

THE 2025 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD

Quantitative data | 2025

Factsheet / July 2025

This document contains a selection of graphs with quantitative data from the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.


See the complete
2025 EU Justice Scoreboard at:
<https://europa.eu/!MVdjDv>



2.1. Efficiency of justice systems


2.1.1. Developments in caseload

Figure 1 Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (1))




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases.

Figure 2 Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders.

Figure 3 Number of incoming administrative cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. Methodology changes in **EL**, **SK** and **SE**.

2.1.2. General data on efficiency


– Estimated length of proceedings –

Figure 4 Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. For **LV**, the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information system. In **PT**, the new Code of Civil Procedure which creates a new enforcement regime entered into force on 1 September 2013. It is based on a new paradigm, which states that court proceedings must be clearly distinguished from out-of-court proceedings. However, so far it has not been possible to adjust the collection of data accordingly and provide the necessary data for this Figure.

Figure 5 Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, up to 2016, in **SK**. For **IT**, the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

Figure 6 Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court instances in 2023 (*) (at first, second and third instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) The order of Member States in the figure is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are available for first and second instance courts in **CY**, **NL** and **IE**, for second instance courts in **HR** and **ES** and for third instance courts in **EL** and **SK**. There is no third instance court in **DE** and **MT**. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.

Figure 7 Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.


Figure 8 Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2023 (*) (first and, where applicable, second and third instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) The order of Member States in the figure is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data available for second instance courts in **BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK** and **FI**, for third instance courts in **CY, LT, LU** and **MT**. The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in **CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI** and **FI**. There is no third instance court for these types of cases in **LT, LU** and **MT**. The highest administrative court is the first and only instance for certain cases in **BE**. Access to third instance courts may be limited in some Member States. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.


– Clearance rate –

Figure 9 Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in % — values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved than come in, while values below 100% indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. In **IE**, the number of resolved cases is expected to be under-reported due to the methodology.

Figure 10 Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)



Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. In **IE**, the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.


Figure 11 Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. In **CY**, the number of resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative court was set up in 2015.


Pending cases

Figure 12 Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**.

Figure 13 Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

Figure 14 Number of pending administrative cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants)
(source: CEPEJ study)




(*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.

2.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law


– Competition –

Figure 15 Competition: average length of judicial review in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(*) **AT**: data for 2014 and 2021 include decisions of the Cartel Court on the substance, not the judicial review of these decisions by the Supreme Court. Since the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the decisions of the Cartel Court are included in the length of proceedings before the national competition authorities (see below). **IT**: an estimation of length was used for 2014, 2021 and 2022. An empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is low (below five a year) in many Member States. This can cause the annual data to rely heavily on one case that is exceptionally long or short (e.g. in **LU** where there was only one case). **ES**: The number of appeals corresponds to the number of companies that filed an appeal against each CNMC decision. **IE**: Not applicable for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as prior to 2023 the CCPC was not empowered to make decisions of the relevant type capable of being judicially reviewed


Figure 16 Competition: average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities in 2021-2023 (*) (in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(*) In the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities has been calculated as follows: the number of days between the first formal investigative measure and the adoption of a final decision by the national competition authority (by the administrative authority or, in Member States with a judicial system, by the court that has the power to adopt a prohibition decision and/or impose or confirm fines). For this reason, the data since the 2024 edition in the above figure cannot be compared to the data published in earlier editions. This calculation method allows for comparable data at EU level for the sole purpose of the EU Justice Scoreboard and may differ from the reporting at national level in certain Member States. **CZ** and **SK** have a two-instances administrative procedure. When appealed, first instances decisions are reviewed by the second instance body of the authority, which may prolong proceedings. **DK**: In 2021, following the transposition of the ECN+ Directive, Denmark moved from a purely criminal enforcement system to a system where the Danish competition authority can now directly apply for the imposition of a fine before a civil court and adopt settlement decisions in its own administrative proceedings. This led to an increase of decisions since 2022. For **AT**, **DK** and **FI**, the length of proceedings covers the combined duration of proceedings before the administrative and judicial national competition authorities. **AT**: data include proceedings relating to a large scale cartel in the construction sector. Due to the size of this case, proceedings triggered by the same first investigative measure were (and still are being) led and concluded successively, gradually distorting the average length of proceedings. **ES** and **IT**: data excludes commitment decisions adopted by the national competition authority. **IE**: Not applicable for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as the CCPC did not have the power to make its own binding administrative decisions in antitrust cases until September 2023 (prior to that date, it could only take enforcement action in such cases through the courts).

– Electronic communications –


Figure 17 Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (first instance/ in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee)



(*) The number of cases varies from one Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no cases for the year. Sometimes, the limited number of relevant cases (**CZ**, **DK**, **IE**, **ES**, **LV**, **AT**, **PT**) can cause the annual data to rely heavily on a single case that is exceptionally long or short; this may result in wide variations in the data from one year to the next. In **DK**, a quasi-judicial body is in charge of first instance appeals. In **ES**, **AT**, and **PL**, different courts are in charge depending on the subject matter.

– EU trademark –


Figure 18 EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights)



(*) **FR, IT, LT, LU:** A sample of cases used for data for certain years. **DK:** Data from all trademark cases (not only EU) in commercial and maritime high courts; for 2023, 372 cases concerning intellectual property law were finalised. 53 were regular civil cases, 275 were handled as small claim procedures and 44 were prohibition proceedings and injunction proceedings. The information on the case processing times is not available. **EL:** Data based on weighted average length from two courts. **ES:** Cases concerning other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length. **PL:** For 2023, the weighted average was calculated on the basis of number of cases resolved. **FI:** For 2023, a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice was requested in one of the two cases. The time during which the case was pending before the Court of Justice was included in the calculation of the average number of days.


– Consumer Protection –

Figure 19 Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network)



(*) **DE, LU, AT:** scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of the relevant consumer rules.. An estimate of average length was provided by **EL** and **RO** for certain years.


Figure 20 Consumer protection: average length of administrative decisions by consumer protection authorities in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network)



(*) **DE, LU, AT:** Not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of the relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average length was provided by **DK, EL, FR, RO** and **FI** for certain years.

- Money laundering -


Figure 21 Money laundering: average length of court cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)



(*) For **PT:** The database was filtered, for each judicial county, by the relevant criteria to reach the information related to money laundering files; regarding the average number of days, the dates of infraction and the date of final decision or closure were taken into account. **CY:** Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average tried within a year. Less serious offences, before the district courts, take longer to be tried. **SK:** Data correspond to the average length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court.

– Anti-corruption –

Figure 22 Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases from 2021 to 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days)
(source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption)




(*) No reply to this question from **DE, IE, ES, IT, CY, MT, PL, SK** and **SE, NL**. In this calculation for 2022, the period starts to run from the date the public prosecution service summons the defendant to appear in court; the period ends on the day when the judge of first instance delivers the final verdict. The average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, account must be taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, it takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average length from first hearing until delivery of the final verdict is 194 days.

2.2. Quality of justice systems

2.2.1. Access to justice

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –


Figure 23 Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2024 (*) (differences in % from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (2))



(*) Calculations are based on 2023 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. **BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, SI, SK, FI**: Legal aid also has to take into account the applicant's disposable assets. **EL**: Beneficiary of legal aid is a person whose capital annual income does not exceed 2/3 of the lowest annual salaries as provided for by the existing legislation. **LU**: A partial legal aid regime was introduced. There is no specific threshold, granting legal aid depends on the overall financial and family situation of the applicant. **BG, HR, LV, MT** and **RO**: No data provided.

2 The 2024 data are collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State). Given that conditions for legal aid depend on the applicant's situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old employed applicant without any dependant or legal expenses insurance, with a regular income and a rented apartment.


Figure 24 Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2024 (*) (amount of court fee as a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (3))



(*) Calculations are based on 2023 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. A 'low-value claim' is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2022, this value ranged from EUR 326 in **BG** to EUR 2 381 in **LU**). **BE**: EUR 24 contribution to the Fund for the second line legal aid; Court registry fees: EUR 50 or EUR 165. Afterwards, if dismissed/convicted: possibly EUR 1 350 for the procedural indemnity. **NL**: Court fees values correspond to a litigant with less than EUR 30 000 annual income. **SE**: The court fee applies if the value of the claim exceeds EUR 2 329.

– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods –

Figure 25 Rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific criminal case, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (4))




(*) The data are gathered based on a specific case study. The amounts are all in EUR, and where needed they were converted from national currencies (71). To take account of the economic differences between Member States the added value of the fee and expense were divided by the comparative price level indices expressed in percentage where the EU- average is 100%, **DK** is 149% and **BG** is 59% (72). This adjusts the sum of fees and expenses that the lawyers receive. **AT**: The Austrian legal aid system is state funded and based on the solidarity of all Austrian lawyers who all participate on a rotation-based system in the legal aid system. In general, the individual lawyer does not receive any direct remuneration for legal aid services. Instead, the Austrian state pays a yearly lump sum to the Austrian Bar for the total of legal aid services rendered by all lawyers. The Austrian Bar distributes this sum to the regional bars on the basis of the number of registered lawyers who provided legal aid services and on the basis of the number of legal aid cases which were handled by the regional bars. The money is used for the lawyers' social security and pension scheme, which is not state funded. **IE**: The legal profession is split into barristers and solicitors. The legal aid each of the professions is entitled to differs. The figure above presents the maximum that could be charged as a fee under the legal aid scheme in the particular scenario.

- The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2023, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State).
- The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State).


– Financial resources –

Figure 33 General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2013, 2021 – 2023 (*)
(source: Eurostat)



(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2023 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2022 for **DE, ES, FR** and **SK** are provisional. Data for **BE, DE, ES, FR, PT** and **SK** for 2023 are provisional. Data for **PL** have a break in series in 2022. Source: Eurostat, Gov_10a_exp

Figure 34 General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2013, 2021 – 2023 (*)
(source: Eurostat)




(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2023 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2022 for **DE, ES, FR** and **SK** are provisional. Data for **BE, DE, ES, FR, PT** and **SK** for 2023 are provisional. Data for **PL** have a break in series in 2022. Source: Eurostat, Gov_10a_exp

Figure 35 Ratio of annual salaries of judges and prosecutors to annual average gross salary in the country in 2023 (*)
(source: Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)



(*) Member States specific comments on the data are accessible in the CEPEJ study (5).

Figure 36 Ratio of annual salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff to annual full-time adjusted average gross salary in the country in 2023 (*) (source: European Commission and Eurostat (6))




(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, in accordance with the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. **AT**: data on administrative justice have been part of the data since 2016. **EL**: since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and civil justice as well as administrative judges. **IT**: Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018.

⁵ https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents

⁶ 2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and Eurostat. The source of data on annual average gross salary used for calculating the ratios in Figures 34 and 35 differ (in Figure 34, they are provided by CEPEJ, using information provided by their national correspondents, while in Figure 35, the source is Eurostat). Therefore, the ratios are not directly comparable between the two figures.


– Human resources –

Figure 37 Number of judges, 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)




(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, according to the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the *Rechtspfleger*/court clerks that exist in some Member States. **EL**: since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and civil justice as well as administrative judges. **IT**: Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018. **AT**: data on administrative justice have been part of the data since 2016.

Figure 38 Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2022 – 2024 (*) (source: European Commission (7))



(*) The data are sorted by 2024 values, from the highest to the lowest.


Figure 39 Number of lawyers, 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)



(*) According to the CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised by national law to plead and act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of law; to appear before the courts or advise and represent their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). **DE:** No distinction is made between different groups of lawyers in Germany. **FI:** Since 2015, the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector.

2.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection

Figure 50 How the general public perceives the independence of courts and judges (*) (source: Eurobarometer (8) – from left to right, light colours: 2016, 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2025)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of 'total good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good' then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very bad'.

Figure 51 Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence (share of all respondents – higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (9))





Figure 52 How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer (10) – from left to right, light colours: 2016, 2023 and 2024, dark colours: 2025)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good'; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very bad'.

9 Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?', see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys

10 Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?', see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys

Figure 53 Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (11))






Figure 54 How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer (12) – from left to right, light colours: 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2024)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident).

- 11 Eurobarometer survey FL555; replies to the question: 'Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (your country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?' if the response to Q1 was 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'.
- 12 Eurobarometer survey FL541, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question Q3: 'To what extent are you confident that your investments are protected by the law and courts in (your country) if something goes wrong?' For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company owns or controls and that is characterised by the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk.


Figure 55 Main reasons among companies for their perceived lack of effectiveness of investment protection
(source: Eurobarometer (13) – from left to right, light colours: 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2024)



3 Other indicators relevant for the single market

3.1. Independent authorities relevant for the functioning of the single market

Figure 59 How companies perceive the independence of the first instance public procurement review bodies (*)
(source: Eurobarometer (14) - 2025)




(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very good'; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very bad'.

13 Eurobarometer survey FL541, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question Q3: 'To what extent are you confident that your investments are protected by the law and courts in (your country) if something goes wrong?' For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company owns or controls and that is characterised by the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk.

14 Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the public procurement reviewbody that reviews public procurement cases in terms of its independence? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?', see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys.

Figure 60 How companies perceive the independence of the national competition authorities (*)
(source: Eurobarometer (15) - 2025)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very good'; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is 'very bad'.

- 15 Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the national competition authority that decides in competition matters in terms of its independence? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?'; see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys.