

# Discussion of 'Some elements of a revamped fiscal framework for Spain' by Carlos Cuerpo Caballero and Lucia Rodriguez\*

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László Jankovics

Fiscal Governance Unit

European Commission – DG Economic and Financial Affairs

\*The views expressed are solely those of the discussant, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Commission.

### Scope of my discussion

- Remarks on the direction and context of the reform proposal
- What can be learnt from existing domestic numerical fiscal rules in the EU?
- What can be learnt from existing IFI experiences for the reinforced role of AIReF in fiscal decisionmaking?



### Context of the reform proposal

- An operational expenditure rule anchored to debt seems to be the emerging consensus, also for a possible reform of the EU SGP framework (IMF, Bruegel, EFB + it is actually also the path taken at the EU level)
- Transition from the current regime to the new one
- Kopits-Symanski's eight criteria for the assessment of rules: the paper self-evaluates itself along four dimensions, but the other four are also important (in particular, enforceability and consistency between national and European rules)




## Domestic debt rules in the EU (without subnational rules)

- Countries which essentially replicated the SGP debt rules (often coupled with the debt reduction benchmarks):
  Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Spain (with specific limits for subsectors)
- Countries where the debt rule links numerical thresholds of debt-to-GDP ratios to automatic budgetary steps in a graduated manner: Poland, Slovakia
- Unique debt rules: Sweden: a debt anchor defined at 35% of GDP; Hungary: a debt ceiling set at 50% of GDP; UK: the mandate for fiscal policy is defined over a multiannual horizon ("a target for public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling in 2020-21");



## Domestic expenditure rules in the EU (without subnational rules)



Source: DG ECFIN Fiscal Governance Database



#### AIReF's role in the reform set-up

- In many aspects, AIReF's proposed role would be a pioneering one in Europe (en route from a watchdog to an independent fiscal agency?)
  - Preparing DSA or long-term sustainability analysis this is done by an increasing number of IFIs (but without formal role)
  - Provision of the medium-term no-policy-change baseline scenario – building a credible NPC scenario is a difficult exercise, involving many judgement calls
  - Determination of next year's fiscal effort by providing the permissible increase in net expenditure growth
  - Scoring of discretionary revenue measures
  - Ex post assessments on rule compliance this is where the most experience are available (and the current Spanish framework needs reinforcement)



## Thank you for your attention!