of the actual scores for policy emphasis are only made within a country in order to understand overall where the highest policy priorities are placed. The logic behind this is that it is difficult to compare the strength of a policy emphasis across different countries.

## Results

Only two countries gave equal priority to all dimensions: Poland and Malta. These two countries appear not to have any policy preference between citizenship models in terms of policy implementation. Several countries gave the highest scores to two dimensions. The Czech Republic and Lithuania gave the equal highest scores to both political and community activities. Spain, demonstrating a typical civic republican approach gave equally high scores to political participation and democratic values. Denmark gave the highest scores to community and values policies. Slovakia was the only country that gave no priority to one dimension and this dimension was political participation. Hungary gave the next lowest score also to the dimension of political participation and this was for rhetoric rather than funding or education. Interestingly, both Hungary and Slovakia have below average citizens' intentions to vote.

No country gave the highest emphasis to political civil society activities suggesting that the critical citizenship model is not the overriding emphasis for any European country at the moment. This can be justified in terms of governments not wishing to interfere in non-governmental political activities and organisations who hold them accountable. However, a critical citizenship model would probably place greater emphasis on learning the role and responsibility of political civil society within citizenship education. According to the fiches only Bulgaria, Greece and Spain had a major emphasis on political civil society in their Citizenship Education.

### ***Civic republican models***

The two models of civic republicanism, one focusing on political participation and the other on values, were found in countries across Europe and will be explained below. Most countries in Europe focus their major policy attention on one of the two dimensions.

#### ***Civic republican political participation model***

Many countries placed the highest policy emphasis on political participation including Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece and Italy (who showed a major policy emphasis in all three aspects of policy analysed) and also Ireland and Latvia.

Examples of countries' policies are:

- The major policy focus in Germany in the field of citizenship is political education. It has an important and well established tradition within the curriculum.
- In Finland, the national government constructed a civic activity programme (2003–2007) to enhance political participation. One of the outcomes was a 'democracy department' at the Ministry of Justice.
- In Italy in 2009 a new curriculum topic was introduced that focused on political participation called '*Cittadinanza e Costituzione*'.
- In Greece one of the explicit aims of their lifelong learning programme is civic participation.

In order to see if there could be links between policy and country norms we compared the policy emphasis on political participation with actual levels of intended voting and political volunteering (see Table 7.2 in Appendix D). From the countries that gave a major emphasis on political participation, the Austrian, Finnish and Greek adults all have above average intentions to vote and political volunteering. Ireland and Italy are above average for voting whilst Latvia is above average for political volunteering. Germany is not above average for either of these forms of political engagement suggesting a gap between implementation and

practice. Only for some countries do we find the coherence between policy and norms of engagement.

In sum we could say that there are three countries that consistently fit the civic republican political participation model as they combine a major emphasis on political participation in policy with high levels of engagement in politics. These countries are **Austria, Finland and Greece**.

### ***Civic republican values model***

Countries that placed the highest emphasis on policies that enhance certain values were: **Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and Spain** (the latter two giving equal top priority to other dimensions).

The following are example of policies from these countries:

- In the field of education Sweden has explicitly stated in the curriculum the values of human rights and freedoms, diversity and equality and freedom and integrity.
- In France the values of liberty, equality, fraternity, laïcité (secularism), Human rights, tolerance, rule of law and citizen duties are explicitly taught.
- In Spain the values explicitly taught are co-existence and learning to behave accordingly, knowing and exercising rights, respecting others, showing tolerance, cooperation and solidarity among people and groups through dialogue and preparation for active citizenship and to respect human rights and the pluralism of a democratic society.
- In the education system in Bulgaria the values of democracy, human rights and ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity are included as an essential part of school curriculum.
- Estonia derives its values for the national curriculum from the ethical principles specified in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the basic documents of the European Union. General human values (honesty, compassion, respect for life, justice, human dignity, respect for self and others) are enshrined as core values, as are social values (liberty, democracy, respect for mother tongue and culture, patriotism, cultural diversity, tolerance, environmental sustainability, rule of law, solidarity, responsibility and gender equality).
- An alternative approach to teaching values outside the school environment, are policies in Denmark from the previous government (before mid-2011) where there was a focus on migrants and their values within government programmes that were specifically targeted at reducing extremism such as the '*Action plan for prevention of extremist attitudes and Radicalisation among youths*'.

The values of equality and human rights supported by the Bulgarian, Swedish, Estonian and French education system are values which would also be supported by the critical citizenship model. The values of citizenship duties taught in France, patriotism in Estonia and the Danish policies targeting at extreme values would follow more the traditional and more nationally focused civic republican concept of values. Whereas the Spanish and Bulgarian values of tolerance would follow more of a liberal model towards diversity of values.

Most of these countries support some degree of tolerance and gender equality. The second step then was to evaluate the extent that these countries adopted the norms of equality and tolerance within the norms of their country. Sweden, Denmark, France, Hungary and Spain score on or above the average on the value of gender equality and Denmark, Sweden,

Spain and France also score above average on tolerance (see Table 7.2, Appendix D). However, **Bulgaria and Estonia score well below the average on gender equality and tolerance indicating a gap between policy and reality.**

From this analysis there are four countries; **France, Denmark, Spain and Sweden** emerge as having a fairly consistent citizenship model based on values that we have named the Civic republican values model. However, the values which are being emphasised are different.

### ***Liberal communitarian model***

A focus of policies on the community could be considered as a modern indicator of liberalism as the focus is less on politics and the state and more on charity and volunteering. The countries that indicate that this is the highest policy emphasis for education, funding and political rhetoric are the **UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Lithuania.**

- The focus for policy towards young people in both the UK and the Netherlands is currently directed more towards enhancing young peoples' volunteering in the community and less on developing political literacy;
- In England the new civic service for eventually all 16 years old to have a volunteering experience is an example of this;
- In Denmark the focus is more on social integration, for example, their action plan on extremist attitudes focusing on working with minorities; and
- In Lithuania in 2007 funding was target at national and local community projects from the Civic and National Education Programme.

In a second step we looked at the actual levels of non-political volunteering of adults. Volunteering in the Netherlands is the highest out of the countries studied and well above the average which supports their position within this model. Denmark and Belgium are also considerably above average on levels of volunteering. England (measured using the wider data on Great Britain) is close to the average, whilst Lithuania is considerably below the average. We would thus suggest that the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and perhaps also England fit in terms of policy and practice into the liberal communitarian model of citizenship. For Lithuania there is again a gap between policy and implementation.

### ***Mixed models***

The clearest finding is the fact that most countries have a mix of citizenship models within their policy portfolio and it is the minority of countries that have a clear pattern emerging from both policies and attitudes.

## **Conclusions**

This chapter draws together the theories of citizenship, policy information and norms of engagement from survey data to search for coherent patterns between policies and engagement that would suggest a particular citizenship model for each of the countries considered.

We found three citizenship models:



- Civic republican political participation model: Austria, Finland and Greece;
- Civic republican values model: France, Denmark, Spain and Sweden; and
- Liberal communitarian model: Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and England.

Denmark is the only country that consistently appears to have two models. Moreover, most countries, are applying a mixture of models both in policy and in terms of norms of engagement reflecting the influences of civic republicanism, liberalism and critical citizenship models within European concepts of citizenship. The process of sharing policy approaches and good practices across Europe may have supported this interweaving of policy approaches. The models should therefore primarily be understood as ideal-typical constructs that countries utilise and merge rather than strict regimes that rigidly apply to certain countries.

# Chapter 8. Conclusions from the analytical investigation

In this study we have completed a thorough analysis of Participatory Citizenship across the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) covering **policy, practice and engagement**. From the analysis of the evidence from the country fiches, we can draw a number of conclusions and recommendations in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy for 'smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' and more specifically the 2013 European Year of Citizens and the next phase of the Europe for Citizens Programme 2014 to 2020. A major recurrent theme throughout this report has been the **current global financial and economic crisis** and the barriers that it has created for sustaining civil society and participatory projects as a whole. Our conclusions will focus on possible effective, targeted and innovative strategies to tackle head-on, the challenges of austerity on Participatory Citizenship and democracy in Europe.

## The impact of the economic crisis

Across many European countries the **economic crisis** has led to an increasing focus on internal national and local political concerns rather than broader European perspectives. The subsequent policy focus has turned almost entirely on **economic competitiveness**, with policies on education emphasising science and technology above social and political learning. **Policies regarding Participatory Citizenship have yet to be placed at the forefront of policy solutions to the economic crisis** and those policies which have emerged are situated in terms of the economic benefits, for example, the benefits of volunteering on skills for the labour market.

One of the main consequences of the economic crisis on the field of Participatory Citizenship has been that a considerable **reduction in funding** across all levels and dimensions including national, local and private sector contributions. There remains funding for some citizenship integration projects such as the courses for migrants on the learning of languages and job related skills but much less funding is left for Participatory Citizenship projects in the broader sense of the term that we have used for this study that include political civil society, traditional politics, democratic values and other forms of community projects. The strains of the cuts in funding have been noted in civil society across Europe and at the European level with European wide NGOs noting the difficulties for national and local NGOs to become engaged at the European level when they are focused on finding funding merely to keep their organisations afloat. The effects have been felt at all levels and have challenged policies that have previously supported the participation and engagement of citizens in decision making in policies that influence their lives. Although European wide, the analyses of the policy fiches has indicated that the cuts on civil society activities have been felt the most in the newer democracies with fledgling civil societies (e.g. central and eastern Europe).

Whilst, **levels of engagement** amongst youth and adults have yet to be consistently influenced by the economic crisis (keeping in mind the caveat that the collection of quantitative data provides a picture of the state of play between 2008–10 and not 2012) we can already see a **loss of faith in politicians and political institutions** across EU member states. There has been a dramatic reduction in attitudes of trust in national and European institutions in particular in Spain, Ireland and Greece. The evidence shows that citizens across European countries are continuing to believe in the democratic process but consider that the current political leaders and political institutions are not working for them as ordinary

citizens. In the medium and long term we could expect that reductions in trust may well eventually lead to lower levels of engagement and disaffection from the political system. We could suggest that this may well have immediate implications for voter turnout in the **European elections in 2014** if issues of trust are not tackled fairly quickly.

In the context of a growth strategy (such as EU 2020) to alleviate the economic crisis, the analysis conducted for this study has shown that **Participatory Citizenship, economic competitiveness** and **social cohesion** are **interrelated** and may well be mutually reinforcing each other. Thus countries that have the characteristics of being highly competitive tend also be highly participatory with high levels of social cohesion, for example, the Nordic countries (see Chapter 2). Speculating from this evidence we could suggest that focusing only on the short term economic imperative may miss the broader and long term perspective. **Strategies that include innovative participatory and social cohesive elements that move beyond job related skills could prove a useful balance particularly for young people in periods of high youth unemployment.**

### **Effective strategies for enhancing Participatory Citizenship**

In the context of tight budgets and under the societal stress of austerity, it is more than ever necessary to highlight and identify **effective strategies** for enhancing Participatory Citizenship in Europe. From the analyses conducted for this study, the evidence suggests that the main driver to enhance participatory forms of citizenship is **learning**. The results give general hints about the relationship between learning and citizenship and evidence for particular strategies that work. The general evidence points to learning broadly as a characteristic of the participatory citizen with the active citizen having:

- higher levels of educational attainment;
- greater number of expected years of education (youth expected voting);
- higher performance on a civic knowledge and skills test (youth expected voting);
- greater participation in lifelong learning; and
- more informal learning through watching politics on the TV and discussing political and social issues with parents and friends.

For adults, **education and lifelong learning** have a positive relationship with all forms of participation. Time spent on the web also has a positive association with engagement of adults suggesting alternative forms of access to knowledge are becoming increasingly important. There has been an increasing policy emphasis on **e-participation** across Europe with most of the dimensions of Participatory Citizenship. This includes not only programmes that keep citizens informed but also programmes to increase openness of government and gain citizens perspectives in the policy process. **The good practice report from this study will provide examples of how this can be successfully achieved.**

In addition to learning, the evidence suggests that **wealth** is also a factor that relates to all forms of adult participation; however, it does not have the same relationships with all forms of expected youth participation. This suggests that there are opportunities for preventing exclusion from engagement from the age group of 14 years upwards. The place where most 14 years olds can be found is **school**. One way to support disadvantaged youth to engage more is through carefully constructed **citizenship programmes** in the school environment that focus on getting the most disadvantaged involved.

## **Successful methods for learning Participatory Citizenship**

For young people the evidence, both from existing literature and from the analysis completed for this study, consistently points towards the fact that **situated forms of learning** citizenship tend to be the most effective in facilitating all dimensions of participatory forms of citizenship. **Situated learning** means that the learning takes place **in a relevant environment** to the content. In a school this means that learning citizenship is effective when situated in a **real life civic context** such as influencing decisions that have real consequences and influence on the lives of students and the how the school is run, making connections with decision making in their local communities and involvement in simulations of real events such as mock elections.

In addition, an open and safe environment for discussion across all school subjects has consistently over the years been shown to be a crucial factor. A key characteristic of young people who have aspirations to engage was their levels of **efficacy** (the belief that it is worthwhile to get involved and a belief that as an individual or collectively in a group it is possible to make a difference). It is rather likely that if young people experience **fruitful and meaningful civic opportunities** to engage in school and in their local communities in particular, when they can see that their actions can and have made a difference, then they are likely to enhance their citizenship aspirations as they move into adulthood.

In terms of strategies that encourage political engagement, the evidence points towards the fact that **volunteering** can increase the likelihood of voting. As expected the relationship is stronger if the volunteering is **politically orientated**. There also seems to be a strong relationship between less-political forms of volunteering and more political volunteering. This provides some evidence that promoting volunteering per se can enhance political engagement, or at least develop a resource for political engagement should political mobilisation be necessary in times of political upheaval. Further research is needed on the processes that are involved in the relationship between volunteering and voting and the underlying factors that can enhance this relationship.

The evidence suggests that there are links between **different levels of participation**, for example, if you vote on a local and national level you are more likely to vote on a European level. However, there are challenges in bringing the different dimensions of participation together. Most projects that achieve a European dimension are funded by the European Union. European level NGOs and some local and national NGOs appreciate the European dimension but find it hard to achieve in terms of national funding and national requirements. This means that there is **a clear risk to the impact sustainability of such projects**. In the current economic crisis with policy agendas turning inwards towards national and local needs it could be that that the connection between the national and the European level becomes somewhat more strained and tenuous.

## **Going forward**

In the current context of the economic crisis there appears to be more **new barriers and key challenges** to Participatory Citizenship appearing within and across European countries than drivers. In this situation **innovative ideas** are needed that enable **effective citizen led engagement projects** to be developed and sustained. To support this process there is a need for the **evaluation** of effective strategies through an updated evidence base (including both qualitative and quantitative research) such as this study provides. This evidence can be used to inform decision making at European, national and local level. In addition, there is a need for mechanisms that help to share this **evidence base**, for example, the Active Citizenship and Civic Competence Indicators, proposed ICCS 2016 follow up study, the new Eurydice study, national (e.g. CELS/CiT in England) and local studies and evaluations. This

evidence base would be especially beneficial if it goes beyond the traditional tried and tested approaches and forms of engagement to cover new and innovative practice. In addition, it would be necessary to capture how attitudes and beliefs are changing among differing age groups within and across countries. The strategy for such an evidence base agenda echoes similar calls to those that have been made within the debates concerning social innovation in Europe.

### **A European strategy for developing active measures to support democracy during the continued economic crisis**

During moments of economic hardship it is necessary to make clear arguments as to why **Participatory Citizenship** is as important as economic strategies for sustainable growth. The arguments can be summarised in two ways:

- 1) The evidence shows that, **economic competitiveness** goes hand in hand with Participatory Citizenship and social cohesion. An effective strategy would be to focus on all three pillars as they appear to be mutually reinforcing each other. Citizen led social innovation is an example of this.
- 2) In the current time of sustained economic difficulty and high unemployment, countries are turning inwards towards **national concerns**, in addition, and historically, this has led to a rise in support for nationalistic, anti-democratic and anti-immigration movements that could in time threaten the stability of democracy and democratic values. In the current context of high levels of youth unemployment it is possible that youth can become alienated and disengaged from the system and turn to these alternatives. Learning Participatory Citizenship can be a strategy to prevent this.

Developing the arguments forms the beginning of the second step of such a strategy on providing sustainable funding and support. Assuring sustainable funding and support for Participatory Citizenship programmes needs to be secured across all the sectors that support and facilitate the learning of Participatory Citizenship including: schools, youth sector, adult learning and targeted programmes at specific groups.

In order to achieve the most from the limited resources funding should be aimed towards:

- a) Established **effective practice** such as those that focus on **real life citizenship learning** contexts and practices that make connections with decision making in their local communities.
- b) Funding for **innovative projects** that could lead to new ideas in this field combined with **evaluation** and methods for **sharing new practice**.

The limited resources should be funded towards specific needs;

- c) Programmes and projects should be tailored to the **specific regional, national or local needs** from the evidence provided. For example, in southern and eastern Europe the focus for learning needs to be on the 14 plus age group to support the progression between high levels of citizenship aspiration into actual levels of adult engagement. In addition, gender equality is an issue that needs to be tackled here.
- d) A tailoring of specific programmes or projects towards **specific groups**. There needs to be a focus on disadvantaged groups including youth from underprivileged families and those youth who are currently unemployed towards. The evidence suggest that it is these groups who need the most support in facilitation to ensure that their voices are heard in political decisions that influence their lives.

## **The role of the European Union (EU) and its institutions**

The role of the European Union (EU) and its institutions in this field should be as a leader in **promoting and raising awareness of the importance of Participatory Citizenship** and thus sending a signal to other stakeholders about the importance of this topic. As one of the main stakeholders across and beyond Europe, the EU can take the lead in **coordinating** with other European institutions, agencies and NGOs in this field to enhance and share innovation in good practice. It equally has the position to be able to facilitate and engage with **global networks** on global issues that are relevant to Participatory Citizenship such as on climate change.

The second major role of the European Union and its institutions is the continuation of funding of Participatory projects across the sectors involved including the **Europe for Citizens Programme**, and the youth and education programmes within the new programme Erasmus for all.

The third major role of the European Union (EU) and its institutions is to fund, stimulate and share **research and evaluation** on the state of play, innovative and effective types of citizenship practice that help inform policy and practice.

Specific policy recommendations can be made in terms of short, medium and long term solutions. These are deliberately brief, in this report, as they will be further developed in the Policy recommendations report.

### **Short/medium-term policies**

#### ***2013 European Year of Citizens***

The recommendations coming from the country fiches suggest that the EY2013 should be led by citizens at national and local level and be focused on a 'Year of Listening to EU Citizens' and/or raising 'Questions about European Participatory Citizenship' to help the EU to get more in tune with changing needs at local and national level and to use that learning to adapt their policies, practices and rhetoric. The 'bottom up' approach to the EY2013 that was called for within the open letter to the EP on from civil society organisations chimes well with the needs expressed in the European wide country fiches.

#### ***2014-2020 The Europe for Citizens programme***

The programme should be orientated towards providing sustainable support for civil society organisations focusing on funding on what works and innovative and targeted strategies. The 'Valorisation' dimension should focus on developing, enhancing and sharing the evidence base of innovative and effective practice.

### **Longer term policies**

The European Union and its institutions can take a lead on using innovative Participatory Citizenship practices as a policy tool to combat long term challenges that are the focus of the EU 2020 strategy and individual countries cannot solve e.g. economic growth and competitiveness, climate change, globalisation and migration. If European institutions can be reconstructed to be part of democratic, caring and listening solution that involves citizens in co-constructing the policy agenda one could posit that this would enhance a sense of belonging and help to rebuild and regain trust among citizens in Europe and its institutions.

## Appendix A. Introduction – European Perspective Interviews

Name	Date	Organisation
<b>M. Mauri Uusilehto</b> Europe for Citizens Point Finland	27/10/2011	CIMO (Centre for International Mobility) Hakaniemenranta 6 – P.O. Box 343 FI- 00531 Helsinki Tel: +358/ 207 868 500 Email: <a href="mailto:mauri.uusilehto@cimo.fi">mauri.uusilehto@cimo.fi</a> Web: <a href="http://www.cimo.fi">http://www.cimo.fi</a>
<b>Elvire Fabry</b> Think tank Notre Europe	8/11/2011	19 rue de Milan – 75009 Paris – France Tel: 01 44 58 97 82 Web: <a href="http://www.notre-europe.eu">www.notre-europe.eu</a>
<b>Oana Balutescu</b> Europe for Citizens Point Romania	30/11/2011	Centre for Research and Consultancy in the field of Culture Barbu Delavrancea Street 57, RO - 011353 Bucharest Tel: +40/ 21 316 60 60 Email: <a href="mailto:oana@eurocult.ro">oana@eurocult.ro</a> Web: <a href="http://www.europapentru cetateni.eu">www.europapentru cetateni.eu</a>
<b>Georg Pirker</b> DARE network secretary	1/12/ 2011	c/o Arbeitskreis deutscher Bildungsstätten AdB (e.V.), Mühlendamm 3, D-10405 Berlin Tel: +49 - 30 - 400 401 17 Email: <a href="mailto:pirker@adb.de">pirker@adb.de</a>
<b>Robin Sclafani</b> Director CEJI	2/12/ 2011	CEJI - A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe 8 Rue Amédée Lynen, 1210 Brussels Tel : +32 (0)2 344.34.44 Web: <a href="http://www.ceji.org">www.ceji.org</a>
<b>Viviana Galli</b> Secretary General OBESSU	5/12/ 2011	OBESSU – Organising Bureau of European School Student Unions Rue de la Sablonnière, 20 1000 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 6472390 Web: <a href="http://www.obessu.org">www.obessu.org</a>
<b>Tania Berman</b> President Erasmus Student Network	8/12/ 2011	Erasmus Student Network Rue Hydraulique, 15 B-1210 Brussels, Belgium Tel: <a href="tel:+3222567427">+32 2 256 74 27</a> Mobile: <a href="tel:+3220477567889">+32 (0) 477 567889</a> Email: <a href="mailto:president@esn.org">president@esn.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.esn.org">http://www.esn.org</a> – <a href="http://galaxy.esn.org">http://galaxy.esn.org</a>
<b>Shannon Pfohman</b> Deputy Director – Policy	8/12/ 2011	ENAR – European Network against Racism 60, Rue Gallait (3rd floor) B - 1030 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 240 57 23 Email: <a href="mailto:shannon@enar-eu.org">shannon@enar-eu.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.enar-eu.org/Page_Generale.asp?DocID=15276&amp;langue=EN">www.enar-eu.org/Page_Generale.asp?DocID=15276&amp;langue=EN</a>
<b>Laurie Boussaquet</b> Professor of Political Science	9/12/ 2011	University of Rouen (France) Author of a report on the first participatory experiments organised at the European level Email: <a href="mailto:laurie.boussaquet@gmail.com">laurie.boussaquet@gmail.com</a>

## Appendix B: Chapter 2 – Rates and Trends of Participation

### Data coverage

For the EVS data we focused, where possible, on the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, and 4<sup>th</sup> waves as most EU countries participated in all three waves. For the CIVED 1999 and ICCS 2009 data, it must be noted that some EU countries did not participate in either of the surveys and some only participated in one. We have only considered the 17 countries which participated in both so as to assess change across time. It is important to note that the comparisons between the youth and adults' data can only be made between countries which participated in the EVS wave 2008 and both sets of IEA youth citizenship data (Bulgaria, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and England/Great Britain).

The ICCS 2009 survey has a four point response format, for example, 'strongly agree,' 'agree,' 'disagree,' and 'strongly disagree'. However, in the CIVED 1999 study there was an additional 'don't know' category. As a result of this change it was only possible to compare the percentage of a specific response rather than the mean. We considered the category of 'strongly agree' to be the least affected by the removal of the 'don't know' category. Therefore we have compared the percentage of respondents who have strong convictions i.e. they 'strongly agree' or 'certainly do' the stated activity.



## Voting: National elections

Figure 1.1. EVS 2008: 'If there were to be a general election tomorrow would you vote?' (Percentage of respondents who would vote)





Figure 1.2. ICCS 2009: Intention to vote in a general election when an adult (percentage that would certainly vote).



## Civil Society and Volunteering: Participation in unpaid work in environment, conservation and animal rights organisations

Figure 2.1. EVS 2008: 'Are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for conservation, environment, ecology or animal rights?' (percentage of adults that do this)





Figure 2.2 ICCS 2009: 'Have you been involved in an environmental organisation?' (percentage that have within the last 12 months)



**Civil Society and Volunteering: Participation in unpaid work for trade unions or youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union**

Figure 3.1. EVS 2008: 'are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for trade unions?' (percentage that are)






Figure 3.2. ICCS 2009: Youth that have been involved in a youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union (percentage who have in the last 12 months)




## Protest: Participation in peaceful protests

Figure 4.1: EVS 2008: Adults that have taken part in political action by attending lawful demonstrations (percentage of respondents that have taken this type of action)<sup>5</sup>



<sup>5</sup> For this item only countries that participated in all three waves of EVS were included.


Figure 4.2: ICCS 2009: Youth expected to take part in a non-violent or peaceful process in the future (percentage that would certainly do this)






**Protest: Signing a petition/collecting signatures**

Figure 5.1. EVS 2008: Take political action by signing a petition (percentage of adults that have taken this type of action<sup>6</sup>)




<sup>6</sup> For this item only countries that participated in all three waves of EVS were included.

Figure 5.2. ICCS 2009: Youth expected to collect signatures for a petition (percentage that would certainly do this)




### Ethnic tolerance: Migrant groups have the same chances to jobs

Figure 6.1. EVS 2008: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people over immigrants' (percentage that disagree with this statement – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude)<sup>7</sup>




<sup>7</sup> For this item only countries that participated in all three waves of EVS were included.

Figure 6.2. ICCS 2009: 'All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get good jobs in this country' (percentage that strongly agree with this statement – the higher the agreement the more positive the attitude)




**Gender equality: Men and women have equal chances to jobs**

Figure 7.1. EVS 2008: 'When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women' (percentage of respondents who disagree with this statement – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude towards gender equality)<sup>8</sup>



<sup>8</sup> For this item only countries that participated in all three waves of EVS were included.

Figure 7.2. ICCS 2009: 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women' (percentage that strongly disagree with this statement – the higher the disagreement the more positive the attitude towards gender equality)



## Appendix C: Chapter 6 – Relationship between different forms of participation

Table 6.1: Frequencies of different forms of voluntary participation (version with two codings for no voluntary work)

Countries (with split ups)	Relative Frequencies of Voluntary Participation – %					Intention to vote in the next election
	both political and community voluntary work	only political voluntary work	only community voluntary work	no voluntary work (not mentioned)	no voluntary work (coded as no response)	
Austria	5.6	4.4	15.2	74.7	0.1	84.8
Belgium	4.6	4.0	22.7	68.1	0.5	96.1
Bulgaria	4.5	3.1	5.1	87.2	0.1	69.0
Croatia	2.2	2.8	7.8	74.4	12.8	78.1
Cyprus	3.8	4.2	7.5	84.5	0.0	88.3
Czech Republic	5.6	4.3	15.7	71.9	2.5	65.9
Denmark	7.9	4.7	22.4	33.4	31.7	97.3
Estonia	5.4	3.2	12.6	78.7	0.0	68.3
Finland	7.6	5.7	21.4	65.3	0.0	88.6
France	3.1	3.1	15.3	78.3	0.2	89.6
Germany	2.1	3.1	15.7	78.9	0.2	79.5
Great Britain	2.8	2.0	14.0	80.9	0.2	74.6
Greece	2.9	3.6	7.2	86.3	0.0	88.8
Hungary	0.9	1.9	8.0	89.2	0.0	74.2
Ireland	4.3	2.1	14.3	18.4	60.9	91.3
Italy	4.1	2.9	14.2	3.0	75.8	85.8
Latvia	4.6	4.8	13.0	77.2	0.4	73.8
Lithuania	2.5	5.1	7.3	85.1	0.0	63.9
Luxembourg	11.0	3.7	25.8	59.4	0.1	75.4
Malta	1.4	0.9	11.5	86.1	0.0	91.7
Netherlands	10.9	4.1	30.0	54.5	0.5	88.0
Northern Ireland	3.8	0.8	13.2	25.6	56.6	70.0
Poland	0.5	1.6	5.6	90.7	1.5	65.6
Portugal	4.2	1.7	5.3	86.5	2.3	72.5
Romania	3.9	2.5	6.4	87.2	0.0	75.8
Slovakia	2.5	2.2	7.8	82.8	4.7	79.2
Slovenia	7.2	3.4	17.9	70.0	1.5	73.8
Spain	1.5	2.7	8.0	87.4	0.4	82.3
Sweden	4.9	3.4	18.1	73.6	0.0	94.6

## Appendix D: Chapter 7 – Towards identifying models of citizenship in policy and engagement

Table 7.1 Policy emphasis given for each country for the four dimensions of Participatory Citizenship

	political	community	civil society	values
Austria	9	7	5	7
Belgium FL	4	6	3	3
Bulgaria	7	7	5	9
Cyprus	6	4	4	5
Czech Republic	5	5	4	4
Denmark	4	8	4	8
Estonia	5	8	6	9
Finland	9	7	6	5
France	7	6	2	8
Germany	9	6	5	7
Greece	9	7	8	8
Hungary	1	8	3	9
Italy	9	7	7	8
Ireland	7	6	3	6
Latvia	7	5	3	5
Luxembourg	5	4	3	4
Lithuania	9	9	8	5
Malta	3	3	3	3
Netherlands	6	7	5	6
Poland	6	6	6	6
Portugal	3	3	2	5
Romania	6	5	5	5
Slovenia	3	8	5	7
Slovakia	0	2	3	5
Spain	8	7	7	8
Sweden	5	7	7	9
UK	7	9	3	7



Table 7.2: Attitudes and participation from EVS 2008 – %

	<b>voting</b>	<b>volunteering</b>	<b>equality</b>	<b>political volunteering</b>	<b>tolerance</b>
Austria	84.0	21	67	10	25
Belgium FL	96.1	28	79	9	42
Bulgaria	69.0	10	58	8	5.2
Cyprus	88.3	12	48	8	6
Czech Republic	65.9	22	59	10	16
Denmark	97.3	30	96	13	65
Estonia	68.0	17	73	8	21
Finland	88.0	29	85	12	25
France	89.5	18	85	6	55
Germany	79.5	18	65	5	29
Greece	88.8	10	59	7	19
Hungary	74.2	9	84	3	9
Italy	85.8	18		7	28
Ireland	91.3	18	71	6	23
Latvia	73.8	18	71	10	12
Luxembourg	75.4	37	77	15	47
Lithuania	63.9	10	63	8	4.3
Malta	91.7	13	58	2	4.4
Netherlands	88.0	41	85	15	59
Poland	65.6	7	65	3	20
Portugal	72.5	9	64	6	19
Romania	75.8	10	57	7	21
Slovenia	73.8	25	81	10	16
Slovakia	79.2	11	54	5	8.2
Spain	82.3	10	71	5	29
Sweden	94.6	23	97.5	8	77
UK	74.6	17	68.5	5	24

## **Appendix E: Contributors to the Country Fiches and Good Practices**

### **Austria**

Georg Heller, BA, Assistant at the Centre for Democracy Vienna (Demokratiezentrum Wien) and Werner Wintersteiner, Professor at the University of Klagenfurt and Founding Director of the Centre for Peace Research and Peace Education.

### **Belgium**

#### *French speaking region*

France Clément, Alain Michel and Luce Pepin, European Institute for Education and Social Policy (EIESP), France

#### *Flemish speaking region*

(FeProf. Dr. Wiel Veugelers, University of Humanistic Studies, Utrecht, Netherlands, Dr. Anton Derks, Flemish Ministry of Education and Training and Dr. Dimokritos Kavadias, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels

### **Bulgaria**

Dr Svetla Petrova, Head of Department 'Analyses and International Projects', Centre for Control and Assessment of the Quality in School Education Ministry of Education, Youth and Science

### **Cyprus**

Bruno Losito, Associate Professor and Paola Mirti, Researcher, Roma Tre University

### **Czech Republic**

Dr. Dana Moree, Assistant Professor, Charles University of Prague, Faculty of Humanities

### **Denmark**

Hans Dorf, Associate Professor, Department of Education, Aarhus University, Denmark

### **Estonia**

Einar Värä. Chief Expert, Department of General Education, Ministry of Education and Research

### **Finland**

Tom Gullberg, Ph.D and Senior Lecturer in didactics of history and civics, Abo Akademi University

### **France and European interviews**

Jean Gordon European Institute for Education and Social Policy (EIESP), France  
Antoine Bevort, National Academy for Arts and Crafts (CNAM), France; and  
Alain Michel, European Institute for Education and Social Policy (EIESP), France

### **Germany**

Hermann J. Abs, Professor of Education Research. Institute for School Pedagogy and Citizenship Education, University of Giessen, Germany

Tilmann Kammler, Research Assistant at the Institute for School Pedagogy and Citizenship Education, University of Giessen, Germany

### **Greece**

Eleni Kostelidou, MA Education and Human Rights, Institute of Education, University of London & National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece; Bruno Losito, Associate professor, and Paola Mirti, Researcher, Roma Tre University. Italy

### **Hungary**

Eniko Pap, Programme Manager, Active Citizenship Foundation, Hungary and Zsuzsanna Szelényi, Foundation Chair; in consultation with Judit Lannert and Annamária Gáti, TÁRKI-TUDOK Educational Research Ltd and Rita Galambos, Foundation for Democratic Youth

### **Ireland**

David Kerr, NFER Research Associate and Professor of Citizenship Education, Birkbeck College, University of London

### **Italy**

Bruno Losito, Associate Professor, Roma Tre University

### **Latvia**

Dr. Paed. Liesma Ose, Associate Professor at the Higher School of Management and Social Work, Attistiba, Riga

### **Lithuania**

Hans Dorf, Associate Professor, Aarhus University, Department of Education, Denmark

### **Luxembourg**

Prof. Dr. Wiel Veugelers, University of Humanistic Studies, Utrecht, Netherlands

### **Malta**

Bruno Losito, Associate Professor, and Paola Mirti, Researcher, Roma Tre University, Italy

### **Netherlands**

Prof. Dr. Wiel Veugelers and Drs. I. de Groot, Researcher, University of Humanistic Studies, Utrecht, Netherlands

### **Poland**

Professor Marek Kwiek, Centre for Public Policy Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences. Poznan University, Poland.

### **Portugal**

Bruno Losito, Associate Professor, and Paola Mirti, Researcher, Roma Tre University, Italy

**Romania**

Monica Maria Dvorski, Executive President of the Foundation Centre of Education 2000+. Romania

**Slovakia**

Marian Kisdurka, Project Manager, Slovak Governance Institute, Slovakia

**Slovenia**

Janez Krek, Associate Professor, and Mateja Peršak, Research Assistant, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Education

**Spain**

Bruno Losito, Associate Professor, and Paola Mirti, Researcher, Roma Tre University, Italy.

**Sweden**

Emily Rainsford, PhD student, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, England.

**United Kingdom**

David Kerr, NFER Research Associate and Professor of Citizenship Education, Birkbeck College, University of London and Lisa Nash, NFER Research Associate

## References

Abs, H.J. and Veldhuis, R. (2006): *Indicators on Active Citizenship for Democracy – The social, cultural, and economic domain*. Paper by order of the Council of Europe for the CRELL - Network on Active Citizenship for Democracy. Ispra, Italy. <http://www.pedocs.de/volltexte/2009/1879/>

Amnå, E. and P. Zetterberg (2010). A Political Science Perspective on Socialization Research: Young Nordic citizens in a comparative light. In L. R. Sherrod, J. Torney-Purta and C.A. Flanagan (Eds.), *Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth*, pp. 43-66. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Delli Carpini, M. X. and Keeter, S. (1989). *What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Edelstein, W. (2011). Education for Democracy: Reasons and strategies. *European Journal of Education*, 46(1), Part II.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Etzioni, A. (1993). *The Spirit of Community: Rights, responsibilities, and the communitarian agenda*. New York: Crown.

European Values Study EVS 1981-2008 Variable Report - Longitudinal Data File. GESIS-Variable Reports No. 2011/01. GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences. doi: 10.4232/1.4804

European Volunteer Centre (2010). *Volunteering as a Means of Empowerment and Social Inclusion - A bridge between the European Years 2010 and 2011. Final Report - Conference Conclusions*. Brussels: European Volunteer Centre. [http://www.cev.be/data/File/Brussels\\_Report\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.cev.be/data/File/Brussels_Report_FINAL.pdf). GESIS (2011).

Gollob, R. and Krapf, P. (Eds.) (2007-2010). *Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights in School Practice. Teaching sequences, concepts, methods and models*. EDC/HRE Volumes I-VI. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Green, A. Janmaat, J.G. and Han, C. (2009). *Regimes of Social Cohesion*. Centre for Learning and Life Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies at <http://www.llakes.org.uk>.

Green, A., Preston, J. and Janmaat, G. (2006). *Education, Equality and Social Cohesion: A comparative analysis*. London: Palgrave.

Haste, H. (2004). Constructing the Citizen. *Political Psychology*, 25(3): 413-439.

- Honohan, I. (2002). *Civic Republicanism*. London: Routledge.
- Hoskins, B. (2006). *Draft Framework on Indicators for Active Citizenship*. Ispra: CRELL.
- Hoskins, B. d’Homber, B. and Campbell, J. (2008). The Impact of Education on Active Citizenship *European Education Research Journal*, 7(3): 386-402.
- Hoskins, B., Janmaat, J. and Villalba, E. (2011). Learning Citizenship through Social Practice Outside and Inside School: Multilevel Analysis of the Learning of Citizenship. *British Education Research Journal* <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01411926.2010.550271>
- Hoskins, B. and Mascherini, M. (2009). Measuring Active Citizenship through the Development of a Composite Indicator. *Social Indicator Research*, 90: 459-488. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9271-2><http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9271-2>.
- Hoskins, B., Villalba, C. and Saisana, M. (2012). The 2011 Civic Competence Composite Indicator (CCCI-2): Measuring young people’s civic competence across Europe based on the IEA international citizenship and civic education study. Ispra, Italy, European Commission (doi: 10.2788/67938).
- Howard, M. M. and Gilbert, L. (2008). A Cross-National Comparison of the Internal Effects of Participation in Voluntary Organizations. *Political Studies*, 52: 12-32. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00715.x.
- Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaase, M. (1997). Vergleichende Politische Partizipationsforschung. In: D. Berg-Schlosser; F. Müller-Rommel (Eds.). *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. 3, pp. 159-174. Aufl. Opladen (Leske und Budrich).
- Mascherini, M., Manca, A. and Hoskins, B. (2009). *The Characterization of Active Citizenship*. CRELL research paper, EUR 54065 EN. Ispra: European Commission.
- Michael, X., Carpini, D. and Keeter, S. (1993). *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(4): 1179-1206.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Veugelers, W. (2007). Creating Critical Democratic Citizenship Education: Empowering humanity and democracy in Dutch education. *Compare*, 37(1): 105-119.
- Westholm, A., Montero, J. and Van Deth, J. (2007). Introduction: citizenship, involvement, and democracy in Europe. In J. Van Deth, J. Montero and A. Westholm (Eds.), *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A comparative analysis* (pp. 1–32). London: Routledge.

## Other reports from this study

Hoskins, B. et al. (2012) **Contextual Report: Participatory Citizenship in the European Union**, Institute of Education report for EU. Southampton: Southampton University, ISBN 9780854329373.

Hoskins, B. et al. (2012) **Analytic Report: Participatory Citizenship in the European Union**, Institute of Education report for EU. Southampton: Southampton University. ISBN 9780854329380.

Krek, J. et al. (2012) **Good Practice Report: Participatory Citizenship in the European Union**, Institute of Education report for EU. Southampton: Southampton University. ISBN 9780854329397.

Hoskins, B. and Kerr, D. (2012) **Final Study Summary and Policy Recommendations report: Participatory Citizenship in the European Union**, Institute of Education report for EU. Southampton: Southampton University, ISBN 9780854329403.

All the reports for this study are available on the Europe for Citizens website:

[http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/studies/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/studies/index_en.htm)

Electronic copies may also be obtained from Dr Bryony Hoskins (B.Hoskins@soton.ac.uk), to whom any queries relating to the copyright of this series should be addressed.