

THE 2025 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD

Factsheet / July 2025

This document contains a selection of graphs with quantitative data from the *2025 EU Justice Scoreboard*.




See the complete *2025 EU Justice Scoreboard* at: <https://europa.eu/lvcC6HD>

EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE SYSTEMS

In 2023 civil and commercial cases were **resolved within less than 1 year in most Member States** and the length of proceedings **decreased in 4 Member States** (compared to 2022).


Figure 5 Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in **EL** and **SK**. Pending cases include all instances in **CZ** and, up to 2016, in **SK**. For **IT**, the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. Data for **NL** include non-litigious cases.

In **8 Member States**, the average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities decreased with 100 or more days.


Figure 16 Competition: average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities in 2021-2023 (*) (in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(*) In the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities has been calculated as follows: the number of days between the first formal investigative measure and the adoption of a final decision by the national competition authority (by the administrative authority or, in Member States with a judicial system, by the court that has the power to adopt a prohibition decision and/or impose or confirm fines). For this reason, the data since the 2024 edition in the above figure cannot be compared to the data published in earlier editions. This calculation method allows for comparable data at EU level for the sole purpose of the EU Justice Scoreboard and may differ from the reporting at national level in certain Member States. **CZ** and **SK** have a two-instances administrative procedure. When appealed, first instances decisions are reviewed by the second instance body of the authority, which may prolong proceedings. **DK**: In 2021, following the transposition of the ECN+ Directive, Denmark moved from a purely criminal enforcement system to a system where the Danish competition authority can now directly apply for the imposition of a fine before a civil court and adopt settlement decisions in its own administrative proceedings. This led to an increase of decisions since 2022. For **AT**, **DK** and **FI**, the length of proceedings covers the combined duration of proceedings before the administrative and judicial national competition authorities. **AT**: data include proceedings relating to a large scale cartel in the construction sector. Due to the size of this case, proceedings triggered by the same first investigative measure were (and still are being) led and concluded successively, gradually distorting the average length of proceedings. **ES** and **IT**: data excludes commitment decisions adopted by the national competition authority. **IE**: Not applicable for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as the CCPC did not have the power to make its own binding administrative decisions in antitrust cases until September 2023 (prior to that date, it could only take enforcement action in such cases through the courts).

In **7 Member States** bribery cases in criminal courts are resolved within **less than 1 year**.

Figure 22 Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases from 2021 to 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption)




(*) No reply to this question from **DE**, **IE**, **ES**, **IT**, **CY**, **MT**, **PL**, **SK** and **SE**. NL: In this calculation for 2022, the period starts to run from the date the public prosecution service summons the defendant to appear in court; the period ends on the day when the judge of first instance delivers the final verdict. The average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, account must be taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, it takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average length from first hearing until delivery of the final verdict is 194 days.

QUALITY OF JUSTICE SYSTEMS

26 Member States have measures in place to protect the rights and interest of victims of violence against women and domestic violence, and **25 Member States** to ensure that contact between victims and perpetrators is avoided where necessary.


Figure 32 Legal remedies for victims of violence against women/domestic violence, 2024

(source: European Commission (1))



All Member States have now the possibility to initiate proceedings or to file a claim online in some or all cases.


Figure 45 Digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases, 2024 (source: European Commission (2))



(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial and administrative cases, respectively. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points has been given for both areas.

In **19 Member States** there is at least one mechanism in place to ensure the implementation of administrative court judgments.


Figure 49 Judicial mechanisms in place to ensure the implementation of administrative court judgments, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission with the ACA-Europe (3))



Perceived independence and effectiveness of investment protection

In **21 Member States**; compared to last year, the public’s perception of judicial independence has improved or remained stable.

Figure 50 How the general public perceives the independence of courts and judges (*) (source: Eurobarometer (4) – from left to right, light colours: 2016, 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2025)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of 'total good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good' then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very bad'.


(3) The 2024 data are collected through replies by ACA-Europe members to a questionnaire.

(4) Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025. Replies to the question: 'From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?'; see: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#surveys.

Other indicators relevant for the single market

In **11 Member States**, the first instance public procurement review body is a regular court, while in 11 other Member States, the executive plays a role in the appointment and dismissal of the body

Figure 61 First instance public procurement review bodies: appointment and dismissal (source: European Commission with the Network of First Instance Review Bodies on Public Procurement)




(*) The chart refers to the appointment and dismissal procedures of the following bodies: **BG**: After a public procedure, each political party represented in Parliament proposes its own candidates for members and the chairperson of the Commission for Protection of Competition, and then Parliament starts to elect them with a certain quorum. According to the Law on protection of competition, the powers of the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members shall be terminated by Parliament prior to expiry of their term of office for specific reasons stated in the law. **CZ**: The chart reflects the situation for the Vice-Chairperson for Public Procurement. The public procurement review body consists of two instances. The first-instance decisions are signed by the Vice-Chairperson for Public Procurement and can be reviewed by the second instance represented by the Chairperson of the Office for the Protection of Competition (OPC). The Vice-Chairperson for Public Procurement is appointed and dismissed by the Chairperson of the OPC. The Chairperson is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic on proposal of the Government. **DK**: The chart reflects the situation of the members of the presidency (10 judges) including the head of the review body, and the 20 experts. All members are appointed by the Minister of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. Members of the presidency are proposed by the president of the court under which the judges reside. The proposal from the president of the court is always followed. Experts are proposed partially by ministries and other government bodies, partially by certain associations and organisations mentioned in the law. The members and the head of the Complaints Board can be dismissed by the Danish Minister of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. The minister does not need a proposal in order to dismiss a member or the head of the Complaints Board. **DE**: The chart reflects the situation of the members of the appointing and the dismissal of the members of Public Procurement Tribunals (a specialized department of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) at the federal level and Vergabekammern – Public Procurement Tribunals at the State level). The authority responsible for the appointment of the head of the first instance review body is the administrative authority the body belongs to (deviating rules on the states level possible). The members of the Tribunal are appointed for a term of office of five years by law. They take their decisions independently and are bound only by the law. See Section 157 (4) GWB (German Competition Act). There is no specific regulation about a dismissal in German procurement law. Only general civil service regulations ("Beamtenecht") are likely to give rise to the possibility of dismissal from civil service by the head of the administrative body the Public Procurement Tribunal belongs to in exceptional cases, for example in the event of serious misconduct or long-term illness. However, the head of the administrative body may displace members into another position as an organisational decision. **EE**: The chart reflects the situation of the head and of the members of the Public Procurement Review Committee. Ministry of Finance proposes and the government appoints/dismisses. **EL**: The chart reflects the situation of the members of the panel of the Hellenic Single Public Procurement Authority. The selection of candidates for the positions of Members is carried out after an open procedure by the Supreme Personnel Selection Council (ASEP, independent administrative authority), in accordance with the procedure of L. 4765/2021 (A`6). The members are appointed by a Decision of the Minister of Justice. The disciplinary procedure for the members of the Authority is initiated by the Minister of Justice, following a recommendation by the President of the Authority. A Disciplinary Council is established, which consists of a Vice President of the Council of State, a Vice President of the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) and a Vice President of the Court of Audit. The head of the first instance review body (President) is proposed by the Minister of Justice and is appointed by an act of the Council of Ministers issued following the opinion of the Parliament's Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency. For dismissal, the disciplinary procedure for the members of the Authority is initiated by the Minister of Justice, following a recommendation by the President of the Authority. A Disciplinary Council is established, which consists of a Vice President of the Council of State, a Vice President of the Supreme Court and a Vice President of the Court of Audit. **ES**: There is a joint proposal from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice to the Government (Council of ministers), which appoints. There is no dismissal, as the head of TACRC is appointed for a term of six years. Nevertheless, law establishes a list of reasons that put an end to this term of office. **CY**: The chart reflects the situation for the head and members of the Tenders Review Authority. For appointment, the proposing authority is the Ministry of Finance and the appointing authority is the Council of Ministers. For dismissal, the Council of Ministers is the proposing and dismissing authority. **LV**: Procurement Monitoring Bureau (PMB) is a state institution of direct administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The decisions within the review procedures are made by the complaint examination commission consisting of three members and specially established within the PMB for each case. Commissions are established by order of the head of the PMB. Members of the commission are civil servants/public officials (including the head of PMB). A commission for the assessment of candidates established by the head of the PMB proposes a candidate to the position. The members are appointed to the position by the head of the PMB. The members are dismissed by a decision of the head of the PMB. **HU**: The chart reflects the situation of the chairperson and the vice-chairperson of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board. The Council operating within the Public Procurement Authority appoints and/or discharges the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board. The Public Procurement Authority is a central budgetary organ operating as an autonomous state administration organ subordinated to Parliament. The members of the Council are set out in Section 183 (b) of the Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement. **PL**: The head of the first instance review body, National Appeal Chamber (NAC), the President of the NAC is appointed and dismissed, at the request of the President of the Public Procurement Office, by the Minister responsible for the economy for a term of three years. **RO**: The head of the first instance review body, National Council for Solving Complaints, is elected/dismissed by the Plenum within Council's members. **SI**: The chart reflects the situation for both the members of the panel and the

head of the National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures (NRC). For appointment, Judicial Council Commission for the Assessment of the Suitability of Candidates interviews the candidates and issues a reasoned opinion on the fulfilment of the special conditions referred to in Article 61.b of ZVPVJN and the suitability of the candidates. The Commission of Parliament responsible for mandates and elections by a process of voting chooses among the candidates who meet all the conditions and the President of the NRC is then appointed by Parliament. For dismissal, the Commission of Parliament responsible for mandates and elections sends a proposal for dismissal to the Commission and then the President is dismissed by Parliament. **SK**: The chart reflects the situation of the Vice-Chairperson of the first instance public procurement review body, Public Procurement Office (PPO). Review of public procurement is carried out by the Review Section of the PPO, which is headed by the Vice-Chairman, who is proposed by the head of the governmental office and appointed by the government. The second vice-chairperson of PPO, the Vice-Chairperson for the strategic agenda is dismissed by the government on the proposal of the head of the governmental office. **HR**: The chart reflects the situation for both the members of the panel and the head of the first instance public procurement review body, State Commission for Supervision of Public Procurement Procedures. The Government proposes, Parliament appoints and dismisses.

In **10 Member States**, the appointment and dismissal are entirely under the responsibility of the executive. In **2 Member States**, the courts play a role in the dismissal of the National Competition Authority. In **8 Member States**, the Parliament plays a role either in the appointment, or in the dismissal of the National Competition Authority. In **2 Member States**, the courts play a role in the dismissal of the National Competition Authority.

Figure 62 National competition authorities: appointment and dismissal (*) (source: European Commission with the Network of National Competition Authorities)



(*) **BE**: The Minister for the Economy proposes and appoints. The minister appoints a selection committee for the members. The Minister for the Economy proposes the dismissal, the Head of State (King) dismisses. **CZ**: The Chart reflects the situation of the Chairperson of the Office. The Government proposes the Chairperson of the Office, the President of the Republic appoints. The Government proposes the dismissal, the President of the Republic dismisses. The Chairperson of the Office is represented by 3 Vice-Chairpersons, which are appointed and dismissed by the Chairperson of the Office on her/his own proposal. **DK**: The Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs proposes, the Government appoints. There is no authority, which proposes a dismissal. The Government dismisses. **DE**: The decision-making bodies of the Bundeskartellamt are the decision divisions. The decisions of the decision divisions are taken by the division members (the Chairperson and two associate members). They are civil servants appointed for life and must be qualified to serve as judges or senior civil servants. It is the Authority that proposes case handlers to become a division member, they are appointed by Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. There is no explicit provision for a member of a decision division to be removed from its function. A dismissal, ordered by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, is only possible under general civil service regulations. The Authority may transfer division members from the division to any other department within the Authority. **IE**: The Public Appointments Service proposes, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment appoints the chairperson and the two to four commissions. The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment dismisses the chairperson and the two to four commissioners. **EE**: The Director General of the Estonian Competition Authority is appointed to and released from office by the Minister of Justice on the proposal of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice. **EL**: The Board of the Hellenic Competition Commission, the decision-making body of the Authority, consists of ten members, including a President, a Vice-President, six Rapporteurs and two regular members, with their alternates. The President and the Vice-President of the Commission are selected, following a proposal of the Minister of Development, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, issued following the consent of the parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Transparency. The selection of the Rapporteurs and the two regular and alternate members of the Commission is made by the Minister of Development,

following the consent of the parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Transparency, on the basis of a list of candidates, drawn up by the Selection Committee, following an open competition, which includes submission of a personal dossier and an interview. The regular and alternate members of the Competition Commission, as well as the Rapporteurs are appointed by decision of the Minister of Development and Investments, which is published in the Government Gazette. The five-member Selection Committee consists of: a) the President or Vice-President of the Council of State or the President or Vice-President of the State Legal Counsel, as Chair, b) the President or Vice-President of the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP), c) a former President or Vice-President of the Competition Commission, appointed by lot, d) a TSS HEI member specialised in competition law, nominated by the Minister of Development, and e) a TSS HEI member specialised in competition economics, nominated by the Minister of Development. Disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Council shall be initiated by the Council of Ministers, following a proposal of the Minister of Development and Investments, with regard to the President and its members. The Disciplinary Council consists of two (2) State Counselors, one (1) Supreme Court judge and two (2) university professors, active or emeritus, specialised in competition law, in commercial, criminal or public law or economics, and their term of office shall be five years. **ES**: The Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness proposes the 10 Board members of the CNMC, including its President and Vice-President, the Government appoints them. Parliament may veto the appointment of the proposed candidates by absolute majority (50% +1). The Government proposes the dismissal and dismisses the Board members. **FR**: The President of the Republic appoints all four Vice-Presidents of the Board (permanent members) as well as the 12 non-permanent members and the 2 specialist members who sit when the NCA rules on matters pertaining to regulated legal professions. The NCA Board proposes the dismissal, the President of the Republic dismisses the member of the Board. **HR**: The Government proposes, Parliament appoints the members of the NCA. The Government proposes the dismissal, Parliament dismisses the members of the NCA. **IT**: The Presidents of the House and Senate appoint the chairman and members of the Authority's Board. The Presidents of Parliament take the final decision on dismissal, once judge's decision to apply the accessory penalty of disqualification from public office is final. **CY**: The Minister of Energy, Commerce and Industry proposes, the Government (Council of Ministers) appoints. The Government (Council of Ministers) proposes a dismissal and dismisses. **LV**:

The Ministry of Economics proposes the chairperson of the Competition Council and four council members, the Cabinet of Ministers appoints them. The Ministry of Economic proposes their dismissal, a committee established by the Cabinet of Ministers dismisses. **LT:** The Prime Minister proposes the members in the decision-making body of the Lithuanian Competition Council, the President appoints. The Prime Minister proposes the dismissal of the members in the decision-making body of the Lithuanian Competition Council, the President dismisses. **LU:** There is a public call for application, the President of the Competition Authority appoints. The Government proposes the dismissal, the Head of State (Grand- Duke) dismisses. **HU:** The President of the Hungarian Competition Authority proposes, the President of Hungary appoints the members of the Competition Council, which acts like a separated decision-making forum within the Hungarian Competition Authority. The President of the Hungarian Competition Authority proposes a dismissal, the President of Hungary dismisses the members of the Competition Council. **MT:** There is a public call for application. The Board of Governors of the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority appoints the Director General of the Office for Competition (the national administrative competition authority) by following consultation with the Minister responsible for competition matters. The Board of Governors of the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority dismisses the Director General. **NL:** A selection Commission, which consists of an NCA (ACM) board member, the director of the policy directorate responsible for NCA at the Ministry, an NCA director, on request an "outsider", and a consultant of the Dutch Senior Civil Service (ABD), proposes the chair and the other two board members of the NCA to the Minister of Economic Affairs, who then proposes them further. The Council of Minister appoints them. The Ministry of Economic Affairs proposes the dismissal and dismisses the members. **AT:** The Government proposes the Director-General of the Federal Competition Authority, the President appoints. The Government proposes the dismissal of the Director-General of the Federal Competition Authority, the President dismisses. **PL:** The Prime Minister proposes and appoints the members of the NCA. The Prime Minister proposes the dismissal and dismisses the members of the NCA. **PT:** The Ministry of Economy proposes the members of the decision-making body of the NCA, Parliament gives a reasoned opinion, the Government appoints them. Parliament or the Council of Ministers propose a dismissal, the Council of Ministers dismisses. **RO:** There is an open call for application for the 9 members of the Plenum of the Competition Council. The Standing Bureaus of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and the Legal and Economic Committees of the Chambers propose the candidates, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate elect and appoint the members. The dismissal of the members takes place de iure, when the Supreme Court decides upon an infringement. **SI:** The Government and the Ministry of Economy propose the members of the national competition authority, Parliament elects them. The Government proposes the dismissal, Parliament dismisses them. **SK:** The decision-making of the Antimonopoly Office consists of two instances, the Office and the Council of the Antimonopoly Office. In the first instance, the decision is adopted by respective department of the Office. In the second instance, the Council of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR (the "Council") decides on appeals and reviews the Office 's decisions. The chart reflects the situation of the Council of the Antimonopoly Board. The Chairperson of the Office proposes the members of the Council of the Antimonopoly Office, which consists of the Chairperson of the Office himself and six members of the Council. The Government appoints them. The Chairperson of the Office proposes the dismissal, the Government dismisses. Chairman of the Council is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic. **FI:** The Ministry of the Economic Affairs and Employment proposes the Director-General as well as the Head of Competition Division of the Competition and Consumer Authority, the Government appoints them. The Government dismisses the Directors. **SE:** The Government proposes and appoints the Director-General of the NCA. The Government proposes his dismissal, the Government Disciplinary Board for Higher Officials dismisses the Director-General.