



European  
Commission

# THE 2024 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD

Quantitative data | 2024

Factsheet / 11 June 2024

This document contains a selection of graphs with quantitative data from the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard.




See the complete 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard at: <https://europa.eu/!dBqH4r>

## 3.1. Efficiency of justice systems

### 3.1.1. Developments in caseload


**Figure 2** Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (1))



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases.


1 2022 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat for the Commission: [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard\\_en#documents](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents)

**Figure 3** Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases

**Figure 4** Number of incoming administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. Removal from judicial procedure of some administrative procedures occurred in **RO** in 2018. Methodology changes in **EL**, **SK** and **SE**. In **SE**, migration cases have been included under administrative cases (retroactively applied for 2017).

### 3.1.2. General data on efficiency


#### – Estimated length of proceedings –

**Figure 5** Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **LV**: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information system. **PT**: On 1 September 2013, the new Code of civil Procedure entered into force, establishing a new regime for the enforcement action in Portugal. It is based on a new paradigm, which states that the proceedings that are run in court must stand out clearly from those who run out of court. The authorities are still working to implement the mechanism in question. However, so far it has not been possible to adapt the collection of data and thus not possible to provide the necessary data for this figure.

**Figure 6** Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, up to 2016, in **SK**. **IT**: the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases

**Figure 7** Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court instances in 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are available for first and second instance courts in **BE** and **BG**, for second instance courts in **NL**, for second and third instance courts in **AT** or for third instance courts in **DE** and **HR**. There is no third instance court in **DE** and **MT**. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States

**Figure 8** Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. **CY**: in 2018, the number of resolved cases increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative court was set up in 2015


**Figure 9** Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> and, where applicable, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data available for second instance courts in **BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, RO, SI, SK** and **FI**, for third instance courts in **CY, LT, LU, MT** and **PL**. The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in **CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI** and **FI**. There is no third instance court for these types of cases in **HR, LT, LU** and **MT**. The highest Administrative Court is the first and only instance for certain cases in **BE**. Access to third instance courts may be limited in some Member States. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately.


## Clearance rate

**Figure 10** Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in % — values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved than come in, while values below 100% indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK, IE**: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.

**Figure 11** Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. **IE**: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.


**Figure 12** Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022(\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (**IT** in 2012=279.8%); Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. **DK** and **IE** do not record administrative cases separately. In **CY**, the number of resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative court was set up in 2015.


## Pending cases

**Figure 13** Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in **SK**. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.

**Figure 14** Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)



(\*) Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in **CZ** and, until 2016, in **SK**. **IT**: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

**Figure 15** Number of pending administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/per 100 inhabitants)  
(source: CEPEJ study)




(\*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (EL in 2012 = 3.5). Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately.

### 3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law


#### – Competition –

**Figure 16** Competition: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2019 – 2021 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)  
(source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(\*) IE and AT: the scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions. AT: data include cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not based on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used for IT. An empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is low (below five a year) in many Member States. This can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case (e.g. MT were there was only one case).


**Figure 17 Competition: average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities in 2020 - 2022 (\*) (in days)** (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(\*) The results for all three years (2020, 2021 and 2022) have been updated in light of an agreement between all Member States on when do they consider a case to be opened. For this reason, the data in the above figure cannot be compared to the data published in previous EU Justice Scoreboards. **CZ:** The administrative proceedings before the Czech NCA consist of two instances. The second instance represents the review procedure within the authority. After the adoption of the first instance decision, the parties to the proceedings have the right to lodge an appeal to the Chairman of the Czech NCA who then issues the second instance decision. The second instance decision of the Czech NCA's Chairman is the subject to the judicial review. **DK:** In 2021, there was a change in the Danish competition regime caused by the transposition of the ECN+ Directive. As part of this, there was a change in the fining system where fines changed from criminal to civil. Consequently, handling of court cases changed from being handled by the public prosecutor to being handled by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) which now brings the cases to the civil courts with a claim for a fine after the DCCA has made a decision on substance, i.e. that the undertaking has infringed the competition rules. As part of the introduction of civil fines, the DCCA now has the power to settle cases out of court with a civil fine in cases where the undertaking admits the infringement of the competition rules, there is case law on the level of the fine for comparable infringements, and the infringement as well as the evidence for the infringement is clear. This new power has resulted in an increase of decisions made by the DCCA in 2022. **IT:** In 2022, nine proceedings opened by the Italian Competition Authority (three under Article 101 TFEU and six under Article 102 TFEU) are not taken into account because they closed with undertakings. In 2021, six proceedings opened by the Italian Competition Authority (five under Article 101 TFEU and one under Article 102 TFEU) are not taken into account because they closed with undertakings. Proceedings 1833 - Gare Consip per acquisizione beni e servizi per informatica e telecomunicazioni -, opened by the Italian Competition Authority under Article 101 TFEU, are not taken into account because at the end of the proceedings did not find any breaches of Article 101 TFEU. **CY:** The length of proceedings is attributed to delays caused by recalls and re-examinations of cases and repetitions of procedures in order to comply with applicable administrative law and court decisions. Also, other factors that have contributed to the length of proceedings are the nature and complexity of the cases, the deadline extensions at the requests of the parties and the COVID-19 pandemic. **LV:** For 2020, this particular case was formally opened on 28 December 2018. Whereas only on 16 July 2020, it was recognised that the potential infringement may affect trade between Member States. **AT:** Competition law is enforced in a mixed administrative/judicial system, whereby the (administrative) Federal Competition Authority investigates cases of suspected infringements and, where appropriate, files applications to the (judicial) Cartel Court for decisions on the substance. The length of proceedings under the newly agreed methodology therefore now covers the combined duration of proceedings before the administrative NCA and the judicial NCA. Investigations and proceedings leading to decisions in 2021 and 2022 were impeded and delayed by the effects and limitations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, data include proceedings relating to a large scale cartel in the construction sector. Due to the size of this case proceedings triggered by the same first investigative measure were (and still are being) led and concluded successively, gradually distorting the average length of proceedings. **PT:** Regarding proceedings which have led to several final decisions in different dates (e.g. staggered decisions for different undertakings in the same case, either all settlement decisions or a combination of decisions involving the settlement and "normal" procedure), the NCA reports each decision (and respective duration) separately. This approach follows the instructions of the questionnaire, which requests the number of final decisions, and takes into account the efficiency gains achieved in the proceedings which involve settlement procedures. **SK:** There is a two-instance administrative procedure for competition law matters. The duration of proceedings was calculated from the first investigative measure until the final administrative decision of the second instance.

– Electronic communications –


**Figure 18 Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2019 – 2021 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)** (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee)



(\*) The number of cases varies from one Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no cases for the year (except **PT** for 2020, and **RO** no data). In some instances, the limited number of relevant cases (**BG, CY, MT, NL, SK, FI, SE**) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and result in wide variations from one year to the next. **DK:** quasi-judicial body in charge of 1<sup>st</sup> instance appeals. **EE:** The average length of judicial review cases in 2013 was 18 days. **ES, AT, and PL:** different courts in charge depending on the subject matter.


– EU trademark –

**Figure 19 EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/ in days)** (source: European Commission with the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights)




(\*) **FR, IT, LT, LU**: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. **DK**: data from all trademark cases (not only EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no data on average length due to changes in data collection system. **EL**: data based on weighted average length from two courts. **ES**: cases concerning other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length.

**Figure 20 Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)** (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network)



(\*) **DE, LU, AT**: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2020 is low (fewer than five) in **IE** and **FI**. An estimate of average length was provided by **EL** and **RO** for certain years.


**Figure 21 Consumer protection: average length of administrative decisions by consumer protection authorities in 2014, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)** (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network)



(\*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years.

## - Money laundering –


**Figure 22 Money laundering: average length of court cases in 2014, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)** (source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)



(\*) No data for 2022: BG, DE, IE and PL. For PT: the database was filtered, for each and every judicial county, by the relevant criteria to reach the information related to money laundering files; regarding the average number of days, the dates of infraction and the date of final decision or closure were considered. CY: Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average tried within a year. Less serious offences, before the District Courts, take longer to be tried. SK: data correspond to average length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court.

– Anti-corruption –

**Figure 23 Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases in 2021 and 2022 (\*) (1<sup>st</sup> instance/in days)** (source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption)




(\*) No reply to this question from **DE, IE, ES, IT, CY, MT, PL, SK** and **SE, NL**: In this calculation, the period starts to run at the date the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) summoned the defendant to appear in court: the period ends on the day when the judge of first instance delivers the final verdict. The average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, account must be taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, it takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average length from first hearing until delivery of the final verdict is 194 days.

3.2.1. Accessibility

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –


**Figure 24 Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2023 (\*)** (differences in % from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) <sup>(2)</sup>)



(\*) Calculations are based on 2022 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. **BE, DE, ES, FR, HR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, SI, SK, FI**: legal aid has to also take into account the applicant's disposable assets. **EL**: Beneficiary of legal aid is a person whose capital annual income does not exceed the 2/3 of the lowest annual salaries as provided by the existing legislation. **LU**: A partial legal aid regime was introduced. There is no specific threshold, the granting of the legal aid depends on the overall financial and family situation of the applicant. **HR**: no data provided.

2 The 2023 data are collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State). Given that conditions for legal aid depend on the applicant's situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old employed applicant without any dependant or legal expenses insurance, with a regular income and a rented apartment.


**Figure 25 Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2023 (\*)** (amount of court fee as a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (3))



(\*) Calculations are based on 2022 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. 'Low value claim' is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2022, this value ranged from EUR 269 in BG to EUR 2266 in LU). BE: 24€ contribution to the Fund for the second line legal aid; Court registry fees: 50€ or 165€ Afterwards, if dismissed/convicted: possibly 1350 € for the procedural indemnity. NL: Court fees values correspond to a litigant with less than EUR 30 000 annual income. SE: The court fee is valid if value of claim exceeds € 2329

– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods –

**Figure 26 Rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific criminal case, 2023 (\*)** (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (4))




(\*) The data is gathered based on a specific case study. The amounts are all in EUR, and where needed they were converted from national currencies. To take account of the economic differences between Member States the added value of the fee and expense were divided by the comparative price level indices expressed in percentage where the EU average is 100%, DK is 149% and BG is 59%. This adjusts the sum of fee and expenses that the lawyers receive. AT: The Austrian legal aid system is state funded and based on the solidarity of all Austrian lawyers who all participate on a rotation based system in the legal aid system. In general, the single individual lawyer does not receive any direct remuneration for legal aid services. Instead, the Austrian state pays a yearly lump sum to the Austrian Bar for the total of legal aid services rendered by all lawyers. The Austrian Bar distributes this sum to the regional Bars on the basis of the number of registered lawyers who provided legal aid services and on the basis of the number of legal aid cases, which were handled by the regional Bars. The money is used for the lawyers' social security and pension scheme which is not state funded.

- The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State).
- The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State).

### 3.2.2. Resources


#### – Financial resources –

**Figure 32** General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*)  
(source: Eurostat)




(\*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2022 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2021-2022 for **EL, ES, FR** and **NL** are provisional. Data for **BE, CY, HU, PT** and **RO** for 2022 are provisional. Data for 2019-2022 for **DE** are provisional. Data for **BG** and **PL** have a break in series in 2022.

**Figure 33** General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*)  
(source: Eurostat)



(\*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2021 (from highest to lowest). Data for other years is provisional for **BE, DE, ES, FR** and **PT**.


**Figure 36 Ratio of annual salaries of judges and prosecutors with annual average gross salary in the country in 2022** (\*) (source: Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)



(\*) Member States specific comments on the data are accessible in the CEPEJ study (5).

– Human resources –


**Figure 37 Number of judges, 2012, 2020 – 2022** (\*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)



(\*) This category consists of judges working full-time, in accordance with the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. **AT**: data on administrative justice have been part of the data since 2016. **EL**: since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and civil justice as well as administrative judges. **IT**: Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018.


5 [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard\\_en#documents](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents)

**Figure 38** Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2021 – 2023 (\*) (source: European Commission (6))



(\*) The data are sorted by 2023 values, from the highest to the lowest

**Figure 39** Number of lawyers, 2012, 2020 – 2022 (\*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)




(\*) In accordance with the CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised by national law to plead and act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of law; to appear before the courts or advise and represent their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). **DE**: no distinction is made between different groups of lawyers in Germany, such as between solicitors or barristers. **FI**: since 2015, the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector.

### 3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection

**Figure 51** How the general public perceives the independence of courts and judges (\*)


(source: Eurobarometer (\*)



(\*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.


(\*) Eurobarometer survey FL540, conducted between 14 and 27 February 2024. Replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?', see: [https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/screen/home](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys; FL519 (2023), FL503 (2022), FL435 (2016), also available at: <a href=).

**Figure 52** Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence (share of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (7))




7 Eurobarometer survey FL540, replies to the question: 'Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?' if reply to Q1 is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'.

**Figure 54** Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer <sup>(8)</sup>)




**Figure 55** How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts <sup>(\*)</sup> (source: Eurobarometer <sup>(9)</sup>)



<sup>(\*)</sup> Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident).

- 8 Eurobarometer survey FL541; replies to the question: 'Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (your country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?' if the response to Q1 was 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'.
- 9 Eurobarometer survey FL541, conducted between 14 February and 5 March 2024, replies to the question Q3: 'To what extent are you confident that your investments are protected by the law and courts in (your country) if something goes wrong?' For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company owns or controls and that is characterised by the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk.

**Figure 56** Main reasons among companies for their perceived lack of effectiveness of investment protection (rate of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer <sup>(10)</sup>)



(\* Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident).

10 Eurobarometer survey FLS41; replies to the question: ‘What are your main reasons for concern about the effectiveness of investment protection?’ if the response to Q3 was ‘fairly unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’.

