



# THE 2021 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD

Quantitative data | July 2021

This document contains a selection of graphs with quantitative data from the 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard.




See the complete 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard here

## Efficiency of justice systems

## Developments in caseload

**Figure 3** Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in LV (applied retroactively to 2017), SK and SE (data for 2017 has been adapted to include migration law cases as administrative cases, in line with CEPEJ methodology).

**Figure 4** Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases.

**Figure 5** Number of incoming administrative cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)

(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. Dejudicialisation of some administrative procedures have occurred in RO in 2018. Methodology changes in EL, SK and SE. In SE, migration cases have been included under administrative cases (retractively applied for 2017).

## General data on efficiency

### Length of proceedings

**Figure 6** Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. LV: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, and error checks and data clean-ups in the Court's information system.

**Figure 7** Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases.

**Figure 8 Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court instances in 2019 (\*)**  
(1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> instance/in days)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are available for first and second instance courts in **BE, BG** and **IE**, for second instance courts in **NL**, for second and third instance courts in **AT** or for third instance courts in **DE** and **HR**. There is no third instance court in **MT**. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.

**Figure 9 Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*)**  
(1st instance/in days)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all court instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK, DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. **CY**: in 2018, the number of resolved cases has increased as a consequence of cases being tried together, the withdrawal of 2 724 consolidated cases and the creation of an Administrative Court in 2015.

**Figure 10** Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> and, where applicable, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> instance/in days)

(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data available: for the first instance court in **LU**, and for the second instance courts in **MT** and **RO**, and for the third instance court in **PL**. The supreme or another highest court is the only appeal instance in **CZ**, **IT**, **CY**, **AT**, **SI** and **FI**. There is no third instance court for these types of cases in **HR**, **LT**, **LU** and **MT**. The highest Administrative Court is the first and only instance for certain cases in **BE**. Access to third instance court may be limited in some Member States: **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.

## Clearance rate

**Figure 11** Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*)

(1<sup>st</sup> instance/in % — values higher than 100 % indicate that more cases are resolved than come in, while values below 100 % indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. **IE**: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.

**Figure 12** Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in %)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. **IE**: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

**Figure 13** Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in %)

(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in 2018 = 219%; IT in 2012=279.8%); Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. In **CY** the number of resolved cases has increased as a consequence of cases being tried together, the withdrawal of 2 724 consolidated cases and the creation of an administrative court in 2015.

## Pending cases

**Figure 14** Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.

**Figure 15** Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2017-2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

**Figure 16** Number of pending administrative cases in 2012, 2017 - 2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)

(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (EL in 2012=3.5). Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.

## Efficiency in specific areas of EU law

### Competition

**Figure 17** Competition: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2017 - 2019 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)

(source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)




(\*) **IE** and **AT**: scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions. **AT**: data includes cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not based on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used in **IT**. An empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year. The number of cases is low (below five per year) in many Member States, which can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case.



## Electronic communications

**Figure 18 Electronic communications: Average length of judicial review cases in 2013, 2017 - 2019 (\*)**  
(1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)

(source: European Commission with the Communications Committee)




(\*) The number of cases varies by Member State. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no cases for the year (except **PT** for 2017-19, and **RO** for 2018: no data). In some instances, the limited number of relevant cases (**CY**, **MT**, **SK**, **FI**, **SE**) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and result in large variations from one year to the other. **DK**: quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance appeals. **EE**: The average length of judicial review cases in 2013 was 18 days. **ES**, **AT**, and **PL**: different courts in charge depending on the subject matter.

## EU trademark

**Figure 19 EU trademark: Average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 2017 - 2019 (\*)**  
(1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)


(source: European Commission with the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights)



(\*) **FR**, **IT**, **LT**, **LU**: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. **DK**: data from all trademark cases (not only EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no data on average length due changes in data collection system. **EL**: data based on weighted average length from two courts. **ES**: cases concerning other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length.

**Figure 20 Consumer protection: Average length of judicial review in 2013, 2016, 2018 - 2019 (\*)**  
(1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)


(source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(\*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2019 is low (less than five) in EE, CY, NL, SI and FI. An estimate of average length was provided by EL and RO for certain years.

**Figure 21 Consumer protection: Average length of administrative decisions by consumer protection authorities in 2014, 2016, 2018 - 2019 (\*)**  
(1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)

(source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)




(\*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2019 is low (less than five) in CY. An estimate of average length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years.

## Money laundering

**Figure 22 Money laundering: Average length of court cases in 2014, 2017 - 2019 (\*) (1st instance/in days)**

(source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)



(\*) No data for 2019: **BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, HR, CY and PL**. **BG**: The average length of the cases is calculated from the day of opening the court case to the day of the court decision in months. **LU**: Median- in 201: 36 days, in 2018: 49 days; Average length in 2018: 57 days (7 cases). **ES, NL**: estimated length. **CZ**: Length in months. **HU**: Average number of days was calculated based only on the number of cases resolved with a conviction. **PT**: Average number of days was calculated based on a sample. **IT**: data refer to the responding courts, covering about 99% in 2017; data refer to both trial and preliminary court hearings **CY**: Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average tried within a year. Less serious offences, before the District Courts, take longer to be tried. **SK\***: data correspond to average length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court.


## Quality of justice systems

### Accessibility

### Legal aid and court fees

**Figure 23 Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2020 (\*) (differences in % from Eurostat poverty threshold)**


(source: European Commission with the CCBE)



(\*) **EE**: decision to grant legal aid is not based on the level of financial resources of the applicant. **IE**: partial legal aid has to take into account also the disposable assets of the applicant. **LV**: thresholds vary by municipality, upper limit is represented in the chart. **PT**: Legal aid is a decision taken by the Public Administration, with the Social Security Ministry assessing the applicant's financial conditions under the law.

**Figure 24 Court fee to start judicial proceeding in a specific consumer case, 2020 (\*)** (level of court fee as a share of the value of the claim)


(source: European Commission with the CCBE)



(\*) 'Low value claim' is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2019, this value ranged from €193 in **RO** to €1 824 in **LU**). **ES, PT**: no data were provided. **BG, RO**: no information on court fees for a low value claim was provided. **LU**: Litigants have to pay bailiff fees to start proceedings as a plaintiff unless they benefit from legal aid. **NL**: Court fees for income <€2 325/month. **AT**: The maximum amount of court fee depends on the court's instance. **SE**: Court fees differ in civil matters depending on the type of case. For disputes where the value of the claim is <€2 253, the court fee is €86. In cases where the value of the claim is >€2 253, the court fee is €267. For other types of claims there are other court fees.

**Figure 25 Court fee to start judicial proceeding in a specific consumer case, 2020 (\*) (in EUR)** (level of court fee as a share of the value of the claim)


(source: European Commission with the CCBE)



(\*) Recovery of court fees is decided on a case-by-case basis in **ES** and **EL**. There is no full recovery of court fees by the winning party in and **HU**.

**Figure 26 Recoverability of legal fees in a commercial trial, 2020 (\*) (in EUR) (level of court fee as a share of the value of the claim)**


(source: European Commission with the CCBE)



(\*) For this figure, legal fees do not include clerical costs and VAT, if payable. The hypothetical legal fee for the litigious phase provided for in the scenario is €1 650. Full recovery in systems without statutory fee means that this amount (€1 650) can be recovered. Member States with partial recovery (PL, LV, LU) are sorted by order of the recoverable legal fee (highest to lowest, amounts range from €1 275 – €500). The figure does not include information on the recoverability of legal fees for the pre-litigious phase, which is not envisaged in all Member States. **AT**: scenario not fully applicable to ATs system of reimbursement. **MT**: there is no concept of an hourly legal fee in **MT**, reimbursement is determined based on the value of the claim. **IT**: there is a statutory fee in **IT** (€3 235 in the scenario), but the court can decide on reimbursement within a set range. **LT**: court decides taking into account guidance by the Ministry of Justice, maximum amount in the scenario would be €3 350.

**Figure 27 Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2020 (\*)**


(source: European Commission)



(\*) Maximum possible: 68 points. Aggregated indicators based on the following indicators: 1) website providing information on ADR, 2) Publicity campaigns in media, 3) Brochures for the general public, 4) Court provides specific information sessions on ADR upon request, 5) ADR/mediation co-ordinator at courts, 6) Publication of evaluations on the use of ADR, 7) Publication of statistics on the use of ADR, 8) Legal aid covers (partly or in full) costs incurred with ADR, 9) Full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is successful, 10) No lawyer for ADR procedure required, 11) Judge can act as mediator, 12) Agreement reached by the parties becomes enforceable by the court, 13) Possibility to initiate proceedings / file a claim and submit documentary evidence online, 14) Parties can be informed of the initiation and different steps of procedure electronically, 15) Possibility of online payment of applicable fees, 16) Use of technologies (artificial intelligence applications, chatbots) to facilitate submission and resolution of the disputes and 17) Other means. For each of these 17 indicators, one point was awarded for each area of law. **IE**: administrative cases are subsumed within the category of civil and commercial cases. **EL**: ADR exists in the area of public procurement procedure before Administrative Courts of Appeal. **ES**: ADR is mandatory in labour law cases. **PT**: for civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in case of justices for peace. **SK**: the Slovak legal order does not support the use of ADR for administrative purposes. **FI**: Consumer and labour disputes are also considered to be civil cases. **SE**: judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute settlement is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.

**Figure 29** General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2021, 2017 - 2019  
(as a percentage of GDP)


(source: Eurostat)



(\*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2019 (from highest to lowest). The following data are provisional: **ES** (2019), **FR** (2018, 2019), **PT** (2019) and **SK** (all years). Data extracted 08 April 2021.

**Figure 30** General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2012, 2017 - 2019


(source: Eurostat)



(\*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2019 (from highest to lowest). The following data are provisional: **ES** (2019), **FR** (2018, 2019), **PT** (2019) and **SK** (all years). Data extracted 08 April 2021.

**Figure 31** General government total expenditure on law courts by category (in 2019, as a percentage of expenditure)

(source: Eurostat)




(\*) The following data are provisional: ES (2019), FR (2018, 2019), PT (2019) and SK (all years). Data extracted 08 April 2021.

## Human resources

**Figure 32** Number of judges, 2012-2019 (\*) (per 100 000 inhabitants)


(source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) This category consists of judges working full-time, under the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. AT: Data on administrative justice is introduced in the data since 2016. EL: Since 2016, data on number of professional judges includes all the ranks for criminal and political justice as well as administrative judges. IT: The regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018.

**Figure 33** Proportion of female professional judges at Supreme Courts in 2018 and 2020


(source: European Commission)



(\*) The data are sorted by 2020 values, from highest to lowest.

**Figure 34** Number of lawyers, 2012-2019 (\*) (per 100 000 inhabitants)

(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under CEPEJ methodology a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead and act on behalf of his or her clients, to engage in the practice of law, to appear before the courts or advise and represent his or her clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). **DE**: no distinction is made between different groups of lawyers in Germany, such as between solicitors and barristers. **FI**: since 2015, the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector.



## Training

**Figure 35** Share of continuous training of judges on various types of skills, 2019 (\*) (as a percentage of total number of judges receiving these types of training)

(source: European Commission)




(\*) Figure 35 shows the distribution of judges participating in continuous training activities (i.e. those taking place after the initial training period to become a judge) in each of the four identical areas as a percentage of the total number of judges trained in these types of training. Legal training activities are not taken into account. Judicial training authorities in **EL, MT and PT** did not provide specific training activities on the selected skills. **DK**: including court staff. **AT**: including prosecutors.

## Independence

### Perceived judicial independence

**Figure 48** Perceived independence of courts and judges among the general public, 2021


(source: Eurobarometer)



(\*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.


**Figure 49** Main reason among the general public for perceived lack of independence (share of all respondents - higher value means more influence)

(source: Eurobarometer)



**Figure 50** Perceived independence of courts and judges among companies, 2021 (\*)

(source: Eurobarometer)



(\*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.

**Figure 51** Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all respondents — higher value means more influence)

(source: Eurobarometer)

